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The Economics of Teacher Occupational Choice in China 
Ji Liu 
Teachers are central to improving education quality and student learning. Yet, it is common 
that education systems short-pay teachers. Linking the occupational choice literature, this 
dissertation raises concern regarding potentially large adverse effects of holding teacher 
wages back from broader market levels, in terms of declining teacher aptitude and reduced 
student learning. Using a four-part analysis, I examine and contextualize theoretical 
stipulations using the case of Chinese teachers. Firstly, in Part I, I establish the causal link 
between teachers’ human capital level and student learning outcomes, by employing 
student fixed-effect models to relate differences in teachers across subjects to variations in 
student test scores. I find statistically significant impacts of teachers holding advanced 
tertiary degrees on improving student learning, at 0.033 standard deviations or adding 
about 1 additional month of learning over a typical 9-month academic year. Secondly, in 
Part II, I document relative pay gaps between teachers and comparable workers using 
Mincer earnings function. Between 1988 and 2013, I find sharp shifts in the relative wage 
attractiveness in the teaching sector, such that teachers’ mean wage levels experienced 24 
percentage-points reversal, at 11 percent below the private sector levels in 2013. Also, 
returns to holding advanced tertiary degrees in teaching is about 11 to 15 percent less than 
that of the private sector in years 2007, 2008, and 2013, while this difference was 
statistically indistinguishable in the pre-2007 period. Thirdly, in Part III, I estimate the 
probability of entry to teaching by different human capital traits, and find declining trends 
for more educated individuals overall. In 2007 and 2013, new labor market entrants with 
 
advanced tertiary degrees are 4.7 and 5.8 percentage-points less likely than comparable 
workers in older cohorts to choose teaching. Similar patterns continue to hold when I use 
alternative human capital and skills proxies. Fourthly, in Part IV, using a national 
representative panel dataset containing 211 matched teachers, I track career destinations 
and relate it to opportunity wages and non-pecuniary outcomes. In general, I find that 
teacher turnover rates are high at about 35 percent, half of which are exits from the 
education sector entirely; there also exist positive associations between opportunity wage 
levels and turnover decisions, but there is no evidence of non-pecuniary gains from 
turnovers. 
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1.1 Problem and Statement of Purpose 
Education quality is a frequent topic of discussion among parents, educators, and policy 
makers, and there is a growing consensus that the quality of teachers holds central weight 
to making substantive progress in improving education. Notably, teacher quality is often 
cited as the single most important school factor affecting student learning and achievement 
(Glazerman, Loeb, Goldhaber, Staiger, Raudenbush, & Whitehurst, 2010; Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 2012), with lasting impacts for students well into adulthood (Chetty, Friedman, & 
Rockoff, 2014). To this end, scholars and policy makers tend to focus on three commonly 
perceived approaches to improving teacher quality: attracting the best and brightest 
individuals, incentivizing teachers to better their performance, and offering professional 
development opportunities for continued improvement (Jackson, 2012). While each of 
these broad typologies of intervention is critical in its own regard and undeniably 
intertwined in many ways, recruitment and retention of talented teachers emerges as the 
cardinal gateway in realizing overall teacher quality improvement. In fact, it has been 
widely recognized as one of the most important factors in ensuring equitable and quality 
education for all students (Moore, Destefano, Terway, & Balwanz, 2008; UNICEF, 2011). 
 
Nonetheless, a broad range of studies has indicated that education systems persistently fail 
to attract the brightest and most productive individuals to become teachers, putting the 
improvement of education quality in jeopardy. For one, earlier studies conducted by Vance 
2 
 
and Schlecty (1982), Weaver (1983), Hanushek and Pace (1995), Ballou and Podgursky 
(1997) documented that the average teacher's math and verbal aptitude, as measured by 
college entrance test scores, has been on a steady decline. Likewise, more recent clusters 
of research continue to confirm these observations; for instance, Corcoran, Evans, and 
Schwab (2004), Lakdawalla (2006), Bacolod (2007), and Richey (2014) all present similar 
evidence on the falling aptitude of teachers in the U.S. context. In the same vein, cross-
national comparisons also show that in almost all countries, youth who aspire to become 
teachers are those who perform below the national average on cognitive assessments 
(Bruns & Luque, 2015). Extreme cases even show that in some instances students in upper 
primary grades often outperform their teacher on subject knowledge (UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics, 2006).  
 
While most governments acknowledge the importance of investing in human capital, a 
main logistical constraint facing most countries is ensuring consistency and quality in the 
supply of teaching staffs (World Bank, 2006). In this regard, how well teachers are 
remunerated for their time and dedication to improve student learning to a large extent 
determines the attractiveness of the profession, and whether talented individuals are 
reasonably expected to pursue it. Existing research in the United States and beyond has 
demonstrated that relative shifts in salary structures substantially influence teaching force 
quality through individual occupational choice decisions (see Figlio, 1997; Bacolod, 2007; 
Nagler, Popiunik, & West, 2015). Yet, little is known about this relationship in emerging 
economies, especially in the case of China, where contextual factors such as wage growth 
and sectoral income inequality are much more pronounced than in high-income countries.  
3 
 
1.2 Teacher Quality: Taking a Systemic View 
The importance of teachers for students, schools, and education systems cannot be 
emphasized enough. Rigorous research in the United States have shown that students can 
learn as much as three times more with a high quality teacher as opposed to studying with 
a less effective teacher in a given school year (Rockoff, 2004). To add, this relationship 
has been shown to be even more evident in low- and middle-income countries (Bau & Das, 
2017). To further substantiate the magnitude of the impact of teachers, Rivkin, Hanushek, 
and Kain (2005) and Jackson (2010) show that exposure to better teachers are categorically 
more influential than attending a better performing school, and matters more for student 
learning achievement. In addition, there are also potentially large spillover effects from 
having better teachers, such that more effective teachers not only improve the learning 
outcomes of her students, but are also shown to advance the learning of her colleague’s 
students (Jackson & Bruegmann, 2009). Moreover, recruiting certain underrepresented 
teacher types, such as women in traditionally male-majority STEM subjects, can have 
substantial influence on how students of those underrepresented groups are motivated, 
perceive and engage learning (Eble & Hu, 2018). Yet, given the evidence on the strong 
influence of teachers to student learning, most education systems are facing tremendous 
difficulties in filling teaching posts with candidates who are prepared and ready to teach 
(World Bank, 2017).  
 
To put simply, the world today is facing a global crisis to staff schools with talented, high 
quality and dedicated teachers, and in particular short supply are those with strong 
backgrounds and scholastic aptitudes in both subject and pedagogy knowledge (Schleicher, 
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2012; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). However, 
improving teacher quality is a multi-dimensional issue that requires holistic evaluation at 
the system-level. For instance, many teacher education programs are often poorly funded 
or designed, and result in minimal instructional and career preparation for candidates who 
do decide to pursue teaching (Levine, 2006). To further exacerbate the issue, support 
services are either not in place or mismatched when teachers enter the profession, leaving 
many new teachers to report a lack of instructional and professional support which hinder 
instructional effectiveness (Ingersoll & Smith, 2003; Struyven & Vanthornout, 2014; 
Simon & Johnson, 2015). When all of these factors are compounded, the consequences are 
that many teachers reveal being underpaid, overworked, and at the brink of burnout 
(Ingersoll & May, 2012; Schonfeld, Bianchi, & Luehring-Jones, 2017; Luchei & Jeong, 
2018). All of the above complex and intertwined system-level issues, while beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, can help shed light and lend useful perspective to the multifarious 
challenge impeding the improvement of teacher compensation as an effective means for 
recruiting and retaining talented individuals.  
 
To this end, systemic concerns about teacher recruitment, training, and retention coincide 
with the empirical observation that the size and quality of available teachers has 
substantially declined. In developed economies, there has been a long standing consensus 
that college graduates with strong academic skills and teaching preparedness are less likely 
to enter teaching careers (Vegas, Murnane, & Willett, 2001). In response, studies have 
drawn the link between career attractiveness with competitive salary and desirable working 
conditions. For instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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(2016) has shown that primary school teachers are on average paid 81 cents to the dollar 
compared to a typical tertiary-educated worker, while secondary school teachers receive 
between 85 to 90 percent of the same benchmark. In many parts of the developing world, 
similar chronic issues with low compensation and poor working conditions continue to 
plague the teaching profession. As case in point, in post-socialist regions in Central Asia, 
teacher salaries are not only low, but trails well behind the national average wage, ranging 
from 53 to 92 percent of what individuals with comparable educational attainment can 
expect to earn (Steiner-Khamsi, 2007; Steiner-Khamsi, 2012). To add, teachers are often 
burdened with heavy teaching loads and unpredictable take-home pay due to outdated 
salary structure arrangements that set base salaries arbitrarily low, and over-reliance on a 
“broken system” of salary supplements which were often not paid in full (Steiner-Khamsi, 
2016a, p.17). These findings not only raise concerns regarding how to best attract well 
prepared teachers, but more importantly pose policy-relevant queries in relation to 
addressing broader educational inequity as teacher recruitment and retention challenges are 
often the hardest to tackle in underserved, underfunded, and marginalized communities. 
 
While raising teacher salary is necessary and effective in improving teacher retention 
(Hendricks, 2014), improving teacher compensation often requires raising large sums of 
capital, both in terms of economic funds as well as political determination. For example, 
in most countries, personnel procurement expenditure represents more than 80 percent of 
national education budgets (Levin, 2010), which leaves little room for all other 
educationally important learning inputs, such as instructional supplies, facility upkeep, 
individualized attention for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and high-quality 
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teacher professional development activities. To further complicate matters, many critics of 
public education have taken issue with teachers, citing low educational performance as a 
key reform justification that aim at weakening teacher unions (Peltzman, 1996; Rose & 
Sonstelie, 2010; Strunk, 2011), removing job securities such as teacher tenure (Rockoff, 
Staiger, Kane, & Taylor 2012), installing stronger accountability monitoring (Goldhaber & 
Hansen, 2008; Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010), and linking up student performance to teacher 
pay (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011; Lavy, 2016).  
 
Given the importance of teachers and noting the complication that improving teacher 
quality involves many moving parts in both policy and praxis, much deeper research is 
needed in shedding light to our understanding of how teacher occupational choice can be 
leveraged in educationally meaningful ways. In this light, it is vital to acknowledge that 
the difficulty in recruiting and retaining good teachers is systemic, but if left unaddressed, 
will inevitably create a development gap that jeopardizes vast efforts to improve education 
attainment and quality worldwide – how can students learn without good teachers in the 
classroom?  
 
1.3 Research Purpose and Questions 
In virtue of the global challenge to staff schools with bright and qualified teachers, this 
dissertation situates itself within the teacher quality literature with broader connections to 
occupational choice theory, and is concerned with understanding how the ability 
distribution of the teaching force shifts over time, what factors contribute to such change, 
and consequences on student learning. The main research objective of this dissertation is 
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to understand how sectoral wage characteristics influence teacher occupational choice, 
labor supply, and evaluate its relevant consequences on student learning. While this 
dissertation focuses on the specific case of China, its analytic context is relevant for all 
developing countries that aspire to better understand teacher composition and quality 
through an occupational choice lens. By drawing on both horizontal and vertical 
comparisons of teacher wages and quality, and engaging in a meaningful investigation on 
a critical topic, I hope to augment the relevance and comparability of teacher occupational 
choice. Throughout the dissertation, I use “occupational choice” to refer to between-sector 
choice, unless otherwise noted. As such, I use “between-sector occupational choice” and 
“occupational choice” interchangeably. Conceptually, between-sector choice is closely in 
line with teacher recruitment and retention literature, whereas within-sector choice centers 
around studies on job match and mobility. In general terms, the between-sector choice 
literature is interested in self-selection effects that attract high ability individuals to a 
particular sector, while within-sector choice is interested in the quality of match effects that 
result in productivity and income gains from improved worker-firm match.  
 
The occupational choice theory literature, galvanized by the seminal work of Andrew D. 
Roy (1951), is interested in how individuals pursue their comparative advantage in the 
labor market. Economic studies have documented extensively on how individuals, in 
choosing to enter one market over another, are affected by differential conditions (see 
Willis and Rosen, 1979; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lazear, 1986; Borjas, 1987). In 
teacher labor markets, differences in the distribution of wage returns between teaching and 
non-teaching jobs are reasonably expected to influence individual career decisions. For 
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instance, suppose that wage structure for teaching jobs remains relatively stagnant, while 
wage dispersion in non-teaching jobs rises substantially. In this case, new workers who 
belong in the high ability group (i.e. motivation, cognitive skills, social skills, academic 
preparation) would have a lower return to high ability in the teaching sector, and thus 
become less incentivized to enter the teaching sector. At the same time, current teachers 
who belong in high ability groups would have increased incentives to leave teaching for 
non-teaching jobs, pursuing higher human capital and skill premium. As a general 
prediction, relative changes in wage structure can influence both labor supply decisions as 
well as the ability sorting patterns between teaching and non-teaching sectors, which have 
serious implications for the overall quality of the teaching force, and thereby subsequently 
affecting education quality and student learning. 
 
In each section of the dissertation, I tackle a thematic set of research questions pertaining 
to teacher occupational choice. To begin, I first motivate this dissertation by relating 
traditional measures of observable teacher characteristics to the amount of contribution 
teachers have on student learning outcomes (Part I). Secondly, I compare teachers to 
comparable workers outside of the education sector, and document adjusted wage profiles 
and compensation gaps over time (Part II). Thirdly, I investigate how teachers compare to 
non-teachers using different measures of human capital (Part III). Finally, I explore the 
incidence of job turnover for teachers and examine its relationship with relative wages in 
comparable careers, as well as its impact on non-pecuniary labor market outcomes (Part 




• RQ#1: What is the relationship between observable characteristics of teacher 
labor quality on student learning outcomes?  
• RQ#2: How large is the teaching wage penalty between workers in teaching and 
non-teaching sectors, after accounting for individual characteristics?  
• RQ#3: How has the relative quality of teachers, compared to similar workers in 
other sectors, evolved in the past decades? 
• RQ#4: What is the incidence of job turnover for teachers in China? What is the 
influence of non-teaching opportunity wage on occupational decision? 
 
Importantly, this dissertation is intended to contribute to the existing literature in several 
ways. First, this dissertation rigorously documents the magnitude of teacher-to-non-teacher 
wage gap in a large developing country, China. Second, I relate the findings on teacher 
wage gap to observations of teacher ability trends, and examines occupational choice 
theory in a teacher labor market context. Third, I employ econometric methods to estimate 
causal impact of observable teacher quality on student learning, and explore consequences 
of relative wage effects on teacher job turnover decisions. Fourth, this dissertation aims to 
expand the scope of scholarly discussion in the field of comparative and international 







2.1 Contextual Background 
In past decades, China has made significant progress in both economic and social 
development. For one, China’s GNI per Capita has risen substantially, and is expected to 
continue to increase at a faster rate than other regional developing countries in East Asia 
and the Pacific Region (World Bank, 2012). For another, as a composite measure of social 
welfare in a country, China's Human Development Index (HDI) rose by 2 percent annually 
from 0.410 to 0.700 between 1980 and 2012, placing China above the regional average of 
0.683. (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). More specifically in the 
education sector, China has achieved near-universal net enrolment for primary education 
at 99.8 percent in 2011 (Ministry of Education, 2011), and continues to expand access to 
secondary and tertiary education throughout the country. In this regard, education has been 
effectively mitigating the multidimensionality of inequality and marginalization in China, 
and serves as one of the most important channels through which core objectives of the 
social welfare systems have been materialized in China (Gao, Yang, Zhang, & Li, 2018). 
However, a remaining concern for the future of education development in China lies in 
improving educational quality and equity, as stated in the country’s guidebook for future 
education polices, National Plan for Medium- and Long-Term Education Reform and 
Development (2010–2020), which identifies ‘shortage of talented and quality teachers’ as 




2.11 The Education System in China 
The schooling system in China is one of the largest in the world, and employs one of the 
largest teacher labor force. The structure of the Chinese education system adopts a “6-3-3” 
organization framework, which provides 6 years of primary education, 3 years of junior 
secondary, and 3 years of senior secondary education. The compulsory education period 
covers the first 9 years in the system and is mandated by law. While the broader population 
continues to experience demographic transition, student enrollments in primary, lower and 
upper secondary schools has reached a combined 175 million students in 2010 (see Table 
2-1 for detailed breakdown by level of instruction). In 2012, approximately 5.6 million 
teachers taught in primary schools, and approximately 3.4 million teachers were employed 
in lower secondary schools, totaling close to 10 million teachers employed in primary and 
lower secondary schools (Ministry of Education, 2014).  
 
In terms of spending, China’s public expenditure on education reached 2.2 trillion yuan 
(about $357 billion) in 2012, accounting for approximately 4 percent of China’s national 
GDP, and was about evenly split in three ways among Primary (28 percent), Lower and 
Upper Secondary (31 percent), and Tertiary (31 percent) Education. Of note, the remaining 
10 percent of the total education budget is accounted by Pre-primary and Vocational 
Education spending (Ministry of Education, 2014). In equity terms, China has some of the 
widest range in regional expenditure per pupil, propelled primarily by the imbalance of 
regional development. Specifically, wealthier coastal regions spend about 16 times more 
per pupil than the less development inland regions. To illustrate, in 2010, the national 
average public expenditure is calculated at 1,097 yuan (about $180) per student per 
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academic year. Among thirty-one provincial administrations, the highest provincial 
spender budgeted 8,559 yuan (about $1403) per student per year, while the lowest reported 
was only 538 yuan (about $88) per academic year (Ministry of Education, 2011). 
 
Table 2-1. Student Enrollment by ISCED Level, 2010 
ISCED  Level Enrollment 
01 Early Childhood NA 
02 Pre-Primary 29,766,000 
1 Primary 99,407,000 
2 Lower Secondary 52,759,000 
3 Upper Secondary 24,273,000 
4 Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary 8,777,000 
5 Tertiary-Non University 9,661,000 
6 University – Bachelor 12,656,000 
7 University – Master 1,279,000 
8 University - Doctoral 259,000 
Source: Author’s compilation with data from National Bureau of Statistics, 2011 
 
 
2.12 Teacher Wages in China 
Although teacher wage conditions in China present a unique and interesting case, 
especially from a development perspective, there only exists a very small handful of 
empirical studies on the topic. In the succeeding paragraphs, I summarize the available 
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related literature. First, average teacher wages have expanded rapidly along with China’s 
economic boom in the recent decades. Between 1990 and 1999, the average primary school 
teacher wage in China increased from 2029 yuan to 7413 yuan, rising more than three folds 
within a decade (Chen, 2003). This average wage increase was observed for all levels of 
education, approximately threefold increase across all levels of instruction. Nevertheless, 
Chen’s (2003) analysis comparing wages of teachers with that of 14 other non-education 
sectors between years 1990-1999 provided a different picture. In fact, Chen’s (2003) 
calculation suggests that wages for teachers consistently ranked in the bottom quintile in 
comparison other sectors across all years, while overall salary growth for teachers was only 
marginally above national inflation rate.  
 
It is important to note that at the sector-average level, implications of slow relative rate of 
increase in teacher salary compared to other sectors hold key importance. At face value, 
similar to trends observed by researchers in the U.S. and other developed countries, lag in 
relative wage growth may lead to decrease in teaching’s relative attractiveness as a career 
option (Hoyle, 2001; Elfers, Plecki, John & Wedel, 2008; Ingersoll & Merrill, 2011). 
However, sector-wide average wage growth masks potential composition effects of 
differential quality between age cohorts. For instance, there may exist a quality-quantity 
tradeoff between newer and older cohorts (see Lakdawalla, 2006; Gilpin and Kaganovich, 
2012). If newer cohorts are rewarded disproportionately more for their skills in non-
teaching professions, newer cohort entrants into teaching are much less likely to be 
qualified than previous cohort teacher entrants, thus, the decline in relative wages will 
upward-bias the actual decline in teacher quality. Notwithstanding, despite these theoretical 
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stipulations, a direct age-cohort comparison of relative teaching versus non-teaching wage 
gap is not available in the existing literature.  
 
Second, the sheer numeric size and geographic spread of the teaching sector can lead to 
significant wage inequality, not only in comparison to non-teaching sectors but also within 
the teaching sector. Geographically imbalanced economic growth is an important driving 
force behind within-sector wage inequality between coastal and inland provinces. 
Correspondingly, an inter-provincial study of teacher salaries in 2005 revealed that among 
all sampled provinces, mean wage was highest in Shanghai at 62,300 yuan per year while 
the lowest provincial mean wage was less than one fifth of Shanghai’s average, found in 
Henan province (An, 2014; Li, 2007). This large geographic variation in wage growth is in 
direct contrast with most existing evidence found in developed countries, where the 
teaching sector is often dominated by across-the-board collective bargaining and 
characterized by low within-sector wage spread, and often coupled with large purchasing 
power differences across different Chinese regions. Large wage growth spread, within the 
teaching sector and across geographic regions, has important implications for this analysis, 
because self-selection may be driven by both conditions across sectors and across locations.  
 
Third, on top of large regional wage differences, even within the same province, wage 
inequality appears noticeably large when comparing urban and rural schools. (An, 2014) 
finds that the average income of rural primary school teachers is approximately 7 to 41 
percent lower than the provincial average. Despite being paid conspicuously less, An (2014) 
finds that rural teachers generally bear greater responsibilities than teachers in metropolitan 
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areas. For instance, in terms of teaching load, 32.2 percent of teachers in cities teach less 
than 14 classes per week, while only about 14.2 percent of rural teachers report similar 
amount of teaching load. Rural teachers are also responsible for 1.31 times the number of 
classes than urban teachers, which are likely due to short-staffing (Xue and Li, 2015). The 
issue of persistent staff shortages also prompt the examination of current conditions of 
teacher supply and quality in China. 
 
2.13 Teacher Quality in China 
Staffing schools with qualified teachers has traditionally been a huge challenge in many 
parts of China, as many schools are chronically short-staffed (Sargent & Hannum, 2005). 
To compound this issue, teacher qualification requirements have been relatively low at the 
system-level. On the demand-side, many primary schools have traditionally only required 
a high school diploma, or shizhuan certificate, in order to be eligible to become a member 
of the teaching staff, whereas most lower and upper secondary schools often set the 
teaching prerequisite to be at least an associate or bachelor’s degree (Ingersoll, 2007).  
 
In order to attract new talented teacher recruits, the Ministry of Education initiated free 
teacher education programs at six of the ministry-affiliated teacher preparation universities 
in different parts of the country. As requirement, selected teacher candidates need to score 
above a designated threshold on the National College Entrance Exam in order to enter these 
free teacher preparation programs, which subsequently require an extended period of 
commitment in teaching careers in return. In more recent years, most new primary and 
secondary teachers in China undertake a four year bachelor’s education, benke, or a two-
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year associate’s diploma education, zhuanke, before they begin teaching in public primary 
or secondary educational institutions. 
 
Policymakers have traditionally used teacher’s educational background to screen teachers 
for prerequisite training, skills, and aptitude. Primary and secondary school teachers are 
generally required to hold at least a vocational college degree as a base requirement to be 
eligible to teach, although ones with college degrees or higher are considered favorably in 
hiring and promotion decisions. Despite relatively low entry qualification requirements, 
the Ministry of Education, together with provincial and municipal educational 
commissions, set guidelines, professional standards, and fund teacher education 
programming initiatives to ensure that a relatively high level of teacher quality.  
 
Once teachers enter the education sector, administrators rely on a system of teacher ranks, 
or zhicheng, and teaching awards to make hiring, assignment, compensation, and 
promotion decisions (Ministry of Education, 1986). Such observational measures are 
designed with the goal of providing objective assessments for instructional quality and 
professional performance that are relatively comparable across different subjects, levels, 
and geographical regions of instruction. Teacher rank, among primary and secondary 
school teachers, consists of four levels in descending prestige: senior rank, level one rank, 
level two rank, level three rank. Teaching awards, an important aspect of consideration for 
promotion,, are bestowed by different levels of education authorities, ranging from 
national-level, provincial-level, municipal-level, district-level, and school-level, often 
through the form of teaching competitions. While increase in rank is and progression of 
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career prestige are obtained sequentially over the entirety of their careers, teacher awards 
are determined and awarded at relatively shorter time intervals. Commonly, new teachers 
enter the profession with no predetermined teacher rank, and must earn their placement in 
entry-level rank.  
 
To be promoted to the next rank, teachers must meet two sets of requirements. First, 
candidates applying for a certain rank must possess the corresponding level of observable 
qualifications such as relevant levels of education, years of teaching experience, and length 
of experience serving as homeroom teacher. Second, potential candidates for rank 
promotion are assessed based on their classroom and professional performance, including 
one’s mastery of pedagogical skills, instructional tools, and classroom management. 
Teachers are routinely evaluated within each school on whether or not they should be 
promoted in rank; such class audit evaluations are conducted by both administrative as well 
as peer teaching staff (Chu, Loyalka, Chu, Qu, Shi & Li, 2015).  
 
Existing studies have shown that teacher rank is correlated with pecuniary incentives and 
advancements on salary schedules, which are commonly set forth by local education 
authorities (Wang & Lewin, 2016). As of 2011, 54 percent of primary school teachers held 
senior primary rank, while the remaining 46 percent of teachers either did not have a rank 
or were ranked at level one, two, or three (Ministry of Education, 2014). Importantly, 
despite teacher rank promotions, teaching award prestige, and salary advancements, studies 
have shown that many teachers report the lack of career outlets and clear promotion routes 
as persistent factors influencing their decision to pursue other professional paths (Adams, 
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2012), which elicits serious complications in teacher recruitment and retention. 
Importantly, existing literature assessing teacher quality shifts in China is particularly 
limited, especially at the micro-analytic level. This may be in part due to the scarcity of 
data on direct teacher quality or aptitude measures at the individual-level. Most of the 
existing studies draw on national or regional aggregate numbers provided by the Ministry 
of Education's yearly statistical yearbooks. Using aggregate data to draw inferences on 
individual occupational choice is faced with the obvious ecological fallacy problem. 
Nonetheless, attempts to extend the discussion using individual-level micro data are 
extremely scarce.  
 
Noting these limitations, surveying the current state of knowledge provide important 
implications and entry points for further research on this topic. First and foremost, 
composite measures of teacher quality are correlated with average regional income at the 
provincial-level. Yang, Wang, Yan, and Shan (2013) provides an attempt to evaluate 
aggregate-level changes in teacher quality over time. Using data from 31 provinces, Yang 
et al. (2013) generated a composite index based on five key indicators: student-teacher ratio, 
classroom-teacher ratio, teachers' education attainment, teachers' rank, and average income. 
Their study suggests that provinces with higher levels of economic growth are also placed 
relatively higher on the composite index. Nationally, the average full-time teacher share in 
primary schools was 85.41 percent, closely in line with the 91 percent cutoff required by 
the Ministry of Education (Yang, Wang, Yan, & Shan, 2013). Part-time contractual teachers, 
or daike laoshi, consisted of 3.45 percent of the entire teacher population in 2010, down 
from 3.65 percent in 2009 (Ministry of Education, 2010). For decades, daike laoshi, or 
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uncertified and temporary contract teachers, have been recruited to fill rural school 
vacancies, and often remain in their posts for extended durations due to lack of available 
replacements.  
 
Second, several studies have explored teacher quality through more direct measures. For 
instance, Xue and Li (2015) measured teacher quality in terms of level of education. Their 
study indicated that while improvements have been significant nationally, the gap between 
urban and rural schools continued to exacerbate. The average educational attainment gap 
between rural and urban school teachers in 2004 was 1.36 years at the national average 
level, and in 2013, this same measure increased to 2.04 years (Xue & Li, 2015). Shi and 
Yan (2006) point out that a supplementary factor in rising teacher quality concerns is the 
aging of teachers in rural primary schools. Specifically, over half of rural teachers were 
above 40 years of age, which suggests that the teaching force in rural primary schools may 
be predominantly comprised of relatively less educated teachers.  
 
In addition, while a majority of the teaching force consisted of women, gender composition 
varied greatly by location and level of education. According to Ministry of Education (2010) 
data, the education sector workforce as a whole composed of 58 percent of female. 
However, national averages mask significant regional variations and differences by level 
of education. For instance, the male to female teacher ratio in rural secondary schools is 1: 
0.8, while the same ratio is 2:1 in primary schools (Shi & Yan, 2006). The potential 
differences in gender-specific educational attainment may also play an important role in 
regional variations in teacher quality, and requires further thinking in terms of how to best 
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attract and retain both female and male teacher candidates. 
 
To this end, existing research on the topic of teacher quality is both scant in number and 
limited in depth. To add, many existing studies on teacher quality in China could be 
methodologically strengthened and more theoretically based. Few discuss teacher quality 
in relation to occupational choice theory or look into the broader literature on the 
economics of education. There currently exists a significant literature gap in understanding 
how teacher occupational choice, labor market conditions, and teacher quality have 
interacted over time at the micro-level, especially in a geographically diverse developing 
country such as China. In light of these realities, a high quality study driven by strong 
theoretical motivations and taking advantage of the increasing availability of micro-level 
data is much needed. 
 
2.14 History of Teacher Salary Reforms in China 
Teacher salary policies in China have gone through several important transformations in 
terms of policy institutionalization and programmatic implementation. Until 1955, 
payment in-kind teacher compensation policies were common in most parts of China, 
which was then replaced by a national reform to standardize teacher salaries in currency 
payments (Tian & Yang, 2008). Subsequently, one of China’s earliest teacher salary 
reforms started in 1956, and was characterized by the implementation of a unified wage 
system that observers conclude as having improved absolute salary terms for teachers (Tian 
& Yang, 2008). The main motivation behind this reform was to ensure equal pay for equal 
work, and to enable better budgeting and accounting practices to be put in place nationally 
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for the management of teacher salaries. One of the means in achieving this goal was to 
gradually reduce the large regional differences in wage distribution. For implementation, 
the central government issued 11 designated wage zones with particular consideration to 
variations in living standards and commodity prices based on geography. Policy emphasis 
was put in key areas of development and poverty-stricken areas, such that wage subsidies 
were established for different regions in accordance with commodity prices. Importantly, 
the 1956 teacher salary reform also initiated a long-standing pay scale system that was 
based on individual ability, qualifications, and rank. For instance, the reform established a 
rank-based salary system with 10 teacher ranks and 15 administrative grades (Tian & Yang, 
2008). In general terms, early reforms is 1956 had laid the pretext for much of the teacher 
pay scale system that is still in effect in many forms today. 
 
The next wave of institutionalizing reforms occurred during the 1980s, as represented by a 
series of reforms stemming from the State Council’s (1981) Measures on Adjusting 
Salaries of Primary and Secondary School Teachers, in part as policy response to improve 
teacher salary structures. To this end, the State Council’s (1985) Notice on Government and 
Public Institution Employee Salary Guidelines introduced a new salary scale that is more 
closely tied to job performance; in detail, the new statute stipulated that teacher salaries are 
to be comprised of four core components: base salary, workload subsidies, tenure-based 
subsidies, performance-based subsidies. Follow-up reforms through the State Council’s 
(1987) Notice on Compensation Improvement for Teachers in Basic Education provided 
substantive improvements on the existing wage streams for teacher salary determination, 
and aimed at increasing teacher take-home pay by about 10 percent. This era of reforms 
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established the overarching “base + subsidies” approach for determining teacher salaries, 
as well as attributing larger proportions of wage scale to workload and job performance. 
 
Subsequent reforms in 1993 and 2006 have been in large parts programmatic fine-tuning 
and legal mandates based upon policy foundations from previous eras, such that the 1993 
teacher salary reform focused on increasing the percentage of workload-based subsidies, 
while the 2006 reform emphasized on legally guaranteeing comparable pay for teachers. 
One of the driving forces behind these reform updates was that teacher salary had become 
incompatible with the country’s overall economic growth (Guo, 1994). In detail, the State 
Council’s (1993) Notice on Government and Public Institution Employee Salary Reform 
Implementation Guidelines update has further strengthened the link between teacher salary 
and workload, increasing the percentage of workload-based subsidies to 30 percent of total 
payments. In addition, the guidelines also established 6 new pay-grade advancements and 
homeroom teacher subsidy, as well as the central government’s fiscal responsibility to 
guarantee timely teacher salary payments.  
 
A decade later, the People’s Congress passed the Compulsory Education Law in 2006, 
which instructed all levels of government to ensure favorable wages, living and working 
standards, and social security benefits for teachers, and acted as a legal mandate that 
“average teacher salary levels should be no less than that of local public officials” (People’s 
Congress, 2006, Chapter 4, Section 31). More recent developments in 2009, as stipulated 
by Ministry of Education’s (2008) Guidelines on Performance Evaluation of Teachers in 
Primary and Secondary Schools, resulted in the implementation of a performance pay 
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policy for teachers in compulsory education schools. In effect, the 2009 reform introduced 
an incentive mechanism into schools by making approximately 30 percent of wages 
performance-based, rewarding those who take on more teaching and administrative 
workload, as well as good teaching performance and engaging in pedagogical research 
(Wang, Lai, & Lo, 2014). In broad terms, the current literature landscape suggests that the 
development of teacher salary reforms in China can be broadly categorized into two time 
periods: an institutionalization era between 1950-1980s, that focused primarily on laying 
the foundational frameworks in determining teacher compensation; a more programmatic 
conscious era in providing legal statutes and exploring more effective payment 
mechanisms, from the 1990s to present. 
 
 
2.2 Literature Review on Teacher Occupational Choice 
Education economists are interested in understanding how rational actors make optimizing 
decisions based on constraints. Accordingly, in the labor market, optimizing behaviors can 
help rational actors self-select into various markets and production activities in pursuit of 
comparative advantage. The formal treatment on self-selection and occupational choice 
began with the seminar work of Andrew D. Roy (1951). Roy's insights on individuals' 
decision to optimize choices between 'trout fishing and rabbit hunting' introduced the 
theoretical foundation for understanding how rational actors make occupational choices. 
The core content of Roy's (1951) analysis is that a rational worker compares her expected 
payout, broadly defined in different occupations, and chooses the occupation that 
maximizes this sum. The worker may choose to assess her expected payout based on 
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several dimensions, such as pecuniary benefits in wages and non-pecuniary benefits, such 
as occupational status and working conditions (Dolton, Makepeace, & van der Klaauw, 
1989). To assume simplicity, most existing analyses have used wage from labor work as a 
proxy for lifetime utility (Nagler, Piopiunik, & West, 2015), for which the justification 
derives from the intuition that budget constraints limit individual lifetime choice sets. 
 
2.21 Theoretical Framework 
Since the original 1951 article, the basic Roy model has been extensively modified and 
generalized, and expanded versions include various features such as utility maximization 
agents (Heckman and Sedlack, 1985), multiple sectors (Dolton, Makepeace, & van der 
Klaauw, 1989), credit constraints (Banerjee and Newman, 1993), and uncertainty 
(D'Haultfoeuille and Maurel, 2010). The Roy model has been widely applied by labor 
economists in various scenarios to understand individual occupational choice mechanisms. 
For instance, analyses have been conducted on workers' decision to enter market versus 
non-market sectors (see Heckman, 1974, 1976; Dustmann & van Soest, 1998), unionized 
versus non-unionized sectors (Lee, 1978), piece-rate versus fixed-pay wage structures 
(Lazear, 1986). Additionally, the model has also been used to understand workers' choice 
to emigrate (Borjas, 1987), enter or leave a marriage (McElroy & Horney, 1981), and invest 
in higher education (Willis & Rosen, 1979). 
 
Broadly speaking, the theoretical foundation of much of the existing occupational literature 
rests on the cornerstone of human capital theory, such that career decisions are considered 
as part of an expansive investment project through which investment options between 
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alterative occupations are based on monetary equivalents of costs and benefits that could 
be accumulated over an individual’s working lifetime. In more detail, the analytical logic 
behind the occupational choice framework literature is similar to that of Rubin’s (1974) 
potential outcomes framework, where individuals maximize expected outcomes in two 
states of the world: one if Choice X is executed, and the alternative if Choice X is not 
executed. To illustrate, consider a world with only two sectors of employment, 1 for 
teaching jobs and 0 for non-teaching jobs. Mean wages in these two sectors are respectively 
characterized as 𝜇0 for non-teaching jobs and 𝜇1 for teaching jobs. A worker's potential 
earnings in the non-teaching sector 𝑤0 and in the teaching sector 𝑤1 is given as: 
 
𝑤0 =  𝜇0 +  0         (0.1) 
 
𝑤1 =  𝜇1 + 1         (0.2) 
 
where 0 and 1 represent the worker’s deviation from the mean sectoral wages 𝜇0 and 
𝜇1  respectively. Following convention, 0  is characterized as a normally distributed 
random noise, such that 0~𝑁 (0, 𝜎1
2). In this setup, a worker will choose to work in the 
teaching sector if expected wage payouts are larger in the teaching sector relative to the 
non-teaching option, such that 𝑤1 >  𝑤0  and conditional on both 𝑤0  and 𝑤1  being 
above the worker’s reservation wage. In this stylized world, all individuals care about when 
choosing an occupation is their expected earning such that they will chose the occupation 
that they can expect the highest earnings. Therefore, the condition for a worker to choose 




(𝜇1 −  𝜇0) + ( 1 −  0) > 0       (0.3) 
 
Therefore, the probability (P) of a randomly chosen worker choosing to join the teaching 
sector is equal to Pr [( 1 −  0)>(𝜇1 − 𝜇0)], and can be algebraically rearranged as the 
following: 
 
𝑃 = 1 − Φ(
𝜇1− 𝜇0
𝜎(𝜀1− 𝜀0)
)        (0.4) 
 
where  Φ(∙) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal. Equation (0.4) 
identifies the relationship between probability of choosing to teach and mean wages in each 
sector, such that the larger the difference between mean wages in the teaching sector 𝜇1 
and non-teaching sector 𝜇0, the higher the probability P of a worker choosing to become a 
teacher. Next, setting T=1 for the state of world when a worker chooses to enter the teaching 
position,  𝑣 = (𝜇1 −  𝜇0) , and therefore 𝑧 =  (
𝜇1− 𝜇0
𝜎𝑣
) . In addition, assuming the 
correlation in earnings between non-teaching and teaching jobs as  𝜌 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜎1,𝜎0)
𝜎1𝜎0
 , the 
potential earnings function in the non-teaching sector E(𝑤0) for a worker who chooses to 
enter teaching (in the T=1 state of world) can be expressed as the following: 
 
𝐸(𝑤0|𝑇 = 1) = 𝜇0 − 𝜌0𝑣 (
Φ(z)
1−Φ(z)





 is the Inverse Mills Ratio which equals to the conditional expectation of a 
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normal distribution truncated at point z. The potential earnings in the teaching sector E((𝑤1) 
for a worker who decides to choose a teaching job (in the T=1 state of world) can be 
identified as the following: 
 









)     (0.6) 
 
Based on Equations (0.5) and (0.6), we can better understand the occupational choice 
mechanisms under Roy model's expected outcome framework. First, we consider a 
hypothetical case of positive selection into the teaching sector. If a worker who chooses a 
teaching job is the individual who would have expected to receive above average pay in 
both the teaching and non-teaching sectors, meaning 𝐸(𝑤0|𝑇 = 1) > 0 and 𝐸(𝑤1|𝑇 =




> 1 , 𝜌 >  
𝜎0
𝜎1
         (0.7) 
 
These two conditions have important implications in understanding why this 'above 
average' individual would choose the teaching sector given that he or she could receive 
above the mean earnings in either sectors. The first condition 
𝜎1
𝜎2
> 1 indicates that the 
teaching sector has a larger dispersion of individual earnings, which implies that there is a 
higher rate of return to human capital. The second condition 𝜌 >  
𝜎0
𝜎1
 posits that the type 
of human capital valued by both sectors is highly correlated, or sufficiently overlapped. In 
this case, an 'above average' individual chooses the teaching sector over the non-teaching 
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sector because the two sectors value the same set of human capital, but the teaching sector 
offers a higher return to the individual's human capital.  
 
Secondly, for the hypothetical case of negative selection into the teaching sector, that is a 
worker who chooses teaching is also the individual who would have expected to receive 
below average pay in both the teaching and non-teaching sectors, 𝐸(𝑤0|𝑇 = 1) < 0 and 




> 1 , 𝜌 >  
𝜎0
𝜎1
         (0.8) 
 
This second case is the exact reverse of the first case. Now, the 'below average' individual 
chooses the teaching sector with the expectation that he or she would receive below average 
earnings in either sectors. This is observed because 
𝜎0
𝜎1
> 1 indicates that the teaching 
sector has a narrower wage dispersion, implying that by choosing the teaching sector the 
'below average' individual benefits from entering teaching because it guarantees a higher 
wage than otherwise. Again, the second condition 𝜌 >  
𝜎0
𝜎1
 is the same assumption that the 
type of human capital valued by both teaching and non-teaching sectors is highly correlated. 
 
Two additional hypothetical cases should also be briefly mentioned here. In the case of 
𝐸(𝑤0|𝑇 = 1) < 0 and 𝐸(𝑤1|𝑇 = 1) > 0, meaning if an individual with 'below average' 
potential earnings in the non-teaching sector and 'above average' potential earnings in the 






) must satisfy. In other words, 
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the teaching and non-teaching sectors must value sufficiently different types of human 
capital and that correlation of earnings must be small or negative. Whereas in the case of 
𝐸(𝑤0|𝑇 = 1) > 0 and 𝐸(𝑤1|𝑇 = 1) < 0, meaning for an individual with 'above average' 
potential earnings in the non-teaching sector and 'below average' in the teaching sector to 






) . This is 
theoretically unlikely due to violation of the rational choice based on expected outcomes 
assumption, because the individual would be better off by simply choosing non-teaching 
sector to receive 'above average' earnings. 
 
When applied to teacher labor markets, the model identifies two key factors that influence 
the type of individual who pursues a career in teaching:  
(1) ratio of wage dispersion between teaching and non-teaching sectors,  
(2) correlation between the type of skills valued by teaching and non-teaching sectors  
 
To this end, if worker aptitude and general skills are positively correlated with earnings 
across different sectors, a rise in the difference in earnings dispersion would result in high 
ability individuals choosing the sector with higher returns to skills and human capital. 
Accordingly, given a positive and high correlation between the types of skills valued by 
teaching and non-teaching sectors, average teacher quality can be substantially influenced 
by the ratio of dispersion in earnings between the two sectors. For instance, high ability 
individuals will choose the sector with higher returns to skills, as represented by a relatively 
wider dispersion of earnings. For instance, this scenario applies appropriately for high 
ability teachers in STEM fields (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics). 
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Assuming their attained human capital in STEM is identically valued across teaching and 
non-teaching sectors, STEM teachers will choose to work in a non-teaching sector that 
offers a higher rate of return to their STEM skills, which will have important implications 
for the observed ability distribution in the teaching sector. Notwithstanding, the 
implications for understanding the relationship between sectoral wages and teacher quality 
extend beyond the above applications in STEM fields, especially considering that there are 
many instances in the education sector where all three of the parameters are interacting at 
amplified intensity. 
 
2.22 Implications for Teacher Occupational Choice 
Economics of education studies have utilized the occupational choice framework to 
investigate what factors influence individuals' decision to pursue teaching as a career. This 
line of research was mainly motivated by the frustration over evidence that schools in the 
U.S. are failing to attract the best and brightest individuals to become teachers (Temin, 
2002). Earlier studies carried out by Vance and Schlecty (1982), Weaver (1983), Hanushek 
and Pace (1995), Ballou and Podgursky (1997) documented that the average teacher's math 
and verbal skills, as measured by college entrance test scores, have been steadily decreasing. 
More recent studies continue to confirm this declining teacher quality observation. In fact, 
Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab (2004), Lakdawalla (2006), Bacolod (2007), and Richey 
(2014) all present similar evidence on falling relative abilities of teachers in the U.S. These 
observations of declining average teacher quality emerged with a growing body of evidence 
that show various measures of teacher quality are instrumental to student outcomes 
(Hanushek & Rivkin, 2012), and even adulthood outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 
31 
 
2014).In most existing occupational choice models, the quality of teacher supply depends 
on wage and non-wage job characteristics, as well as on how wages and entry requirements 
in the teacher labor market compare in relation to other sectors in the broader labor market.  
 
To extend on the documented findings of declining teacher quality in the U.S. over the past 
few decades (see Corcoran, Evans, & Schwab, 2004; Bacolod, 2007; Richey, 2014), an 
important education research motivation is to understand why teacher quality has 
experienced such decline and evaluate prominence of potential drivers of such change. 
Some scholars attribute this decline in quality to women's growing labor participation 
(Corcoran, Evans, & Schwab, 2004), while others argue that relative wage compression is 
the explanation (see Hoxby & Leigh, 2004). Scholars also argue that barriers and costs to 
entry, both direct and indirect, pose barriers for prospective teachers (Angrist & Guryan, 
2007). All of these explanations form a basis of understanding for how teachers make 
occupational decisions and shed light on why these individual occupational behaviors can 
have sweeping and unintended consequences for the broader education sector. Following 
the theoretical underpinning of the occupational choice model, economists and education 
researchers have hypothesized that several labor market conditions can affect the average 
characteristics and composition the teaching force. Below, I outline three major labor 
supply explanations: gender desegregation, wage compression, and opportunity wages. 
 
Gender Desegregation in the Labor Market 
First, some scholars attribute this declining labor quality to the growing non-teaching 
employment opportunities for women (Temin, 2002; Corcoran, Evans, & Schwab, 2004; 
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Bacolod, 2007). Historically, due to low probabilities of entry into gender-segregated 
sectors, high ability women have low expected earnings in non-teaching sectors, and thus 
became a captive pool of workers within the teaching sector. In recent decades, progressive 
gender desegregation in many previously male-dominated sectors led to an increase in 
women's likelihood of entry, and as a result, an increase in expected non-teaching earnings 
for women who have a comparative advantage in such sectors. As result, gender 
desegregation allowed high ability women to seek their comparative advantage and receive 
better earnings in non-teaching jobs, leading to lower density of high ability teachers. 
 
As explained by Temin (2002), due to historic labor market segregation in hiring practices, 
high ability women could only seek employment in a limited set of professions such as 
teaching and nursing; however, with the improvement of gender equality in the past half 
century, women's occupational choice sets have greatly expanded, and therefore the quality 
of teachers have become responsive to wages. Yet, in this process, wage levels in the 
teaching sector has not responded to the rising non-teaching opportunities that have 
become available to high-ability women. Utilizing five longitudinal surveys spanning 
between 1957-1992, Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab (2004) document a large decline in 
teacher quality and observes a lower propensity for women at the top-decile of the 
individual aptitude distribution to pursue a teaching career, with more than 20 percent in 
the 1960s falling to just merely 3.7 percent in the 1990s. They find that high-ability women 
have been increasingly attracted to pursue non-teaching careers such as managers, 
computer scientists, accountants, and lawyers. This translates into the observed decline of 
high ability individuals in primary and secondary schools’ teaching force.  
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In the same vein, Bacolod (2007) documents a sharp decline of worker ability in the 
teaching sector using three different labor force ability measures: standardized test scores, 
selectivity of undergraduate institution, partner's education and relative wage standing in 
the population. She finds that the larger the difference in mean wages between teaching 
and non-teaching sectors, the more likely high ability individuals are to become teachers, 
simply because of differences in relative wage structures and characteristics. In addition, 
women and younger age-cohorts are more responsive to wage changes than are men and 
older age-cohorts. An important contribution of Bacolod (2007) is the attempt to 
analytically separate supply-side and demand-side factors influencing average teacher 
quality. She notes that observed occupational choices may be results of a combination of 
relative supply and demand factors.  
 
Supply side economic analyses have often cited positive compensating differentials as a 
key explanation for women's choice to become teachers, because the teaching sector 
requires skills that are complementary with production in the household (Becker, 1985), 
and allows for less costly labor market exits and re-entries when starting a family (Polachek 
1981; Blau, Ferber, & Winkler, 1998). Following these supply-side hypotheses, gender 
desegregation in occupations shifts women's labor supply inward in previously 'women-
dominated' jobs and outward in previously 'non-women-dominated' jobs. This labor supply 
shift would theoretically result in an increase in relative wages for previously 'women-
dominated' sectors such as teaching. Yet, the empirical evidence shows that relative wages 
in the teaching sector declined, pointing to demand factors as the alternative explanation. 
Bacolod (2007) shows that relative wages declined more for women than men, indicating 
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a labor demand shift that had provided women with more non-teaching employment 
opportunities, and is responsible for compositional changes in the teaching force. 
 
Relative Wage Compression for Teachers 
Another strand of research argues that relative wage compression in the teaching profession, 
as opposed to that of non-teaching jobs, has been the main reason why talented individuals 
leave teaching (Hoxby & Leigh, 2004; Chingos & West, 2012; Leigh, 2012; Correa, Parro, 
& Reyes, 2015). Wage compression policies within the teaching sector, such as 
unionization and flat wage structures, translate into a lower return to human capital and 
skills for teachers. Under such policies, occupational choice theory predicts that high 
ability individuals would choose to work in non-teaching sectors, which exhibit a higher 
return to human capital, when considering career options. Accordingly, Hoxby and Leigh 
(2004), Chingos and West (2012), Leigh (2012), and Correa, Parro, and Reyes (2015) 
observe negative impacts of relative wage compression in the teaching profession on 
overall teacher aptitude in the U.S., Australia, and Chile, as high ability individuals choose 
sectors with higher returns to skills.  
 
In the U.S., Hoxby and Leigh (2004) provide causal estimates of wage compression effects 
on teacher quality, which approximately equals to a 9 percentage-point increase in the share 
of individuals with the lowest aptitude rank and a 12 percentage-point decrease in the share 
of individuals with the highest aptitude rank among teachers. Their results indicate that 
wage compression explained about 80 percent of the decrease in the representation of high 
ability individuals in teaching and explained about 25 percent of the increase in the share 
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of low-ability individuals in teaching. Similarly, Chingos and West (2012) study U.S. 
teachers' opportunity wages and find that women, who leave teaching for non-teaching jobs, 
experience a greater dispersion in income compared to before leaving their teaching posts. 
This result implies that better general skills and human capital are valued 
disproportionately more in non-teaching careers, luring high ability teachers to exit. 
 
In Australia, Leigh (2012) directly models the current wages and the aptitude of potential 
teacher candidates using administrative data to document teacher labor supply shifts 
between 1989 and 2003. He exploits the timing and geographic variation of teacher wages, 
which are set at the state-level by collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that 
every 1 percent increase in starting wages of new teachers raises the average aptitude of 
pre-service teachers by .6 in percentile ranks, with effects strongest for those individuals 
around the median. In addition, he also finds evidence that relatively wider earnings 
dispersion in the non-teaching sector, compared to the teaching sector, lowers the aptitude 
of pre-service teachers, with impact strongest for those at the top of the ability distribution.  
 
In terms of the Chilean context, Correa, Parro, and Reyes (2015) apply a two-sector 
occupational choice model to empirically examine teacher occupational choice between 
public and private schools, which is crucially differentiated by centralized earning 
schedules and merit pay, respectively. Correa, Parro, and Reyes (2015) document positive 
self-selection for high ability teachers into private schools and negative self-selection for 
low ability teachers into public schools. The authors interpret their findings as a result of 
rigid teacher wage regulation in public schools that is heavily dependent on certification 
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and experience, whereas private schools exhibit substantially more flexible rules for hiring, 
firing and setting salaries.  
 
The Opportunity Costs of Non-teaching Options 
Third, along the relative wage compression theory, several scholars hypothesize that the 
general state of economy creates shocks to non-teaching work opportunities, and can have 
important implications for the composition of the teaching force (Falch, Johansen, & Strom, 
2009; Nagler, Popiunik, & West, 2015; Neugebauer, 2015). This intuition is based on the 
widely held assumption that the education sector is generally non-cyclical, whereas other 
private sectors often go through boom and bust cycles. Thus, during times of economic 
boom, the ratio of earnings spread is typically larger in non-teaching compared to teaching 
sectors, thus individuals with high ability face a higher opportunity cost to commit to a 
career in teaching. Whereas, during economic recessions, non-teaching job opportunities 
dwindle and wages in non-teaching sectors become compressed, and as result, many high 
ability individuals choose to become teachers. 
 
For instance in Norway, Falch, Johansen, and Strom (2009) utilizes panel data to show that 
public school teacher shortages are strongly correlated with business cycles, meaning better 
macroeconomic conditions are associated with a higher degree of teacher shortage in public 
schools. Nagler, Popiunik, and West (2015) use student-level administrative data from 
Florida, and find that teachers who enter the profession during an economic recession, are 
on average .1 standard deviation more effective in raising student math scores and .03 
standard deviations more effective in raising student reading scores than teachers who enter 
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during non-recession periods. Under a reasonable assumption that only 10 percent of 
recession-cohort teachers enter teaching due to the self-selection mechanisms above, 
Nagler, Popiunik, and West (2015) posit that the expected population effect would translate 
into approximately 1 standard deviation higher on the teacher value added distribution for 
recession-cohorts. Neugerbauer (2015) analyzes shifts in labor market conditions and 
teacher characteristics in Germany between the years 1980-2009. Using a nationally 
representative sample, he shows that there was no relative decline in teacher wages in 
Germany over the past three decades. Neugerbauer (2015) explains this observation by 
linking the relative stable quality of the teaching force with relatively high unemployment 
risks, and he shows that teacher occupational choice in Germany is very sensitive to labor 
conditions in the larger economy, specifically unemployment risks. 
 
The Cost Disease and Rising Demand for Education 
Apart from supply-side explanations, there are also other factors at play influencing who 
becomes a teacher. For instance, the education sector has traditionally been thought of as 
being troubled by an unavoidable ‘cost disease’, that is the rising costs of education far 
outpace that of inflation in general price levels (Baumol, 1993). The idea behind this 
concept is that education has been relatively stagnant in terms of productivity 
improvements. To elaborate, the economy can be divided into two sectors, one being 
technologically progressive and therefore relatively more productive, and the other being 
technologically stagnant marked by lower productivity. In the technologically progressive 
sector, improvements to production technology respond to rising labor costs and substitutes 
low-cost low-skilled labor for more costly skilled labor, and in turn raises labor productivity. 
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However, because by nature of production, it is hard to improve productivity in the 
technologically stagnant sector, worker wages must rise in order to attract and retain 
workers of desirable quality and aptitude. The inevitable result is that labor cost increase 
in the technologically progressive sector will be transferred to the stagnant sector where 
substitution for labor is not easily available. To cope with these circumstances, the stagnant 
sector can either bid up the price of workers, or face ‘labor-draining’, meaning that skilled 
labor will be lost to technologically progressive sectors.  
 
To further complicate the issue of rising per unit costs, demand for education has been 
consistently increasing in most countries, either through economic development or policy 
expansion to open educational access. One important lesson from economic theory is that 
the price and quantity of labor is jointly determined by supply and demand factors, which 
means that demand-side factors can also play an important role. Broadly speaking, scholars 
posit that skill-biased technological change (SBTC) exacerbates the appreciation of skills 
and human capital relative to the median worker. Furthermore, sustained growth in skill 
premium in the general economy creates lasting downward pressure on the average quality 
of the teaching sector (Gilpin & Kaganovich, 2012). Rising demand for college-educated 
skilled workers has led to an increase in demand for better education, and under a relatively 
fixed education budget, education systems can no longer afford to hire high ability 
individuals as teachers (Lakdawalla, 2006). The main intuition derives from recent 
imbalanced expansions in education access and education budget, which led to more 
teachers being hired due to relatively stagnant teacher productivity growth, at a relatively 
lower unit price for their labor because of relatively fixed educational budgets. 
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More specifically, Lakdawalla (2006) argues that demand-side quality and quantity 
tradeoffs play an important role in the decline of teacher quality. Schools are faced with 
higher public demand for schooling because SBTC increases the prices of skilled labor and 
more individuals are inclined to pursue education, yet teachers’ unit productivity to educate 
students has remained practically unchanged. For instance, class size has largely remained 
the same, or decreased, in most countries. Even as the cost of teachers rise, there has been 
little to no substitution of teacher labor in the education production process. This creates a 
resource allocation problem for schools, which in turn respond by substituting teacher 
quality with teacher quantity to cope with this increased demand for education. By utilizing 
time and geographic variations in the price of skilled labor, Lakdawalla (2006) finds that 
higher prices for skilled labor appear to be associated with increased education input and 
declines in relative teacher aptitude measures. 
 
In the same vein, Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012) extend the SBTC analysis by treating 
public schools as education quality maximizing agents, and explicitly model three factors 
that may influence quality - quantity tradeoffs: indirect opportunity costs of teachers, 
unionization and wage compression, and the rise of skill premium. Their general 
equilibrium model predicts that as mean wages and earnings dispersion increase for 
college-educated workers, schools are forced to adjust relative teacher salaries and teacher 
quality standards in response to changes in labor market conditions. As education quality 
maximizing agents, schools may solve the resource optimization problem by lowering 
relative quality of teachers and compensate with a higher number of teachers. Gilpin and 
Kaganovich (2012) show that this prediction is in line with the empirical observations 
40 
 
found between 1955 and 2005, that growth of teachers in the U.S. have far outpaced the 
growth of student enrollment, and while teacher relative wages declined, overall education 
budget as percent of GDP remained practically stable. 
 
 
2.3 Implications for the Chinese Context 
Several important implications can be summarized from the review of existing literature, 
especially for understanding how teacher occupational choice, labor market conditions, and 
teacher quality interact over time in China. First and foremost, the Roy model introduces 
an economic decision-making framework in understanding how and why teachers choose 
to become teachers. Researchers in social sciences have often emphasized the impact of 
norms, beliefs, and structural barriers to employment as explanations for understanding 
observed choices (see Badgett and Folbre, 2003; Morgan, Walker, Hebl, & King, 2013). In 
this respect, studies in line with Roy's model provided individuals with more agency by 
directly measuring teachers' endogenous occupational choice, and consequently led to 
improvements in designs of teacher labor policy analyses.  
 
Importantly, the model identifies key factors that can generate testable hypotheses 
regarding who pursues teaching and why. As evident in the basic Roy model, the decision 
to pursue a teaching career depends on two key parameters: the ratio of dispersion in 
earnings between teaching and non-teaching sectors (
𝜎1
𝜎0
), and the correlation between the 
type of human capital valued by teaching and non-teaching sectors (𝜌). To situate the model 
more contextually in China, cross-sector improvements in earnings for women can have 
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important effects on the type of individuals who pursues teaching, such that opportunity 
wages have increased substantially for women. China’s rapid economic transformation has 
led to significant improvements in per capita income (Wen, 2015). Ding, Dong, and Li 
(2007) show substantial wage increases in female workforce participants throughout 1988-
2002. Many scholars attribute a large proportion of this rise in income to the shift from low 
productivity employment to higher productivity jobs (Brandt and Zhu, 2010). The 
economic transition from planned to market economy has opened access not only to 
previously inaccessible private-sector jobs, but also to a new class of high productivity jobs 
that come with rapid economic development. In this respect, the existing literature on the 
availability of non-teaching options (see Falch, Johansen, & Strom, 2009; Nagler, Popiunik, 
& West, 2015; Neugebauer, 2015) is crucial to reconcile with the consequences for teacher 
quality when previously unavailable career options are made available to teachers and 
teacher candidates. 
 
Second, given the positive and strong correlation in the type of skills and human capital 
valued across teaching and non-teaching sectors, average teacher quality is expected to be 
influenced by the ratio of dispersion in earnings between the two sectors. The combination 
of a large and rigid public sector with artificially compressed wage structures (Zhu, 
Prosterman, Ye, Li, Riediner, & Ouyang, 2006), will likely influence individual 
occupational choice when the economy is undergoing rapidly transitions. Following this 
theoretical approach, the current discussion (see Hoxby & Leigh, 2004; Chingos & West, 
2012; Leigh, 2012; Correa, Parro, & Reyes, 2015) on whether fixed and compressed 
teacher wage schedules fail to reflect the rising opportunity costs that individuals face is 
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also relevant for understanding consequences for overall teacher quality – in the face of 
rapid economic development. As a general prediction stemming from occupational choice 
theory, new workers who belong to the high ability group (broadly defined) would have a 
lower return on skills in the teaching sector, and thus become less incentivized to enter the 
teaching sector. At the same time, current teachers who belong to high ability groups, once 
faced with better non-teaching career options, would have increased incentives to leave 
teaching for non-teaching jobs, pursuing higher skill premiums.  
 
Third, by empirically exploring parameters related to occupational choice decisions, 
scholars can answer educationally important policy questions, and identify existing policy 
gaps that may become problematic in the recruitment and retention of talented teachers. In 
this regard, various studies including Rockoff (2004) and Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 
(2005) have investigated the impact of teacher quality on student achievement, concluding 
that by moving up one standard deviation on the teacher quality distribution leads to 
approximately .1 standard deviation gain in student achievement. It is clear that teachers 
play a key role in students’ learning and the production of human capital. As noted in the 
occupational choice framework, given that the worker's human capital is valued in both 
sectors and that correlation of skills is substantially large, high ability individuals will 
choose to supply their labor in the sector with higher returns, as represented by the larger 
dispersion of earnings, for those sets of skills. Therefore, short paying teachers may have 
both immediate consequences in the decline in career attractiveness, but also far-reaching 
and long-term societal costs, because the decline in average quality of teachers may result 
in reduced learning and accumulated human capital for students, and therefore curtailed 
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skills preparedness once they enter the workforce. 
 
To this end, numerous studies have shown that foundational skills acquired while in school 
through good instruction can have long-term impacts on worker productivity, income, and 
career progression (see Hanushek & Woessmann, 2015; Valerio, Puerta, Tognatta & 
Monroy-Taborda, 2016). Thus, ensuring the quality of the teaching force has serious policy 
implications for human capital accumulation both at the micro-individual and macro-
country level, and has potentially significant long-term consequences for economic 
development and societal prospects. By investigating how relative labor market conditions 
affect teacher occupational choice, policy instruments can be identified to better attract 
high-quality teachers and become more effective in retaining individuals in the teaching 
force. In this regard, the current dissertation presents an important theoretical application 
of occupational choice in teacher labor markets, as well as a policy investigation to aid 
policymakers in devising teacher recruitment, management, and retention policies that will 
lead to a bright and well-functioning teaching force that can ultimately improve student 




METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
In broad strokes, this dissertation applies quantitative methodology to answer theoretically 
important and policy relevant questions regarding the relationship between student learning, 
observable characteristics, teacher quality and teaching wages. More specifically, I plan to 
first motivate this dissertation by showing the impact of teacher quality on student learning 
outcomes (Part I), document trends in adjusted wage profiles (Part II), explore how teachers 
compare to non-teachers on labor quality measures (Part III), and investigate how stagnant 
wages in the teaching sector have affected the quality of teacher labor supply (Part IV). In 
particular, I examine specific sets of research questions in the four succeeding sections: 
 
Research Question #1: What is the relationship between observable characteristics of 
teacher labor quality on student learning outcomes? 
• In Part I, using a nationally representative teacher-student linked dataset 
(China Education Panel Survey, CEPS), I first establish the causal 
relationship between observable teacher quality characteristics, as 
illustrated by educational attainment level, on student learning outcomes in 
Chinese schools. Results from Part I motivate a comparison of relative 
teacher quality with non-teaching workers using observable human capital 




Research Question #2: How large is the teaching wage penalty between workers in 
teaching and non-teaching sectors, after accounting for individual characteristics?   
• In Part II, using a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional 
household survey dataset (China Household Income Project, CHIP), I 
empirically estimate key parameters in the teacher occupational choice 
framework, namely mean wage difference and differential returns to skills, 
and document trends over time. The objective of this exercise is to examine 
the degree of change in these key two parameters in regards to identifying 
and assessing observed teacher “wage penalty.”  
 
Research Question #3: How has the relative quality of teachers compared to workers in 
other sectors evolved in the past decades? 
• In Part III, using a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional 
household survey dataset (China Household Income Project, CHIP), I 
evaluate the extent to which predictions of the occupational choice 
framework extend to the Chinese context, in terms of observed teacher 
ability patterns relative to the broader non-teaching workforce. I consider 
results from this exercise jointly in relation to wage characteristic 
observations observed in Part II, and discuss the broader implications for 
the relative labor quality of the teaching force. 
 
Research Question #4: What is the incidence of job turnover for teachers in China? What 
is the influence of non-teaching opportunity wage on occupational decision?  
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• In Part IV, I leverage an available nationally representative panel dataset 
(Rural-Urban Migration in China, RUMiC) on teacher’s labor market 
career decisions and track teachers across year to examine the prevalence 
of teacher turnover, and identify teacher job switch destinations. In addition, 
I conduct an exploratory investigating on the relationship between relative 
non-teaching opportunity wages to teacher’s occupational decision, and 
assess the associated impacts on non-pecuniary outcomes. 
 
 
3.1 Part I: The Impact of Teacher Quality on Student Learning 
Often in the field of economics of education, student learning outcomes are estimated with 
education production function to illustrate the relationship between student test scores A 
and various types of educational inputs, such as student and family inputs P, teacher quality 
inputs T, and school resource inputs S.  
 
A = f (P, T, S)        (1.0) 
 
In most circumstances, student and family inputs P include a vector of individual and 
family background demographic, socioeconomic, and educational effort factors as well as 
measures of innate ability and accumulated prior learning. Teacher characteristic and 
teacher quality inputs T often refer to various teacher quality variables, such as teacher’s 
level of educational attainment, certification status, professional development participation, 
and years of teaching experience. School resource inputs S reflect a variety of school-level 
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educational resources that contribute to student learning, such as state of facilities, 
curriculum content, access to instructional technology, quality of educational facilities, 
peer composition, and so on. 
 
Accordingly, under the education production function framework, teachers are presumably 
identified as the most educationally important input factor because it directly influences 
instructional quality and immediately impacts student learning experience (Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 2012). Rigorous evaluation studies in the United States, such as those performed 
by Rockoff (2004) and Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) have found that by moving up 
1 standard deviation on the teacher quality distribution leads to approximately .1 standard 
deviation gain in student achievement. Consequently, researchers and policymakers have 
sought to determine specific teacher characteristic traits that can improve the underlying 
teacher quality and subsequent student learning outcomes; extensive research on these 
traits have identified teacher’s own educational attainment level (Harris & Sass, 2011), 
teacher’s professional certification status (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007), and length of 
teaching experience (Kane, Staiger, & Rockoff, 2007). However, common measures of 
observable teacher quality characteristics, such as educational attainment level, experience, 
and certification, have not always shown consistent results (Levin, 2010).  
 
For these reasons, in Part I, I conceptualize teacher quality as educational productivity, or 
the marginal product of observed teacher characteristic inputs on student learning outputs, 
and relate it to teacher’s commonly observational traits, such as a teacher’s own educational 
attainment level. In this regard, the research question will seek to understand to what extent 
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observable teacher quality characteristics – teacher educational attainment – matter for 
student learning outcomes. Particularly, educational attainment is selected among a rich set 
of teacher observable characteristics for two reasons. First, a teacher’s educational 
attainment level is a broad reflection of academic proficiency, accumulated human capital, 
and signals of premarket or innate skills, which are all reasonably expected to influence the 
underlying teacher preparedness and instructional effectiveness. Secondly, unlike 
education-specific credentials such as teacher licensure, teaching awards, and teacher rank, 
educational attainment level is a human capital trait that is directly comparable across 
sectors, which enables a clearer interpretation in the broader labor market.  
 
The objective of conducting this analysis with data from China, is to illustrate the 
consequences of observable teacher quality inputs, in this case a teacher’s educational 
attainment level, on student learning in a developing country context. More specifically, I 
utilize causal identification strategy to establish this relationship through measuring the 
amount of increased learning outcome that can be attributed to having better and more 
qualified teachers. This analysis motivates the rest of the dissertation by investigating the 
important implications of observable teacher ability distribution changes, as well as 
underlying consequences in affecting student learning and broader educational quality.  
 
As common with most educational issues, empirical identification of causal relationships 
between teacher inputs and learning outputs is challenging. Estimating the impact of 
observable teacher characteristics on student learning suffers from common selection-bias 
issues, where there may exist non-random sorting between students and schools, and within 
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schools between students and teachers. In particular, if more qualified teachers are 
systematically assigned to teach classes enrolled with high-performing students, or if more 
qualified teachers are compensatorily assigned to teach in low-performing classes, the 
relationship between teacher qualifications and student learning becomes ambiguous, and 
could become either upward or downward biased, and results obtained from subsequent 
analyses cannot be interpreted as causal. To address potentially problematic selection bias 
issues, I estimate a student fixed-effect education production function with between-subject 
differencing to link teacher characteristics to student learning using within-student 
variations across three subjects: Chinese, Mathematics, and English, in teacher quality 
measures in order to establish the causal relationships between observed teacher quality 
and student achievement outcomes. In this case, the analytic objective is to identify how 
student learning outcomes vary for the same student across different subjects in which 
observable teacher characteristics also vary.  
 
For implementation, I relate within-student, between-subject variations in test scores to 
between-subject differences in teacher observable characteristics, in order to minimize the 
confounding influence of student and family unobservable factors. In effect, this student 
fixed-effect analysis compares test scores of the same students on different subjects that 
are taught by different teachers. More concretely, for each student, there are as many rows 
of data as there are subjects tested, where each row represents test scores obtained on each 
of the tested core subjects: Chinese, Math, and English. Due to each of these subjects being 
taught by different teachers who have varying degrees of educational attainment, teacher 
training, qualifications, and awards, I am able to relate this difference in teacher observable 
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characteristics across subjects to the variation in test scores across subjects for each student, 
and eliminate sources of potential bias to establish causal relationships. 
 
Consequently, I adopt the aforementioned student fixed-effect empirical strategy to address 
problematic endogeneity problems in three main ways. First, the between-subject variation 
nature embedded in the strategy eliminates influence of all observable and unobservable 
student characteristics that do not vary across subjects. Second, benefitting from the two 
wave nature of the dataset, I include a rich set of subject-varying student-level input 
information, including baseline test scores and subject-specific student effort. Third, to 
further address potential omitted variables that differ across subjects, I include a rich vector 
of subject-varying teacher-level control variables. 
 
The estimation procedure is modified from that of existing literature adopting similar 
student fixed-effects modelling (see Altinok & Kingdon, 2009; Metzler & Woessmann, 
2012), with two important improvements. First, with the abundance of background 
information collected from the teacher questionnaire, I am able to employ a rich vector of 
teacher characteristic measures, such as identifying a teacher’s general human capital levels, 
as well as controlling for her pedagogical skills. Second, the two wave structure of the 
China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) dataset provides a rich set of student-level controls, 
including prior year test scores by subject and subject-varying student-level effort and 
motivation variables. With these improvements in mind, for the current case, the key 
explanatory variable teacher ability (a vector of education level and attained credentials) is 




𝐴𝑖𝑠 = α +  γ𝑇𝑠 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑠       (1.1) 
 
𝑇𝑠 = {𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙}    (1.2) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑠 is student i’s test score in subject s. 𝑇𝑠 is the key variable of interest: level of 
teacher educational attainment for subject s. In particular, I estimate the effect of having at 
least a 4-year Bachelor’s degree, relative to those whose education attainment level is 
below 4-year Bachelor’s. There is no need to include additional student-level controls 
because I add a student fixed-effect term 𝜇𝑖, which controls for all student-level observable 
and unobservable characteristics that do not vary across subjects. Such covariates might 
include all personal, family, school and broader contextual characteristics at the student-
level that do not differ across subjects.  
 
Importantly, it is worth noting that because a “class” in China is defined as a group of 
students within the same grade, who take the same subject courses together. Therefore, in 
this analysis, I do not add class fixed-effects or control for any additional “class” 
characteristics such as class size and peer composition, because all characteristics at this 
level is regarded subject-invariant. In addition, there may also remain school-level 
unobservables in the error term, which would be problematic if correlated with student test 
score or teacher quality variables. However, because student fixed-effects estimation 
implies regressing within-school, school-level unobservables are arguably subject-




To illustrate in more detail the intuition behind the strategy of using a two subject example, 
simple differencing between subjects 1 and 2 will yield the following: 
 
(𝐴𝑖1 −  𝐴𝑖2) = γ(𝑇1 − 𝑇2) + ( 𝑖1 − 𝑖2)         (1.3) 
 
where the key coefficient of interest is γ, representing the variation in student achievement 
that is explained by the difference in teacher educational attainment between subjects 1 and 
2. All student-level subject-invariant observables and unobservables are netted out, 
whereas the remaining observed and unobserved student and teacher school characteristics 
that vary by subjects are captured in the error term ( 𝑖1 − 𝑖2).  
 
A key assumption for causal estimation of  γ in this model relies on the fact that the 
differenced error term ( 𝑖1 − 𝑖2) is orthogonal to both outcome variables (𝐴𝑖1 −  𝐴𝑖2) 
and teacher quality vectors (𝑇1 − 𝑇2). Importantly, this means that omitted student- and 
teacher- variables that vary by subject could introduce bias for the causal estimation of γ. 
To illustrate, I discuss each of the three potential scenarios. First, there may exist subject-
varying student-level unobservables that are correlated with both (𝐴𝑖1 −  𝐴𝑖2) and (𝑇1 −
𝑇2). If student-level unobservables, such as effort and motivation, are subject-varying, this 
would become problematic if these student-level unobservables remain in the error and are 
correlated with subject-specific teacher characteristics. For instance, if student ability is 
subject-specific, ( 𝜇𝑖1 −  𝜇𝑖2)  is not netted out and remains in the error term; and if 
correlated with teacher quality variables (𝑇1 − 𝑇2), an omitted variable bias problem could 
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arise. But for that to happen, students must be matched to specific teachers by subject, such 
that high-performing students in subject s are systematically matched with better teachers 
for that subject.  
 
In response, I take advantage of the two wave nature of the China Education Panel Survey 
(CEPS) dataset to include a vector of subject-dependent student-level baseline control 
variables 𝑋𝑠, which include subject-specific test scores of the previous academic year, as 
well as rich subject-varying student information on outside-of-class effort, teacher-student 
interaction, and learning motivation at baseline. For subject-varying outside-of-class 
student effort, I proxy this with student’s attendance in subject-specific private tutoring, 
whereas I explicitly model for subject-varying teacher-student interaction, and student 
learning motivation using subject-specific student survey responses. In detail, for each of 
the three tested subjects, students are asked to answer if they attend outside-of-school 
private tutoring for each subject, rate their frequency of in-class interaction with each 
subject teacher, and evaluate the general usefulness of subject content later in life. 
 
𝑋𝑠 =  {𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡−1, 𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡−1,  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 } (1.4) 
 
Second, there may exist teacher-level omitted variables that are subject-varying, which are 
related to outcomes at the student-level. To mitigate this source of bias, I add a vector of 𝐶s, 
which includes additional teacher-specific baseline covariates that vary across subjects. 
The vector of 𝐶s  is composed of indicators such as teacher’s sex, teaching experience, 
whether the teacher is a homeroom teacher, as well as other observable teacher 
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characteristics: certification status, whether she received preservice training through a 
normal education program, current teacher rank, and prestige of teaching award received. 
In addition, to detect the degree of presence in non-random sorting among students and 
teachers, I also check whether these subject-specific teacher characteristics are correlated 
with student subject-specific test scores.  
 
𝐶𝑠 =  {𝑠𝑒𝑥, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚,           
𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡, 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘, 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑}  (1.5) 
 
Third, for robustness check, I inspect for possible confounding relationships in respect to 
ability grouping practices. Specifically, it would be especially concerning if students are 
assigned to subjects according to their subject test scores, which I control for using subject-
specific teacher responses detailing whether class assignment had been based on student 
test scores on that particular subject. In addition, I also run an independent subsample 
regression for students whose homeroom teachers reported that ability grouping was 
nonexistent in class assignment. 
 
In effect, the detailed analytic approach is expanded and presented in the following form: 
 
𝐴𝑖𝑠 = α +  β𝑋𝑠(𝑡−1)  +  γ𝑇𝑠 +  π𝐶𝑠 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑠      (1.6) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑠 is student i’s achievement score in subject s. 𝑋𝑠(𝑡−1) is a vector of student-
level background characteristics for student i that vary across subjects at baseline. 
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Specifically, for each student i, I control for subject-specific test scores of the previous 
academic year, baseline enrolment in private tutoring, baseline frequency of student-
teacher interactions, and student evaluation on usefulness of the subject content at baseline. 
𝑇𝑠 refers to the level of educational attainment for the individual responsible for teaching 
subject s. The model attempts to estimate an unbiased γ as the key coefficient of interest, 
which reflects the relationship between observable teacher quality characteristics and 
student learning outcomes. 𝐶𝑠 is a vector of additional teacher-specific control covariates 
that vary across subject: sex, experience, homeroom status, certification status, teacher 
education attendance, teacher rank, and teaching award received. 𝜇𝑖 is the student fixed-
effect, which controls for all student-level observable and unobservable characteristics that 
do not vary across subjects. Finally, 𝑖𝑠 is the remaining error term. 
 
As a final step, in order to assess whether heterogeneity in the relationship between teacher 
quality and student learning exists in consideration to student background characteristics, 
I interact teacher quality variables in Equation 1.6 with student baseline characteristics, 
including student’s sex, baseline test scores, minority status, whether she is a “left-behind 
children” (both parents not living with student), and whether the student reported that her 
family is experiencing financial hardship. Inclusion of the interaction terms changes the 
interpretation of the key coefficient  γ , which now refers to the impact of teacher’s 
educational attainment on learning outcomes among the advantaged student population. 
Consequentially, coefficients for the interaction term correspond to the degree to which 
student learning outcomes of disadvantaged students are differentially affected, relative to 
advantaged student groups.  
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3.2 Part II: The Teaching Wage Penalty 
In this section, I utilize micro-level individual earnings data to answer the empirical 
question regarding relative earnings level between teachers and comparable workers in 
non-teaching sectors. Policymakers across different contexts are generally very interested 
in recruiting individuals with high aptitudes to enter the teaching profession (see Allegretto, 
Corcoran, & Mishel, 2008), and consequently, it becomes crucial to examine relative wage 
characteristics in the teaching sector that teachers face, and ask: are they reasonably 
attractive for teachers?  
 
In line with the teacher occupational choice framework, returns to skills is one of the key 
parameters that affects how individuals determine occupational choice, assuming skills 
demands are sufficiently correlated across fields. To this end, the research objective in Part 
II is to understand whether there exists a “wage penalty” for individuals who choose to 
become teachers, compared to workers of similar demographic and background attributes. 
In this context, a teaching wage penalty can mean that individuals who choose to pursue 
teaching may face either a lower average sectoral wage or lower returns to their human 
capital in the teaching sector, holding all else equal.  
 
For implementation, I follow two separate estimation steps. In the first step, I empirically 
estimate the mean wage difference between teachers and non-teachers using Mincer (1974) 
earnings function. The results from this first analysis led light on mean sectoral wage 
differences and carry empirical implications for understanding teacher occupational choice. 
In the second step, I investigate the degree to which there exists heterogeneous returns to 
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skills in teaching and non-teaching sectors. The rate of returns to skills and human capital 
in a given sector is a key determinant for occupational choice, as individuals pursue 
comparative skills advantage in different labor markets. Broadly speaking, by documenting 
the magnitude and shifts in these parameters over the past decades, I generate predictions 
of how the quality of teacher supply changes. More concretely, a rise in the difference in 
mean wages and an increase in the ratio of earnings dispersion would result in high ability 
individuals choosing between whichever sectors that yield higher returns to skills and/or 
human capital. 
 
To look more specifically into the empirical application, I adopt standard Mincer (1974) 
earnings function to estimate regression-adjusted mean wage differences between teachers 
and non-teaching workers as well as the net effect of skills and human capital accumulation 
(proxied by Bachelor’s degree receipt) on log weekly earnings (see Allegretto, Corcoran, 
& Mishel, 2008, p.11, for a detailed discussion on the advantages of using weekly earnings, 
as opposed to using annual, monthly, or hourly wages). To this end, the Mincerian earnings 
function framework assumes that education, considered a main measure of accumulated 
human capital, develops general skills valued in the labor market and can explain for the 
variations found in individual earnings, following the functional form: 
 
lnW = f(Edu, Exp, Exp Squared)     (2.0) 
 
where the log weekly wages are regressed on education attainment, work experience, and 
a quadratic function of work experience. In more detail, I adapt this generic form of Mincer 
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function to the estimating of “wage penalty” for teachers, relative to earnings of workers 
in public and private sectors, while accounting for important background and demographic 
characteristics at the individual level. The empirical formulation of this relationship is 
expressed by the following: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑁𝑇𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑢𝑁𝑇𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖𝛽4 +  𝑖   (2.1) 
 
where Yi  is the natural logarithm of weekly wages, Expi
2 is the Mincerian work 
experience and its quadratic term, PuNTi  and PrNTi denote dummy variables public 
sector non-teaching (otherwise =0), and private sector non-teaching (otherwise =0) 
respectively. In addition, Xi is a vector of individual-level control covariates including 
educational attainment levels (2-year associate’s is the reference category), female (male 
=0), single (otherwise =0), minority (Han =0), party member (otherwise =0), tenured or 
permanent contract worker (otherwise =0), age cohort fixed-effects, and worker-type 
dummy variables. εij is the remaining error term. All standard errors are clustered at the 
province level to account for the data design feature that individuals are nested within 
sampled provinces. 
 
Importantly, the coefficient β2 will indicate the regression-adjusted mean wage 
differences between teachers and private sector non-teaching workers, and the coefficient 
β3  will indicate the regression-adjusted mean wage differences between teachers and 
public sector non-teaching workers. This standard Mincerian model serves as the base 
model. In subsequent models, I add interaction terms of private sector non-teaching with 
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educational attainment, and public sector non-teaching with educational attainment, which 
will provide results on whether there are differential returns to education in different sectors. 
In detail, the expanded specification with interaction terms takes the following form: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑁𝑇𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑢𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑁𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖 
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑢𝑁𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖𝛽4 +  𝑖        (2.2) 
 
where β2  and β3 will now indicate the mean wage differences between non-Bachelor’s 
degree holders between teachers and private or public sector non-teaching workers 
respectively. β5 and  β6 will refer to the differential returns to having a Bachelor’s degree 
in teaching versus that of private and public sectors. Consequently, the two-step analysis, 
as illustrated in Equation (2.1) and (2.2), will provide answers to whether there is a “wage 
penalty” in terms of mean wages and returns to skills for teachers and indication of its 
magnitude as well as relative shifts over time. 
 
The standard Mincer function is typically estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions, however, OLS estimates may produce biased estimates (Card, 2001). In 
addition, as Scott-Clayton and Wen (2017) points out with data in the U.S., controlling for 
ability and background characteristics are important and matters more for individuals with 
lower attainment levels. Nonetheless, in this analysis, the goal is to evaluate the relative 
attractiveness of wages in teaching and non-teaching sectors. Therefore, I do not attempt 
to argue for causal identification, but will tackle potential endogeneity issues by including 
additional control variables: year of birth fixed-effects, father’s education, and mother’s 
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education. Finally, all of the above analysis will be repeated for each wave of available 
CHIP data, with the objective to illustrate how the regression-adjusted mean wage 
differences and returns to education change over time. 
 
3.3 Part III: Teacher Quality and Occupational Trends 
In Part II, I documented how teaching wage characteristics evolved over time in China, 
from which I evaluate key parameters central to the occupational choice framework 
regarding what influences individual’s career determination. In this section, I take a step 
further by exploring labor quality trends in the Chinese teacher labor market. I seek to 
understand how teachers compare with non-teachers, on a number of labor quality 
measures. Conceptually, labor quality often refers to the marginal product of skills on some 
form of labor output. However, such information is often not easily observed, or measured 
a priori. Therefore, in the following analysis, I conceive labor quality as a vector of 
observable characteristics that is valued throughout the labor force, in both teaching and 
non-teaching sectors.  
 
A conventional approach adopted by labor economists, shown in Part II, is to use education 
and experience-adjusted wages as a measure of labor quality, as schooling and experience 
are often regarded as proxy for skill level on the job, and wages represent how the market 
values such sets of skills (Lakdawalla, 2006). However, because different sectors often 
reward worker skills and ability differently, it becomes problematic in this regard due to 
simultaneity or reverse causality. Consequently, I elect to focus on a separate class of 
proxies for labor quality and worker skills – attained education level, upper secondary 
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school selectivity, and national college entrance exam scores – as indicators of labor quality 
for comparing teaching and non-teaching sectors. These crude measures of human capital 
are used primarily as proxies of worker skills, and are intended to be interpreted broadly, 
either as signals of premarket or innate skills, accumulated human capital, and/or academic 
proficiency for productivity development on the job. While these simple measures only 
capture some aspects of teacher and/or labor quality, it is difficult to argue that they are 
either uninformative with respect to the level of human capital and skills attained by the 
worker or unrelated to teacher or labor quality. 
 
To implement, I use a multinomial probit model to estimate the relationship between 
measures of labor quality – education level, high school selectivity, national college 
entrance exam scores – and observed occupational choice in teaching, public non-teaching 
or private non-teaching careers. To ensure comparability among career outcomes, this part 
of the analysis is restricted to the professional worker subsample within each wave of CHIP 
data, in which each employed worker reported to be either an owner, a manger, a 
professional, or laborer. In addition, while the multinomial probit model is in many ways 
similar to the multinomial logit model, its error terms are not necessarily required to be 
independent of each other as in multinomial logit estimation (Greene, 2000). In particular, 
because multinomial probit does not assume independence of irrelevant alternatives in the 
outcome choice sets, which may result in computation bias, it is often considered a more 
accurate alternative to multinomial logit models. In this regard, I adopt a multinomial probit 




𝑃𝑟 (𝑇𝑖 = 𝑗) = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑄𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖𝛽2 +  𝑖         (3.1) 
 
where the outcome of interest 𝑇𝑖 is set to equal different observed occupational decisions 
j for individual i, with being a teacher set as the base comparison category. Respectively, 
𝑄𝑖 is defined using different measures of labor quality – education attainment level and 
high school selectivity – estimated independently in separate models. 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of 
individual-level covariates including female (male =0), single (otherwise =0), minority 
(Han =0), party member (otherwise =0), and εij is the remaining error term. All standard 
errors are clustered at the provincial level. Coefficients 𝛽1 in the above multinomial probit 
model is expected to indicate the relationship of different measures of labor quality on 
individual occupational decision in and outside of teaching careers. For interpretation, 
𝛽1 indicates the human capital premium or gap exhibited by teachers on other comparable 
workers in the private and public sectors. To evaluate the magnitude of the relationship 
between different measures of labor quality 𝑄𝑖 and individual career decision outcomes 𝑇𝑖, 
I report marginal effects using Adjusted Predictions at the Mean (APS) for binary and 
continuous variables separately. For binary explanatory variables, marginal effects indicate 
the discrete change in predicted probabilities of entry into occupational outcome j as the 
value of the binary variable changes from 0 to 1. For continuous explanatory variables, the 
marginal effect reflects the instantaneous rate of change in predicted probabilities that is 
related to a 1-unit increase. 
 
To further distinguish the differential quality patterns in teacher stock and teacher flow, I 
report Adjusted Predictions at Representative Values (APRV) using identical multinomial 
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probit regressions, specifically for individuals whose age (a) is 30 and for individuals 
whose age is 50. Marginal effects conditional on age equals 50 years old will approximate 
the relationship between obtaining a Bachelor’s degree and observed occupational choice 
decisions in the existing stock of the labor force (𝛽1
′  in Equation 3.2), while the marginal 
effect results conditional on age equals 30 years old will illustrate the career decisions of 
new labor market entrants (𝛽1
′′  in Equation 3.3). Finally, the above analysis will be 
repeated for each wave of CHIP subject to data availability to untangle stock and flow 
effects in the labor market, and results from this exercise can illustrate how the teacher 
“ability premium”, if there is one, has changed over time. 
 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 𝑗 | 𝑎 = 50) = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1′𝑄𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖𝛽2 +  𝑖         (3.2) 
 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 𝑗 | 𝑎 = 30) = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1′′𝑄𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖𝛽2 +  𝑖         (3.3) 
 
3.4 Part IV:  
Teacher Exits, Opportunity Wages, and Non-Pecuniary Outcomes 
Over the past decades, China has persistently mobilized its education system to improve 
teacher quality at the basic education level, and one particular influential strategy has been 
focused on optimizing the “quality and composition of the teaching force” (State Council, 
2017, Section 1). Evidence in the United States and from international contexts has shown 
that pre-retirement teacher attrition, or teacher turnover, is a key factor in affecting teacher 
quality, and that job satisfaction including pay and teaching conditions are among the 
leading causes for departure (Ingersoll, 2001; Aklog, 2005; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007; 
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Sutcher, Darling-Hammond, & Carver-Thomas, 2016). Particularly in China, while teacher 
retention has been a growing concern (Sargent & Hannum, 2005), few empirical studies 
have examined the influence of job characteristics on teacher turnover rates in this context.  
 
In this section, I seek to investigate the incidence of teacher turnover and exits from 
teaching posts. Particularly, I evaluate the determinants of teacher’s decision to leave 
teaching posts, and its influence on individual’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns in the 
labor market. Existing studies that investigate China’s teacher retention and turnover have 
predominantly relied on prospective approaches and often relied on expressed preferences. 
Studies often adopt some variation of teacher opinion or attitude surveys, such that current 
teachers answer questionnaires regarding their intentions to stay or leave their current posts. 
For instance, Liu and Onwuegbuzie (2012) find that about two-in-five (40.4 percent) 
teacher respondents in Jilin Province, China report intention to leave teaching had they 
been given the opportunity, and many teachers cite high level of stress, low salary, 
inadequate breaks and holidays, heavy workload, and difficult student behaviors as reasons 
for departure. Using a similar teacher attitude survey of 510 respondents, Liu (2012) also 
finds a negative correlation between teachers’ compensation and their turnover intentions. 
 
However, relying only on attitude surveys and prospective answers on occupational 
decision can be problematic, because a myriad of factors unrelated to individual’s 
motivation can influence teacher responses, such as the ordering and wording of questions, 
social desirability bias, and so on (Duckworth & Yeager, 2015). In addition, existing 
research in developed countries has shown that there are large discrepancies between 
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teacher’s actual career decision and recorded survey responses. For instance, teachers often 
opt for the highest paying job (Steele, Murnane, & Willett, 2010), but when surveyed, tend 
to turn down the role of pecuniary compensation or the importance of working condition 
(Liu, Johnson, & Peske, 2004). Such evidence highlights the importance of utilizing 
revealed career preferences as opposed to only analyzing expressed job preferences. 
 
To this end, this part of the dissertation leverages rich individual-level information 
available through a linked nationally representative panel dataset, RUMiC 2007 and 
RUMiC 2008, to track teachers across years and relate compensation levels to teacher’s 
decision to stay or leave teaching. In particular, I connect teacher job exit decisions to the 
broader occupational choice framework by assessing the relationship between teacher exit 
decisions and a teacher’s observed wage difference from the mean wage of comparably 
educated workers. The main argument for connecting these two variables derives from the 
occupational choice framework’s prediction that opportunity wages, proxied by alternative 
non-teaching wages (see Falch, Johansen, & Strom, 2009; Nagler, Popiunik, & West, 2015; 
Neugebauer, 2015), can influence how teachers make occupational decisions. To be more 
specific, a teacher’s observed wage difference from the mean wage of comparably educated 
workers measures the earnings spread between teaching and non-teaching jobs among 
workers with arguably similar levels of human capital, and is conceptualized here as the 
opportunity cost to commit to a career in teaching. While theoretically relevant, the 
relationship between opportunity wage and individual occupational choice decisions is not 
well documented in low- and middle-income countries. Accordingly, this section will 
attempt to identify the causal impact of teaching-to-non-teaching wage spread on the 
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probability of teachers choosing to leave teaching posts. 
 
However, the causal impact of non-teaching wage premium on teacher’s exit decisions 
cannot be easily estimated in a cross-sectional data because of the fundamental missing 
data problem for counterfactuals. For instance, researchers can observe only one wage 
information in one state of the world, either high or low non-teaching premium, for any 
given individual. Therefore, this analysis anchors on the subsample of tracked teachers 
available in the linked RUMiC 2007 and 2008 panel dataset to establish reasonable 
counterfactuals, and leverages within-individual variation to eliminate unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity that may influence job exit decisions. Subsequently, I estimate a 
standard individual fixed-effect regression in the following form: 
 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑇𝑖𝑡) =  𝛾 ∙  ∆𝑊𝑖?̂? +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝜃 +  𝜇𝑖  +  𝑖𝑡        (4.1) 
 
where 𝑃 𝑟(𝑇𝑖𝑡) is the probability of individual i identified as a teacher at time t, and it is 
regressed on the key explanatory variable  ∆𝑊𝑖𝑡 ̂ , which is computed as the conditional 
wage difference between teacher i and comparable workers who reside in the same 
province, with the same level of educational attainment at time t. Importantly, 𝛾  will 
represent the relationship between opportunity wages and probability of staying in teaching 
jobs. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of time-varying control variables such as logarithm of weekly income, 
number of work hours per week, and tenure status. 𝜇𝑖  is the individual fixed-effect 
variable which will effectively eliminate all time-invariant observable and unobservable 
factors, such as demographic background, educational level, etc. To further account for 
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potential year-sensitive bias introduced through aggregate common shocks, I add year 
fixed-effect dummies as additional control.  
 
As a final step, I examine how teacher’s job-related decisions can impact one’s non-
pecuniary life outcomes. To implement, I utilize an index of subjective well-being (SWB) 
available in the RUMiC dataset to proxy for individual’s attained utility. Subjective well-
being is a holistic psychiatric measure of happiness, life satisfaction, and/or distress (Clark 
& Oswald, 2002), which was collected on both waves of RUMiC. In detail, the SWB index 
is constructed using a set of 12 questions, GHQ-12, each indicating 1 as the best scenario 
and 4 as the worst. Following Fang and Sakellariou (2015), I compute total raw scores on 
all responses, and subtract it from 48, which results in a composite index ranging between 
0 and 36. In detail, I fit an individual fixed-effect model of the following form: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿 ∙ (𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝜃 +  𝜇𝑖  +  𝑖𝑡         (4.2) 
 
such that 𝑈𝑖 is the derived utility of individual i at time t and is approximated using the 
SWB index. 𝐷𝑖𝑡 refers to a choice set of j possible career outcomes that individuals can 
choose from: become a teacher, remain as a teacher, or exit teaching, while 𝛿 is a set of 
coefficients that are associated with each choice. I add 𝑋𝑖𝑡 as a set of time-varying control 
variables: logarithm of weekly income, number of work hours per week, tenure status, and 
self-reported health outcomes. Similar to Equation 4.1, 𝜇𝑖 is the individual fixed-effect 
that will remove all time-invariant observable and unobservables, while adding year fixed-




This dissertation leverages the availability of two large and publicly available datasets in 
China. In Part I of the analysis, I employ student-to-teacher linked data available in the 
China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) to establish causal links between teacher quality 
measures and student learning outcomes, whereas in the succeeding Parts II, III, and IV, I 
utilize the rich earnings data collected from the China Household Income Project (CHIP) 
to answer questions regarding relative teacher wages and teacher ability trend shifts over 
time. After a thorough review of the current landscape of publically available micro-
datasets in China, these two datasets are chosen among others not only because they offer 
a large sample size and national representation, but also because their survey questions 
contain key information on student learning, teacher qualifications, worker wages, among 
other key variables that are central to answering core research questions which motivated 
this dissertation. In the following sections, I elaborate in further details regarding main 
features of these two datasets. 
 
3.51 China Education Panel Survey 
Administered by the National Survey Research Center, the China Education Panel Survey 
(CEPS) is the first nationally representative and longitudinal survey of lower secondary 
school students in China (National Survey Research Center, 2014). The core objective of 
the CEPS is to document youth transition as they progress from lower secondary to upper 
secondary schools and beyond, and collect detailed background information on 
instructional content and practices, learning environment and facilities, learning outcomes 
and behaviors, as well as family and socioeconomic conditions. The longitudinal project 
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initially launched in the 2013-2014 academic year and applies a stratified, multi-stage, 
probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) sampling design, and is devised to be a nationally 
representative dataset. A total of 22,400 students in 438 classes in 112 middle schools were 
surveyed at baseline in two age cohorts: seventh and ninth grade students (2 classes per 
grade, 2 grades per school). The seventh grade cohort is planned to be tracked annually as 
they move into upper grades in lower secondary schools, while the ninth grade cohort will 
be followed through their transition into upper secondary education and the labor market.  
 
Baseline Sampling 
By design, the CEPS baseline survey follows a school-based data collection procedure, 
utilizing multi-stage, multi-strata, and proportional-to-size sampling (PPS) methodology. 
At the first stage, surveyors sample 28 units from an exhaustive list of 2870 county-level 
administrative units, of which 15 county-level observations are randomly chosen from the 
national sample, 10 county-level observations are randomly chosen from a list of 120 
migrant-dense counties (defined as within-province migrant count exceeding 222 thousand 
and/or between-province migrant count exceeding 196 thousand), and finally, 3 county-
level observations are randomly chosen from the Shanghai metropolitan area (see Table 3-
1 for detailed breakdown). At the second stage, local education authorities provide detailed 
school-level information, including range of grades, school size, percentage of out-of-
district enrollment, on all lower secondary schools in their jurisdiction. Based on the 
county-level school sampling frame and using PPS methods, surveyors randomly identify 
four lower-secondary schools within each of the sampled county that has at least one 
seventh grade and at least one ninth grade classroom. In the third stage, surveyors work 
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directly with principals from each sampled school, and within each school, two classrooms 
from each grade, seventh and ninth, are randomly chosen and subsequently surveyed. If 
there is less than two classes per grade, all classes enter the sample. In the final step, all 
students within sampled classrooms, along with all associated parents, homeroom teachers, 
subject teachers, and principals are all surveyed to form the completed sample.  
 
Table 3-1. Number of Observations at Baseline, by CEPS sampling frame 
















119 24 78 221 








118 22 77 217 
      
Number of 
Schools 
60 12 40 112 
Number of 
Counties 
15 3 10 28 
Source: Author’s compilation of CEPS data.  
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Baseline Data Collection 
At each school that is included in the sample, surveyors collaborate with local education 
authorities to work with school-level leadership personnel to arrange for an appropriate 
time for data collection. Then, surveyors collect principals’, teachers’, parents’ and students’ 
consent to participate in the study. Next, surveyors directly obtain school-level 
administrative data on student core subject test scores on Chinese language arts, 
Mathematics, and English (mid-semester test scores for spring semester, 2013). They also 
work with teachers and students to arrange for a 45-minute session for each class to 
complete the cognitive-item test component of the survey. Upon completion of the 
cognitive test and student questionnaires, all homeroom and subject teachers from the 
selected classes are surveyed. For subject teachers, only those teaching the three core 
subjects Chinese language arts, Mathematics, and English are surveyed. If the homeroom 
teacher teaches one of the three core subjects, her response replaces the subject 
questionnaire. Finally, parent questionnaires are distributed to students, to be filled by 
parents at home, and collected the next day by homeroom teachers. Importantly, for each 
type of questionnaire, the surveyors adopt a detailed verification process to ensure data 
quality and completeness, with the only exception being on the cognitive test components. 
The nested nature of the dataset also allows for matching student responses to families’, to 
teachers’, and to principals’. 
 
Baseline Variables 
The CEPS questionnaire set includes a total of five independently administered surveys, 
for students, parents, homeroom teachers, subject teachers, and principals. A unique feature 
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of this survey is that it contains rich student-level information including administrative 
information on core subject test scores, as well as detailed, matched family and teacher 
background characteristics information. In particular, for each student, information on 
demographic, cognitive ability, health, family, learning, and extracurricular variables are 
collected with administrative data on core subject test scores. For each teacher, detailed 
background information on educational attainment level, years of experience, training, 
certification, rank, awards, as well as information on instructional effort and behavior, 
stress level, attitudes, and expectations are available. 
 
Follow-up Data Collection 
In the 2014-2015 academic year, CEPS conducted a follow-up survey for all students who 
all participated in the first wave. While the follow-up survey was conducted at the school-
level, the survey team adopted two different strategies in tracking students who were in 
seventh and ninth grades during baseline survey. For all of the 10,279 students who were 
in seventh grade at baseline, surveyors considered them potential subjects in the follow-up 
round. For those who were in the ninth grade cohort during baseline survey, the follow-up 
survey was mainly to obtain administrative records of test scores and homeroom teacher 
response regarding student graduation whereabouts. 
 
In the analysis presented in Part I, I focus exclusively on the tracked students in the seventh 
grade cohort across 112 schools. In the follow-up survey, out of 10,279 students, a total of 
9,449 students (91.9 percent) who were in the seventh grade cohort were tracked and 
surveyed. For the seventh grade cohort, total attrition from the baseline seventh grade 
73 
 
cohort sample was 830 students (see Table 3-2 for detailed breakdown by attrition type), 
of which the three prominent reasons were school transfer (71.1 percent), dropout (14.6 
percent), and unknown (6.1 percent).  
 
Table 3-2. Number of Follow-up Attrition in CEPS Seventh Grade Cohort, by type 
 
Count Frequency (%) 
School Transfer 590 71.08 
Dropout 121 14.58 
Unknown 51 6.14 
Short-term Absence 31 3.73 
Long-term Sick Leave  14 1.69 
Class Transfer 8 0.96 
Long-term Absence 4 0.48 
Repeat Grade  3 0.36 
Vocational School Transfer 3 0.36 
Expelled 2 0.24 
Deceased 2 0.24 
Sports Team Leave 1 0.12 
Total 830 100 
Source: National Survey Research Center, 2015. 
 
 
Similar to the baseline data collection, the follow-up questionnaire set also includes five 
independently administered surveys, for students, parents, homeroom teachers, subject 
teachers, and principals. More specifically, I focus on student level test score information 
on Chinese language arts, Mathematics, and English from the follow-up survey dataset. 
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These standardized test scores are collected from school-wide mid-semester examinations, 
for which it is common practice for the entire grade to partake during a common testing 
period. These mid-semester exams are usually designed collectively by subject teachers in 
the same grade with clear intentions to test students on curriculum contents, and answer 
sheets are graded with good rigor and consistency. In some schools, student’s names and 
class are even hidden from the grader to ensure score validity. Therefore to a degree, core 
subject mid-semester test scores can be regarded as a consistent measure of student learning 
outcomes in a given grade.  
 
In practice, I utilize administrative data on student core subject test scores in the follow-up 
survey found for the seventh grade cohort, and match it to the baseline seventh grade cohort 
data. I focus on the core subject test scores for three additional reasons. First, these core 
subjects are crucial for continuing education beyond lower secondary schools in the 
Chinese context. For instance, the combined weight for these three subjects often exceed 
three quarters of the total score on standardized admission test to upper secondary 
education and subsequently access to higher education through the College Entrance 
Examination. Secondly, these subjects are fundamental to obtaining skills that can facilitate 
further education and training opportunities. Without the foundational skills obtained 
through the learning of these core subjects, it will be challenging to take advantage of future 
skills upgrading opportunities either through continuing education or workplace training. 
Third, these three subjects are considered core subjects of instruction and takes up more 
than one half of total instructional time in schools. Therefore, teacher instructional quality 
and student learning outcomes on these core subjects are arguably key determinants and 
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proxies for overall educational quality. 
 
3.52 China Household Income Survey 
The Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) is a repeated cross-sectional dataset 
collected by researchers at Beijing Normal University, with support from the National 
Bureau of Statistics. Beginning in 1989, there has been seven waves of data collection. 
Among them, five waves use multistage stratified probability method to achieve national 
representation, which are respectively referred to as CHIP1988, CHIP1995, CHIP2002, 
CHIP2007, and CHIP2013 (the numbers correspond to the year that survey responses are 
based on). CHIP1999 included only urban households, while CHIP2008 represented a 
panel follow-up to CHIP2007, which included an urban household survey, a rural 
household survey, and a rural-to-urban migrant household survey. Collectively, five waves 
of CHIP data (with exception of the urban survey in 1999 and the panel follow-up in 2008) 
anchor on the established National Bureau of Statistics routine household survey sample. 
Each wave of CHIP data offers a snapshot of labor market conditions at the micro-level, 
and represents one of the most comprehensive publicly-available repeated cross-sectional 
data that cover important employment and income information over a time range of 25 
years, that is suitable for tracking dynamics of sectoral employment and income 
characteristics over time. 
 
Parts II, III, and IV of this dissertation leverages the detailed individual-level demographic 
and earnings information, as well as the large sample size and timing variation available in 
CHIP data to empirically evaluate patterns in the relationship between relative wages and 
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teacher occupational choice over time. Specifically, I focus exclusively on the urban 
sample, where wage income is reported for employed individuals, and the labor market 
conditions are arguably comparable across sectors. In addition, to ensure that the influence 
of income outliers and data input error, a standard 1 percent winsoring procedure was 
applied to all wage earnings information, such that the top and bottom 1 percent of wage 
earnings are replaced with values at the 99 and 1 percentile respectively. As a further step 
to standardize repeated cross-sectional data for better comparability, I restrict the analytic 
sample to individuals aged between 16 and 60 at the time when the survey took place. 
 
In Table 3-3 and 3-4, I show the detailed sample size breakdown and geographical 
distribution by year. In general, the total urban sample size fluctuates approximately 
between 15,000 and 30,000 across years, while roughly about close to one half of the 
sample report currently being employed in paid labor arrangements, which include being 
self-employed and paid helpers in family business operations. Importantly, I identify 
between 190 – 779 teachers in each wave of the CHIP data. In this regard, because CHIP 
datasets do not include ISCO or equivalent job-level codes, therefore, identification of 
teachers are based jointly on sectoral, occupational, and work unit ownership information. 
Unfortunately, due to data availability, I am not able to distinguish between levels of 
instruction; however, because teachers who work in primary and secondary education 
represent the largest population within the teaching force, they are likely oversampled in 
my identification of teachers. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that a substantial 
number of identified teachers work in primary and secondary settings. Particularly, teachers 
are identified as professional workers who are employed in the education sector and 
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working in public institutions (shiye danwei). In the following section, I provide further 
information on the data sampling, collection, and variables on each wave of CHIP data in 
the succeeding text. 
 
Table 3-3. CHIP Sample Size, by year 
Year 
Full Sample,  
Urban Individuals 
Employed Workers,  
Urban Analytic Sample 
Identified Teachers, 
Urban Analytic Sample 
1988 31827 17073 779 
1995 21533 10765 441 
2002 21696 9762 505 
2007 14695 5465 207 
2008 14859 5452 190 
2013 19887 7811 429 
Source: Author’s compilation using Chinese Household Income Project. 
 
 
Table 3-4. CHIP Sample Geographical Coverage, by year 
Year List of Sampled Provincial-level Regions Count 
1988 
Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, 
Henan, Hubei, Yunnan, Gansu 
10 
1995 
Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, 
Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu 
11 
2002 
Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, 





Beijing, Shanghai, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Yunnan, Gansu 
16 
2008 
Beijing, Shanghai, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Yunnan, Gansu 
16 
2013 
Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Gansu, 
Xinjiang, Shandong 
15 




The objective of initiating CHIP1988 was primarily to study income distribution and 
inequality in China, which involved sampling of provincial-level administrative regions in 
a stratified multi-stage procedure (Eichen & Zhang, 1993). The urban and rural sampling 
frames are based on the routine household sample maintained by the National Bureau of 
Statistics, which included 34,945 urban and 67,186 rural households. Within each 
household, all members are surveyed. Systematic sampling methods based on income 
distribution was employed, which derived a cross-sectional dataset that included 31,827 
individuals nested within 9,009 urban households, and 51,352 individuals within 10,258 
rural households. In-person data collection took place in the spring of 1989, and 
respondents reported information on sex, age, education, income, employment status, 





Conducted between January and March in 1996, CHIP1995 systematically samples the 
National Bureau of Statistics’ established routine household sample using a stratified multi-
stage procedure, which derived an urban sample of 21,533 individuals in 6868 households, 
and 34,739 individuals in 7,998 rural households. The administered survey questionnaires 
collected similar background and employment information as in the previous 1988 wave. 
 
CHIP 2002 
Conducted in the spring of 2003, CHIP2002 included a rural-to-urban migrant sample in 
addition to the previously standard urban and rural subsamples. Consistent with previous 
cycles, the urban subsamples was drawn from the larger National Bureau of Statistics’ 
established routine urban household sample using a multistage stratified probability 
method to be nationally representative. The sampling procedure yields a dataset with 
21,696 individuals in 6,934 households. Survey questionnaire collected similar background 
and employment information as in previous waves, but with additional information on the 
selectivity of high schools that individuals attended. 
 
CHIP 2007, 2008 and RUMiC 2007, 2008 
To be clear, CHIP 2007 and CHIP 2008 are often referenced in the broader research 
community as the 2007 and 2008 waves of the longitudinal survey on Rural-Urban 
Migration in China (RUMiC). Collected in the spring of 2008 and 2009, the two-wave 
survey was jointly designed and administered by an international consortium of researchers 
with support from the National Bureau of Statistics. The project was designed to track 
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households so long as they are present in the surveyed cities, which means that the dataset 
could be evaluated as cross-sectional data independently or linked together as individual 
panel data. Respectively, RUMiC 2007 and RUMiC 2008 each comprises of three 
independent survey components: urban household survey, rural household survey, migrant 
household survey (see Akguc, Giulietti, Zimmermann, 2014). Each of the three survey 
components includes detailed information on household and individual demographics, 
employment and income, training and education, health and well-being, among other 
background dimensions such as social networks, etc.  
 
Of particular interest, the urban sample was derived using National Bureau of Statistics’ 
routine household sample, which involved randomly sampling households in nineteen 
different cities across sixteen provinces. According to Akguc, Giulietti, and Zimmermann’s 
(2014) reporting, the total number of households surveyed in RUMiC 2007 was 5,005 and 
included 14,695 individuals, of which 5.8 percent of the baseline sample was lost in the 
follow-up RUMiC 2008 but added about 1,018 individuals (see Table 3-5). The 
questionnaires included detailed information on demographics, employment, and 
socioeconomic variables, such as age, marital status, children, household registration status, 
as well as migration status and experience. 
 
CHIP 2013 
Conducted in July and August of 2014, CHIP2013 collected information on 2013 income 
and expenditure as well as personal and household background characteristics. Stratified 
by geographic location, the sampling frame is derived from an established routine 
81 
 
household sample maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics which included over 
160,000 households in 31 provinces. Systematic sampling derived 19,887 individuals 
nested within 6,674 households. Similar to CHIP2002, survey questionnaire in this cycle 
also collected personal background and employment information as in previous waves, as 
well as additional information on the selectivity of high schools that individuals attended. 
 














RUMiC 2007 5005 14695 5465 207 
RUMiC 2008 4735 14859 5452 190 





1018 - - 







In this chapter, I sequentially present complete results from each part of the dissertation 
analysis. However, before proceeding directly into the micro-level analysis results, a brief 
discussion of macro-level trends in teacher wages is in order to illustrate the broader 
contextual background for the succeeding micro-level analyses. To situate the discussion 
more broadly in China’s development context, a 30-fold expansion of real GDP since 1978 
suggests that labor market conditions have experienced rapid shifts, and the magnitude of 
change is qualitatively different from most developed economies (Wen, 2015). Drastic 
shifts within a relatively short window of time may exacerbate the adverse occupational 
selection effects, especially with the presence of relatively fixed teacher salary schedules 
and infrequent wage adjustments as compared to other sectors. Therefore, the core 
objective of this macro-level analysis is to understand how aggregate-level wages in 
teaching has shifted, as well as identify emerging patterns in the quality composition of 
teachers using a common measure of human capital: educational attainment. In more detail, 
I present results from a relative wage accounting exercise at the cross-sector level in Table 
4-0-1 as well as taking a deep dive within-education in Figure 4-0-1, and compile worker 
composition information to show changes in the educational attainment of teachers in 
Tables 4-0-2 and 4-0-3, as well as examining sources of net teacher intake in Table 4-0-4. 
 
Firstly, in Table 4-0-1, following Lakdawalla (2006) and using most recently available 
disaggregated sectoral wage data, I deflate teacher wages using national average worker 
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wage for a given year, and for easy interpretation, log point changes are transformed as 
percent changes. In broad strokes, Table 4-0-1 shows that observed wage growth for 
teachers, relative to the average national worker between 1999 and 2009, has substantially 
regressed, at -44.1 percent for primary school teachers and -46.7 percent for secondary 
school teachers respectively. This wage accounting exercise indicates that relative wages 
for teachers have been growing at around half the growth rate of wages for the national 
average worker between 1999 and 2009. 
 
As a point of reference, Lakdawalla (2006) demonstrates that most high-income countries 
witnessed relative teacher wage growth rates in the range of -28.8 percent for Sweden and 
7.25 percent for Japan over three decades, between 1965 and 1994. In scilicet, the 
magnitude of relative teacher wage lag in China is much greater than that of developed 
economies, and occurred at a much quicker rate, approximately less than a third of the 
timeframe. Despite these consequential changes, few studies quantitatively discuss the 
impact of teacher wage characteristics on teacher quality shifts in China, or provide any 
rigorous research that relate observed teacher labor supply patterns to the existing 
occupational choice literature. Thus, a formal analysis of teacher occupational choice in 
the Chinese context is justified, and can provide important insights not only for exploring 
policy instruments that recruit and retain more capable and educationally productive 
teachers, but such empirical work is also crucial for understanding individuals’ labor supply 
decisions in rapidly developing economies.  
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Table 4-0-1. Teacher Log Wage Growth 1999 -2009, national mean deflated 
 
Primary School Teacher 
Wage, percent change 
Secondary School Teacher 
Wage, percent change 
National Average -44.12 -46.73 
Anhui -40.14 -43.43 
Beijing -51.52 -53.84 
Chongqing -45.31 -43.18 
Fujian -48.37 -46.08 
Gansu -48.17 -51.59 
Guangdong -54.79 -56.40 
Guangxi -40.44 -45.56 
Guizhou -38.76 -44.24 
Hainan -44.91 -50.40 
Hebei -36.98 -40.20 
Heilongjiang -49.46 -49.31 
Henan -31.72 -37.64 
Hubei -47.19 -51.34 
Hunan -44.33 -46.82 
Inner Mongolia -42.79 -39.05 
Jiangsu -44.28 -44.06 
Jiangxi -42.60 -54.44 
Jilin -40.40 -44.57 
Liaoning -31.00 -39.19 
Ningxia -46.12 -46.41 
Qinghai -38.27 -45.12 
Shaanxi -35.65 -37.04 
Shandong -36.47 -41.54 
Shanghai -38.15 -42.03 
Shanxi -42.04 -46.44 
Sichuan -50.84 -51.02 
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Tianjin -35.17 -41.81 
Tibet -50.03 -55.34 
Xinjiang -53.72 -55.34 
Yunnan -54.97 -56.47 
Zhejiang -49.53 -47.89 
Source: Own calculations, based on National Labor Statistics Yearbook, 1999, 2009. Note: 
Data for special administrative regions of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan is not available. 
 
 
To add, the sheer numeric size and geographic spread of the teaching sector led to 
significant wage inequality not only in comparison to the non-teaching sector, but also 
within the teaching sector. In Figure 4-0-1, I visualize the large differences in wage growth 
at the provincial level for both primary and secondary school teachers. For instance, in 
Yunnan (southwest on the map), the average primary teacher wage growth is 21.6 percent 
less than the national average teacher between 1999 and 2009, while in Shanghai, the wage 
growth is 10 percent more. This large geographic variation in wage growth is in direct 
contrast with most existing evidence found in developed countries, where the teaching 
sector is often dominated by common collective bargaining and characterized by low 
within-sector wage spread, which may be further exacerbated by potentially large 
purchasing power differences across different regions. To this end, large wage growth 
differences and wage spread, within the teaching sector and across geographic regions, has 
important implications for the succeeding analysis, because self-selection may be driven 





Figure 4-0-1. Teacher Log Wage Changes 1999-2009, sector mean deflated 
Panel A | Primary Teachers             Panel B| Secondary Teachers 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on National Labor Statistics Yearbook, 1999 and 2009.  
Note: Log of teacher wage have been deflated using national teacher mean wage for each given year. Darker shade of red represents 
steeper relative decline, darker shade of blue represents steeper relative increase. 
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Secondly, I track compositional shifts in educational attainment of teachers relative to 
workers in the broader labor market. Using both the earliest as well as most recently 
available data from National Labor Statistics Yearbook (2003, 2017), I calculate changes 
in the percentage of workers in each sector with a given level of educational attainment 
and deflate it using the national mean growth rate. In general, teachers are becoming more 
educated, and the rate of increase is much quicker in the education sector. Detailed results 
are presented in Table 4-0-2, and each cell is to be interpreted as the percent change in 
educational attainment level of workers in that sector relative to the growth at the national 
mean. For instance, between 2003 and 2017, the percent of teachers with at least a 
Bachelor’s degree grew as much as 4 times relative to the national average growth in 
percent of workers with at least Bachelor’s degrees (6.8 percent, while teachers with an 
Associate’s degree decreased at about 2.8 times the national average growth in percent of 
workers with Associate’s degrees (5.3 percent). 
 
Thirdly, to examine more deeply within the education sector, in Table 4-0-3, I decompose 
educational attainment for teachers by different levels of instruction: primary, lower 
secondary, and upper secondary. Particularly, I find that educational attainment for teachers 
at different levels of instruction have systematically increased. For primary schools, the 
percentage of teachers with at least Bachelor’s degrees increased from less than 1 percent 
in 1999 to close to 20 percent in 2009, and reached more than half (50.4 percent) of all 
primary school teachers in 2016. At the lower secondary level, the growth in teachers with 
at least a Bachelor’s degree was also substantial, expanding 5 times from 12.4 percent in 
1999 to 59.4 percent in 2009; by 2016, approximately 4-out-of-5 lower secondary school 
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teachers have at least a Bachelor’s degree. At the upper secondary level, similar trends are 
observed; 65.9 percent with Bachelor’s degree in 1999 have increased to over 90 percent 
in 2009 and close to 100 percent by 2016. Overall, observed patterns across instructional 
levels indicate that educational attainment levels of teachers at all instructional levels have 
increased sharply, with majorities of teachers holding at least an associate’s or bachelor’s 
degree by 2016.  
 
However, in more recent years, the relative educational attainment advantage of teachers 
relative to workers in other sectors is quickly dissipating. Importantly, between years 2003 
and 2017, the education sector saw the highest increase in workers with at least a 
Bachelor’s degree, narrowly placing ahead of “Finance and Banking” (3.93 times the 
national mean). Other sectors that saw similar sizable increases are “Scientific Research 
and Development,” “Public Health and Social Welfare,” “Information Technology,” 
“Government and Public Administration,” and “Leasing and Business Services,” which all 
exceeded twice the national average growth in the percent of workers with at least 
Bachelor’s degrees. On the other hand, results in columns four, five and six on Table 4-0-
2, indicate that the growth of teachers with at least Bachelor’s degrees has been dwarfed 
by several sectors in recent years. To illustrate, the percent of workers with at least a 
Bachelor’s degree in the “Finance and Banking” sector grew at 2.55 times the national 
average, followed by “Information Technology” (2.47 times) and “Public Health and Social 
Welfare” (2.46 times), while the “Education” sector grew at 2.2 times the national average 
rate between 2009 and 2017. In addition, share of workers with 2-year Associate’s degree 
also sharply decreased in the education sector, more than any other sector, for the same 
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years. Overall, results show that while the number of workers with at least a Bachelor’s 
degree has been growing in the education sector as well as most other sectors, in more 
recent years, sectors such as “Finance and Banking,” “Information Technology,” and 
“Public Health and Social Welfare” have been quickly catching up and recruiting workers 
with Bachelor’s degrees at a comparatively faster pace. That is to say, the flow of higher 
quality workers to non-education sectors is gaining considerable momentum. 
 
Fourthly, because teacher composition has positively shifted since 1999, I evaluate to what 
extent this phenomenon may have been driven by new entrant teachers or teacher exits. 
Due to the Ministry of Education began reporting source of new teachers only after 2004, 
in Table 4-0-4, I report net intake information for teachers by source, level of instruction 
for 2004, 2009, 2013, and 2016. For interpretation purposes, a positive number in each cell 
means there are more teachers entering than there are leaving, conditional to prior year’s 
total teacher employment size, whereas the opposite is true for negative numbers. While 
the Net Total results are important, it could be biased by many factors such as policy shocks 
as well as demographic transitions; therefore, I focus on the net intake source categories. 
For primary schools, there were no consistent patterns, but there is seemingly more teachers 
retiring than there were new entrants in 2004 and 2009. Additionally, substantial net 
transfers into teaching and within-school adjustments into teaching are also observed for 
2009 and 2016. In lower secondary schools, there is a consistent pattern that net intake in 
new teacher entrants is a main source of compositional change, in additional to a significant 
amount of net transfers and within-education adjustments out of teaching. At the upper 
secondary level, net intake in new teachers is a substantial source in the replenishment 
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process, while there also exists a mixed pattern of volume in both directions: net transfers 
from outside of education and net within-education adjustments out of teaching posts. 
 
To briefly summarize the macro-level analytic findings, I outline the main results. On the 
one hand, while average growth in teaching wages are relatively experiencing large 
declines in comparison to the cross-sector national mean wage, relative labor quality in the 
education sector, as approximated by educational attainment levels, has until recently 
shown greater growth compared to most other sectors. Nonetheless, higher growth sectors 
such as “Finance and Baking” have begun to attract highly educated workers than the 
education sector in more recent years. On the other hand, growth in educational attainment 
among teachers at different instructional levels has been large and relatively even across 
instructional levels. Moreover, in accounting for source of teacher intake, new teacher 
entrants seem to be the most consistent source, while there is considerable net transfer out 
of teaching to other sectors at the lower secondary level. Finally, while the macro-level 
analysis are limited by the availability and type of data, its findings are instructive for 
understanding the broader context of teacher occupational choice in China, with respect to 
alternative career options. This dissertation proceeds to present a more detailed 
investigation in the succeeding subsections with respect to teacher’s occupational decisions.   





Table 4-0-2. Workers’ Educational Attainment Growth, 2003-2017, national mean deflated 
  
2003-2017 Growth,  
deflated by national mean 
2009-2017 Growth,  














National Average 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Education 400.4 -281.8 101.1 219.9 -195.4 25.8 
Finance and Banking 393.3 -98.3 177.6 255.7 -67.6 104.3 
Scientific Research and Development 341.7 -38.0 174.1 218.8 12.1 122.1 
Public Health and Social Welfare 295.2 90.3 203.0 246.1 -63.3 101.6 
Information Technology 284.8 82.7 193.9 247.6 74.9 166.6 
Government and Public Administration 280.0 -167.6 83.5 204.8 -109.2 58.1 
Leasing and Business Services 254.4 231.1 241.3 72.5 6.5 41.6 
Electricity, Gas and Water 197.2 152.2 176.0 124.4 87.1 107.2 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 166.7 -110.4 45.1 141.8 38.5 93.8 
Mining and Quarrying 114.4 176.2 140.3 115.0 156.8 134.7 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 72.5 152.0 106.4 56.8 102.0 77.9 
Environment and Public Utility 72.3 -20.2 32.4 54.8 37.0 46.5 
Real Estate 70.4 -41.2 21.4 83.6 45.6 65.1 





Manufacturing 66.2 94.1 78.6 61.7 80.7 70.6 
Transportation, Post, and 
Telecommunications 
61.7 80.5 69.4 53.7 65.7 59.3 
Personal and Other Services 46.6 71.5 56.2 40.4 51.1 45.3 
Hospitality and Catering Services 26.6 61.7 40.8 20.7 39.4 29.5 
Construction 25.8 25.9 25.6 23.6 18.8 21.5 
Agriculture 3.0 6.9 3.8 2.6 5.8 4.1 
Source: National Labor Statistics Yearbook, 2003, 2009 and 2017. Note: Relative changes in percent of workers with a given educational 
attainment level has been deflated using the national mean for that level in that given year. The national mean growth rate in percent of 
workers with a given educational attainment level between 2003-2017 for Bachelor’s and above is 6.809 percent, for Associate’s is 
5.296 percent, and for High school and below is -12.205 percent; the national mean growth rate between 2009-2017 for Bachelor’s and 
above is 6.050 percent, for Associate’s is 5.310 percent, and for High school and below is -11.360 percent. 
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1999 0.7 15.5 83.7 100 
2004 4.6 44.2 51.2 100 
2009 19.8 55.0 25.2 100 
2013 37.2 50.1 12.7 100 




1999 12.4 73.2 14.4 100 
2004 29.1 64.7 6.2 100 
2009 59.4 38.8 1.7 100 
2013 74.9 24.4 0.7 100 




1999 65.9 32.5 1.7 100 
2004 79.6 20.0 0.4 100 
2009 93.6 6.3 0.1 100 
2013 96.8 3.1 0.1 100 
2016 97.9 2.0 0.0 100 
Source: National Education Statistical Yearbook, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2013, 2016.  
  




Table 4-0-4. Share of New Teachers as Percent of Prior Year Total Teacher Employment, by source, teaching-level, and year 
 
Primary Teachers Lower Secondary Teachers Upper Secondary Teachers 
2004 2009 2013 2016 2004 2009 2013 2016 2004 2009 2013 2016 
Net Total -1.29 0.20 -0.01 1.83 0.17 1.27 -0.67 0.35 11.25 1.20 2.13 2.25 
 
Net New Recruit In -0.41 -0.12 0.33 1.10 1.84 1.53 0.69 1.29 7.12 0.57 2.57 2.21 
 





-0.16 0.11 -0.18 0.02 -0.71 0.32 -0.40 -0.19 1.40 -0.82 -0.07 -0.01 
  Net Other In -0.55 -0.19 -0.11 -0.14 -0.40 -0.15 -0.17 -0.26 -0.14 -0.34 -0.26 -0.27 
Source: National Education Statistical Yearbook, 2004, 2009, 2013, 2016. Note: The average total teacher employment numbers for 
2004, 2009, 2013, and 2016 are 5648745, 3480049, 1459080 for primary, lower secondary, upper secondary respectively. Net Recruit 
In is defined as the difference between number of new teacher entrants and number of retiring teachers. Net transfers refers to the 
difference between the number of teachers who entered teaching from another sector and the number of those who have left teaching 
for another sector. Net within-education adjustments is categorized as the difference in number of non-teaching school staff (e.g. 
administration or support staff) that switched to a teaching post and those who switched from a teaching post to a non-teaching position. 
Net others includes all undefined reasons. 
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4.1 Results for Part I:  
The Impact of Teacher Quality on Student Learning 
 
An educationally-important and policy-relevant objective of this section is to establish 
whether commonly observed teacher background characteristics, such as educational 
attainment level, are causally linked to affect student learning outcomes. Existing research 
has shown that this relationship can be empirically ambiguous. Therefore, to rigorously 
answer this research question, I employ a student fixed-effect strategy to relate differences 
in teacher characteristics across subjects to variations on student test scores. Effectively, 
this methodology helps eliminate all student-level observable and unobservable subject-
invariant factors, and in effect compares how student test scores vary for the same student 
across different subjects in which teacher characteristics also vary, after controlling for 
important student- and teacher-level variables that are different across subjects. In the 
succeeding sections, I present the detailed results. 
 
For each of the test score outcomes, administrative data is directly obtained at the school-
level, and collected once at baseline survey and another during the follow-up wave. In 
Table 4-1-1, I present a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of all student-learning 
outcomes used in the following analysis. Importantly, the correlation of within-wave, 
between-subject and between-wave, within-subject are at least moderate; some are strongly 
correlated. For instance, the correlation coefficient for Chinese, Math, and English test 
scores at baseline range between 0.64-0.72 (p-values <.05) and 0.68-0.73 (p-values <.05) 
at follow-up, indicating strong correlations and good internal reliability. In addition, the 
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correlations between baseline and follow-up test scores for each of the three respective 
tests are 0.71-0.74 (p-values <.05), which also demonstrate strong test-retest reliability 
across waves. Due to each school administering similar but not identical tests, each test 
score outcome is first transformed into percentages by taking the quotient of the raw and 
total score, then independently standardized at the grade- and subject-level within schools; 
therefore the unit of interpretation changes to standard deviations within -grade-, -subject, 
and -school. In Figure 4-1-1, I plot the distribution of students’ standardized follow-up test 
scores by subject teacher’s educational attainment level. 
 
Table 4-1-1. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics between Test Score Types 
Test Score Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Baseline Chinese 1      
2 Baseline Math 0.64* 1     
3 Baseline English 0.72* 0.70* 1    
4 Follow-up Chinese 0.73* 0.56* 0.63* 1   
5 Follow-up Math 0.58* 0.71* 0.61* 0.69* 1  
6 Follow-up English 0.58* 0.62* 0.74* 0.68* 0.73* 1 
        
N 5032 5032 5032 5032 5032 5032 
Mean 75.64 73.73 79.86 78.59 71.53 67.57 
SD 18.22 28.07 26.62 22.06 32.76 30.19 
Max 136 150 150 142.5 150 150 
Min 1 3 3 0 0 0 
Note: Rows 1-6 show Pearson’s R correlation coefficients. * denotes p-value <.05 
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Figure 4-1-1. Distribution of student test scores by teacher’s educational attainment 
 
Note: Author’s compilation according to CEPS data. This chart plots student test scores for 
all three tested subjects: Chinese, Math, English by subject teacher’s educational 
attainment level. Kernel density is computed using Epanechnikov method, bandwidth for 
“BA & above” is 0.1333, bandwidth for “AA” is 0.1852. 
 
 
In Table 4-1-2, detailed information on descriptive statistics is introduced, for both student 
level variables (see Panel A) and teacher-level variables (see Panel B). In the seventh grade 
subsample drawn from the nationally representative CEPS data, there are a total of 5,032 
students and 357 teachers. In Panel A, I discuss subject-varying student-level variables 
relevant to the current analysis. To begin, between 10 to 16 percent of students in the 
sample report that they attended private tutoring last week for the three core subjects: 
Chinese, Math, and English. Close to 90 percent of students indicated that they find each 
of the three subjects valuable for their later life developments. In terms of classroom 
learning experience, between 63 to 67 percent of all students reported that they felt their 
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subject teachers were frequently interacting with them during class instruction. 
 
In Panel B of Table 4-1-2, I report descriptive statistics information on subject-varying 
teacher characteristics. First, approximately 73 percent of all teachers are female, and close 
to a third (29 percent) of them serve as homeroom teachers, whose teaching responsibilities 
extend beyond course instruction but also include class management duties such as student 
counseling, parent coordination, etc. Second, in terms of teacher preparation, certification 
and contract, most teachers report having attended a pre-service teacher education “normal” 
program (93 percent), and 97 percent of all teachers received official teaching certifications 
issued by the government authorities. In China, pre-service teacher education (normal) 
program is defined as attending an educational institution or program that specializes in 
training pre-service teachers; these institutions are commonly accredited by the Ministry 
of Education based on a broad base of quality that range from facilities to curriculum. For 
employment status, only about two thirds (64 percent) of all teachers report to hold 
permanent appointments or bianzhi in their respective schools, while others (36 percent) 
self-identify as being employed on temporary contract arrangements at their current school.  
 
Third, I report teacher’s baseline pedagogical skills levels with information on their teacher 
rank and teaching awards. Teacher rank, or zhicheng, consists of four levels in descending 
prestige: senior rank, level one rank, level two rank, level three rank. To promote in 
teaching rank, teachers often undergo rigorous review of the credentials, training, and 
performance. Teaching awards, on the other hand, are bestowed by different levels of 
education authorities, ranging from national-level, provincial-level, municipal-level, 
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district-level, and school-level, and are commonly awarded through formal teaching 
competitions. In the current sample, 84 percent of all teachers self-identify as Level 2 rank 
or above, while about one third (35 percent) received at least a Municipal-level or superior 
teaching award. Fourth, in terms of workload, the sample mean was 44.59 hours (SD=12.89) 
for the past week, with a wide range (12-100). In addition, the sample mean for teaching 
experience is 14.67 years (SD=8.67), with a range including new teachers (0 years) and 
veteran teachers (39 years).  
 
Fifth, in order to assess the extent to which student ability grouping practices may influence 
or confound observed impacts, I also report teacher responses on whether classes are 
assigned based on a combined total score, or subject-specific scores. Importantly, if ability 
grouping is prevalent such that non-random sorting occurs between students and teachers, 
selection bias may confound the results. At the teacher-level, 28 percent of teachers 
indicate that students are assigned to classrooms using a combined test score, while 12 
percent of teachers report individual test scores are used to assign students to classrooms. 
In the succeeding analysis, the second type of class assignment based on subject scores 
could be particularly more worrying and problematic, because it introduces unobserved 
subject-varying unobservables that may be correlated with both teacher characteristics and 
student test score outcomes. To address these potential issues, I explicitly model these 
relationships in the sensitivity and robustness checks. Last but not least, for the key variable 
of interest, teacher’s educational attainment level, all but 2 teachers, who completed 
education at the vocational secondary level, report having at least an associate’s degree (2-
year zhuanke), while approximately 83 percent obtained at least a bachelor’s degree (4-
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year benke). This will be the key variable of interest in the succeeding analysis. 
 
In Table 4-1-3, I evaluate the degree to which teacher observable characteristics differ 
across subject. As mentioned previously in the methods section, if there are systematic 
differences in teacher observables or unobservables, which are related to student outcomes, 
estimated results may be biased. I empirically check for this possibility in the dataset. In 
effect, I compare to what extent teacher characteristics are different across subjects, where 
each row in Table 4-1-3 represents an independent regression of various teacher-level 
variables on subject, with the reference subject group being Chinese. The results indicate 
that relative to Chinese subject teachers, Math teachers are less likely to be female and hold 
a teacher rank above Level 2, whereas English teachers are more likely to be female, less 
likely to have attended a pre-service normal education program, and less likely to report 
class assignment was based on subject score. To be clear, in Table 4-1-3, I do not find 
systematic differences on teacher observable baseline characteristics by subject. 
 






Table 4-1-2. Descriptive Statistics of CEPS Seventh Grade Cohort Students and Teachers 
  Definition and Metrics N Mean  SD Max Min 
Panel A: Student-Level Variables       
 Private Tutoring 
Enrollment in private tutoring =1,  
otherwise =0 
 
  Chinese 5032 0.10  - 1  0  
  Math 5032 0.16  - 1  0  
  English 5032 0.18  - 1  0  
 Subject Valuable 
Student found subject matter valuable for 
later life =1, otherwise =0 
 
  Chinese 5032 0.93  - 1  0  
  Math 5032 0.90  - 1  0  
  English 5032 0.87  - 1  0  
 Frequent Teacher Interaction 
Teacher interacted frequently with student 
during instruction =1, otherwise =0 
 
  Chinese 5032 0.64  - 1  0  
  Math 5032 0.63  - 1  0  
  English 5032 0.67  - 1  0  
         
Panel B: Teacher-Level Variables       
 Female Teacher is female =1, otherwise =0 357 0.73 - 1 0 
 Homeroom 
Teacher is a homeroom teacher =1,  
otherwise =0 
357 0.29 - 1 0 






 Pre-Service Normal Education 
Teacher attended a pre-service normal 
education teaching program =1, otherwise 
=0 
357 0.93 - 1 0 
 Certification 
Teacher is government certified to teach 
=1, otherwise =0 
357 0.97 - 1 0 
 Permanent Contract 
Teacher is employed on permanent 
contract =1, otherwise =0 
357 0.64 - 1 0 
 Second-tier or Above Teacher Rank 
Teacher received senior, first-tier, second-
tier teacher rank =1, otherwise =0 
357 0.84 - 1 0 
 Municipal or Above Teaching Award 
Teacher received national, provincial, 
municipal-level teaching awards =1,  
otherwise =0 
357 0.35 - 1 0 
 Last Week Working Hours  
Teacher's number of working hours last 
week 
357 44.59 12.89  100 12 
 Teaching Experience Teaching experience in years 357 14.67 8.67 39 0 
 Teaching Experience Categories  357     
  Group 1 
Teaching experience is less than or equal 
to 5 years =1, otherwise =0 
 
0.18 - 1 0 
  Group 2 
Teaching experience is more than 5 years 
and less than or equal to 15 years =1, 
otherwise =0 
0.36 - 1 0 






  Group 3 
Teaching experience is more than 15 years 
and less than or equal to 25 years =1, 
otherwise =0 
0.32 - 1 0 
  Group 4 
Teaching experience is more than 25 years 
=1, otherwise =0 
0.11  - 1 0 
 Class Assignment by Total Score 
Class assigned according to total score =1, 
not assigned according to total score =0 
357 0.28  - 1 0 
 Class Assignment by Subject Score 
Class assigned according to subject score 
=1, not assigned according to subject score 
=0 
357 0.12  - 1 0 
 Teacher's Educational Attainment       
   Bachelor's Degree and Above 
Teacher's highest educational attainment 
was bachelor's degree or above =1, 
otherwise =0 
357 0.83 - 1 0 
 






Table 4-1-3. CEPS Teacher characteristics by subject types (N=357) 
Dependent Variables 
Subject (reference = Chinese) 
Math English 
 Bachelor's degree and above (below =0) -0.046 -.006 
  (0.172) (0.383) 
 Female (male =0) -0.593* 0.681* 
  (0.151) (0.197) 
 Homeroom (non-homeroom =0) 0.264 0.026 
  (0.188) (0.230) 
 Pre-Service Normal Education (did not attend =0) 0.008 -0.585* 
  (0.269) (0.265) 
 Permanent Contract (temporary =0) -0.288 -0.015 
  (0.167) (0.201) 
 Certification (not certified =0) 0.130 0.558 
  (0.385) (0.464) 
 Second-tier or Above Teacher Rank (below =0) 0.490* -0.056 
  (0.179) (0.141) 
 Municipal or Above Teaching Award (below =0) 0.153 -0.039 
  (0.143) (0.153) 
 
Class Assigned by Subject Score  
(not assigned by score =0) 
0.030 -0.605* 
  (0.192) (0.282) 
 Teaching Experience (years) 1.714 0.097 
  (0.879) (0.966) 
 Last Week's Working Hours (hours) -2.337 -2.221 
   (1.804) (1.698) 
Note: Each row represents an independent regression. All coefficients are from probit 
regression, with exception of Last Week's Working Hours and Teaching Experience, which 
are from OLS regression. Robust standard errors closeted at the school-level and are 
presented in parenthesis, * denotes p-value <.05. 
 






In Table 4-1-4, I find that while there are differences in the prevalence of teachers whose 
highest educational attainment level was at least a 4-year bachelor’s compared to those 
who only received a 2-year associate’s or below, there is little evidence that teachers with 
different education are also systematically different on other observable dimensions. With 
exception to gender, certification status, and teacher rank, there is no statistical difference 
between the two groups of teachers on other observable characteristics. Relative to teachers 
with 2-year associate’s or below educational attainment, those with at least a 4-year 
bachelor’s degree are more likely to be female, have obtained certified status, and hold a 
teacher rank above Level 2. 
 
Table 4-1-4. CEPS Teacher characteristics by educational attainment levels (N=357) 
Dependent Variables 
Bachelor's degree and above  
(reference = below) 
 Female (male =0) 0.778* 
  (0.209) 
 Homeroom (non-homeroom =0) 0.274 
  (0.155) 
 
Pre-Service Normal Education  
(did not attend =0) 
0.370 
  (0.233) 
 Permanent Contract (temporary =0) 0.052 
  (0.176) 
 Certification (not certified =0) 0.953* 
  (0.279) 
 Second-tier or Above Teacher Rank (below =0) 0.689* 
  (0.213) 






 Municipal or Above Teaching Award (below =0) 0.252 
  (0.213) 
 
Class Assigned by Total Score  
(not assigned by total score =0) 
0.286 
  (0.246) 
 
Class Assigned by Subject Score  
(not assigned by subject score =0) 
0.376 
  (0.261) 
 Teaching Experience (years) -2.314 
  (1.604) 
 Last Week's Working Hours (hours) -0.923 
    (2.412) 
Note: Each row represents an independent regression. All coefficients are from probit 
regression, with exception of Last Week's Working Hours and Teaching Experience, which 
are from OLS regression. Robust standard errors closeted at the school-level and are 
presented in parenthesis, * denotes p-value <.05. 
 
 
To examine the impact of observed teacher quality, specifically a teacher’s educational 
attainment level, on student learning outcomes, I present results from the student fixed-
effect models in Table 4-1-5. In the table, I first present a simple model with no baseline 
control covariates added (Model 1), as well as including results from controlling for 
teacher-level subject-varying baseline characteristics (Model 2), adding student-level 
subject-varying baseline variables (Model 3), and finally presenting the full model with 
both student- and teacher-level subject-varying baseline covariates (Model 4). In Models 
5, 6, and 7, I examine the robustness of the results using sensitivity analysis based on 
detailed information on class-assignment.  
 






First and foremost, in Model 1, results of the simplest specification with just one key 
variable indicate that students tend to score higher when teachers with bachelor’s degrees 
teach the respective subjects, albeit the impact being not statistically significant. This is to 
be expected because there may be important subject-varying control covariates that are 
missing in the specification. In Models 2 and 3 respectively, I add subject-varying baseline 
teacher and student covariates 𝐶𝑠 and 𝑋𝑠(𝑡−1), such that subject-varying factors at baseline 
are accounted for. In effect,  𝐶𝑠  represents a vector of controls that include teacher’s 
homeroom status, attendance in pre-service teacher education program, permanent contract 
status, certification status, teacher rank, teacher award, teaching experience, while  𝑋𝑠 
contains student-level covariates such as baseline test score, private tutoring enrollment, 
attitude towards subject and frequency of teacher-student interactions. 
 
Specifically, the key coefficient γ turns statistically significant after the inclusion of 𝐶𝑠 
and 𝑋𝑠. For Model 2, I find statistically significant impact of 0.046 standard deviations (p-
value < 0.05) after adding teacher-level covariates, and 0.033 standard deviations (p-value 
< 0.05) after adding student-level covariates. In Model 4, where I include the full 
specification with both student- and teacher-level subject-varying covariates, I continue to 
find statistically significant impact of 0.033 standard deviations (p-value < 0.05). In other 
words, holding all else equal, increasing teacher’s educational attainment level from 2-year 
associate’s to 4-year bachelor’s degree can increase student learning outcome by as much 
as 0.033 standard deviations, with a 95 percent confidence interval between 0 to 0.068 
standard deviations. To put this number in broader context, an impact of 0.033 standard 
deviations increase in student learning outcomes roughly correspond to 1 additional month 






of learning in a typical 9-month school year (Kane & Staiger, 2010; OECD, 2016).  
 
For robustness check, I check if ability grouping practices may confound results. After 
controlling for potential subject-specific classroom assignment, in Model 5, the adjusted 
result is 0.034 standard deviations and remains statistically significant at the .10-level. In 
Models 6 and 7, I conduct a further robustness check exercise by limiting the analysis to a 
sub-sample of which classes are reported by homeroom teachers to have not been assigned 
by aggregate subject scores. In Model 6, even after limiting to classes that were not sorted, 
I continue to find statistically significant impacts and the effect size has also doubled to 
0.069 standard deviations (p-value < 0.05).  
 
In Model 7, similar observation on the size of impact persists at 0.071 standard deviations 
(p-value < 0.05), after adding additional control variables on subject-specific class sorting. 
I interpret these results as showing the robustness of the positive impact that teacher’s 
educational attainment has on student learning. More specifically, this translates to 2 
additional months of learning in a typical 9-month school year (Kain & Staiger, 2010; 
OECD, 2016). In fact, after addressing potentially problematic bias introduced by class 
sorting practices, the effect sizes are larger than in the overall sample, suggesting that there 
may have been compensatory assignment of teachers to students, in that some schools have 
been assigning more-educated teachers to teach low-performing students. These types of 
sorting of between students and teachers would suggest that existing estimates may be 
downward biased, and that the true impact of having more educated teachers on student 
learning may be even larger than observed; potentially twice as large. For interpretation, 






results with additional controls presented here offer a bounds exercise and identifies upper 
and lower bounds and potential impacts on learning, that is approximately ranging between 
0.03 SDs to 0.07 SDs, or equaling between one to two months of additional learning for a 
given 9 month academic year. 
 
In Table 4-1-6, as an additional step to identify heterogeneous impacts of teacher 
educational attainment on student learning, I interact the key variable, 4-year bachelor’s, 
with student baseline characteristics, including student’s sex, baseline test scores, minority 
status, whether she is a “left-behind children” (both parents not living with student), and 
whether the student reported that her family is experiencing financial hardship. Inclusion 
of the interaction terms changes the interpretation of the key coefficient γ, which now refers 
to the impact on the advantaged student population, whereas coefficients for the interaction 
term correspond to the degree to which disadvantaged students are differentially affected, 
relative to the advantaged students. In Models 8, 9, 10 and 11 presented in Table 4-1-6, the 
key coefficient γ is larger than that of the full specification results in Model 4, which is an 
indication that the impacts on male students, students without low baseline scores, local 
household registration, and with at least one parent living with them are larger than that of 
the entire population. However, all interaction terms remain statistically insignificant at 
the .10-level, which suggest that there is no discernible difference in impact between 
disadvantaged or advantaged student groups. The results also suggest that increasing 
teacher’s educational attainment from 2-year associate’s to 4-year bachelor’s seem to be an 
equitable approach to raising achievement level, such that students with disadvantaged 
backgrounds benefit no less than other students with more advantaged backgrounds. 










Table 4-1-5. Impact of teacher educational attainment level on student learning outcomes (Student Fixed-Effects Model) 
Dependent Variable:  















Class Assignment by 
Total Score =0 
Teacher-level Variables        
 Bachelor's and above (below =0) 0.046 0.041* 0.033* 0.033* 0.034# 0.069* 0.071* 
  (0.036) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
 Homeroom (non-homeroom =0)  0.027#  0.016 0.016 -0.005 -0.004 
   (0.016)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
Pre-Service Normal Education (otherwise 
=0) 
 -0.039#  -0.035 -0.036 -0.067* -0.083* 
   (0.024)  (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033) 
 Permanent Contract (temporary =0)  0.001  0.017 0.017 0.008 0.011 
   (0.016)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.043) (0.043) 
 Certification (not certified =0)  -0.007  0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 
   (0.047)  (0.043) (0.043) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Second-tier or Above Teacher Rank 
(below =0) 
 -0.016  -0.021 -0.021 0.025 0.032 
   (0.029)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) 











Municipal or Above Teaching Award  
(below =0) 
 -0.015  -0.015 -0.017 -0.030 -0.037* 
   (0.015)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) 
 Teaching Experience Group 2 (6-15 years)  -0.003  0.003 0.004 0.034 0.032 
   (0.023)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) 
 Teaching Experience Group 3 (16-25 years)  0.016  0.032 0.033 0.049* 0.050# 
   (0.024)  (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) 
 Teaching Experience Group 4 (>25 years)  -0.012  -0.011 -0.010 0.015 0.013 
   (0.029)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) 
 
Class assigned according to subject scores 
(not assigned according to subject scores =0) 
    0.003  0.055 
      (0.018)  (0.042) 
Student-level Variables        
 Baseline test score (SDs)   0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 0.038* 0.038* 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Private Tutoring (not enrolled =0)   0.042* 0.042* 0.043* 0.046* 0.045# 
    (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.24) (0.24) 
 Subject Valuable (not valuable =0)   0.158* 0.159* 0.154* 0.176* 0.176* 
    (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) 
 Frequent Teacher Interaction (otherwise =0)   0.091* 0.090* 0.089* 0.093* 0.093* 










    (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
         
Constant -0.026 0.029 -2.845* -2.822* -2.820* -2.937* -2.938* 
  (0.030) (0.053) (0.067) (0.082) (0.084) (0.096) (0.097) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.659 0.659 0.713 0.713 0.709 0.718 0.7152 
Student Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15096 15096 15096 15096 15096 10309 10309 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parenthesis, * denotes p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10.  






Table 4-1-6. Heterogeneous impact of teacher educational attainment level on student 
learning outcomes, by student baseline characteristics (Student Fixed-Effects Model) 
Dependent Variable:  











Teacher-level Variables      
X 
Bachelor's and above  
(below =0) 
0.041* 0.039* 0.034# 0.042# 0.027 
  (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) 
Interaction Terms      
 
X * Student female (male 
=0) 
-0.012     
  (0.034)     
 
X * Student low baseline 
score (otherwise =0) 
 -0.034    
   (0.024)    
 
X * Non-local household 
registration (local =0) 
  -0.037   
    (0.056)   
 
X * Both parents not living 
with student (otherwise =0) 
   0.004  
     (0.044)  
 
X * Family facing financial 
hardship (otherwise =0) 
    0.031 
      (0.042) 
       
       
       
Constant -2.833* -2.771* -2.829* -2.787* -2.820* 
  (0.083) (0.090) (0.083) (0.092) (0.082) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.710 0.714 0.713 0.701 0.713 
Student-Level Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Teacher-Level Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Student Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15096 15096 15096 15096 15096 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * denotes p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10 
  






4.2 Results for Part II:  
The Teaching Wage Penalty 
 
As discussed in the literature review section, theoretical implications of adapting Roy 
(1951) two-sector selection model in teacher labor markets imply that there are two key 
factors influencing teacher occupational choice decisions:  
(1) ratio of wage dispersion between teaching and non-teaching sectors,  
(2) correlation between the type of skills valued by teaching and non-teaching sectors  
 
In this regard, if one assumes that labor aptitude and general skills are positively correlated 
with wage earnings across teaching and non-teaching sectors, an increase in the ratio of 
earnings dispersion would result in high ability individuals choosing the sector with higher 
returns to skills and human capital. Therefore, detecting the existence and examining the 
degree of sector-based wage penalty, in terms of the difference in returns to skills, is crucial 
to understanding how wage characteristics could potentially affect overall labor force 
quality in a particular sector. To evaluate whether there exists a wage penalty for teachers 
and its relative magnitude, the following section utilizes a Mincer function multiple 
regression approach to identify mean wage gaps between teaching and non-teaching sectors 
after controlling for important worker characteristics, as well as comparing the degree of 
heterogeneous returns to human capital and skills. In the remainder of this part, I present 
further results with discussion on empirical implications. 
 
To begin, I describe background characteristics of the underlying sample population for 






each wave of CHIP data utilized in this current analysis, as illustrated in Tables 4-2-1 
through 4-2-6. By way of organization, I group the descriptive statistics discussion by 
outcome or variable, and subsequently outline any observed patterns across different waves 
of CHIP data. First and foremost, as explained in the methodology section, I restrict the 
analytic sample to all employed individuals between 16 and 60 years old in urban areas, 
where wage income is available as cash sums for employed individuals, and also because 
the labor market conditions are arguably comparable across sectors.  
 
Secondly, as the key outcome of interest for the analysis in this section, respondent’s 
weekly wages from primary occupation information are log-transformed, and I apply 1 
percent winsoring method to mitigate outlier effects. To this end, I report raw earnings 
information in local currency (1 yuan is approximately US$0.15) by wave. For the earliest 
observed wave in 1988, the mean weekly wages is 35.5 yuan (SD=16.2), while the number 
increases to 109.9 yuan (SD=57.6) in 1995, 261.5 yuan (SD=173.1) in 2002, 579.3 yuan 
(SD=423) in 2007, 649.3 yuan (SD=467.9) in 2008, and 863.2 yuan (SD=584) in 2013. 
The average growth in nominal mean wages between 1988 and 2013 was a factor of 24 
times, while the wage dispersion as measured by standard deviations grew 1.5 times more 
at more than 36.5 times. Using urban household consumer price index data available 
through the National Bureau of Statistics (2018), real mean wage growth was 
approximately 7 times over the 25 year period, whereas the real wage dispersion grew by 
about 10.5 times. As noted in both the nominal and real wage growth results, it is observed 
that while mean wages rose substantially over time, wage dispersion increased at a much 
quicker pace which indicates expanding wage inequality. 






Thirdly, I report teacher and sector identifier categories. Specifically, as CHIP data does 
not report ISCO or equivalent job-level codes, identification of teachers are based jointly 
on sectoral, occupational, and work unit ownership information. To this end, teachers are 
identified as professional workers who are employed in the education sector and working 
in public institutions (shiye danwei); public sector non-teachers are defined as employed 
individuals who work in either a government agency or public institution and are not 
teachers, while private sector non-teaching includes all employed individuals in the private 
sector. Unfortunately, due to data availability, I am not able to distinguish between levels 
of instruction for teachers; however, because teachers who work in primary and secondary 
education represent by far the largest worker population within the teaching force, they are 
likely to be oversampled in my identification of teachers. Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that a substantial majority of identified teachers work in primary and secondary 
settings. In further detail, identified teachers consist of between 3 to 5 percent of the total 
sample across years, approximately three in five respondents are private sector non-
teachers and about a quarter are public sector non-teachers. Across all available years, labor 
force composition by this classification does not fluctuate much, but with one exception, 
such that there were disproportionately more public sector non-teacher workers in 1988 
(74 percent), about three times the amount of private sector workers. This number reversed 
in 1995 and stabilized through the rest of the data years. 
 
Fourthly, educational attainment levels are grouped into three categories to improve 
comparability over time; such that individuals with a 4-year university education (benke) 
or any post-graduate degree (yanjiusheng) are classified as having obtained at least a 






Bachelor’s degree, whereas the group “Associate’s” refer exclusively to those who have 
completed high school education and obtained a 2-year post-secondary education 
(dazhuan). In addition, individuals with no education or attended some level of education 
below upper secondary are all grouped together. Across years and also across sectors, the 
average educational attainment level is on the rise, with gradually more individuals falling 
into the Associate’s or Bachelor’s and above categories. More specifically, there were only 
6 and 7 percent of the sample with Bachelor’s and above or Associate’s educational levels 
in 1988 respectively; this number rose over time to 13 percent and 29 percent in 2002, and 
finally reaching 24 percent and 23 percent in 2013. However, most of the recent growth 
was observed in the Bachelor’s and above category, while the percent of individuals with 
Associate’s increased to 29 percent in as recent as 2007 before beginning to decline in 2008. 
 
Finally, the samples appear to be relatively stable across most domains of individual 
characteristics over time. Overall, the average age, work experience, sex, marital status, 
minority status of respondents indicates a very tight range across years, only differencing 
very slightly. For instance, average age across years only differed very little, CHIP2002 
having the oldest sample (40.23 years old) and CHIP1988 with the youngest cohort (36.61 
years old). Female representation was slightly less than half in all samples, ranging from 
47 percent in 2007 to 48 percent in 1988. Across years, information on single and minority 
status is approximately reported at around 10 to 15 percent and 1 to 5 percent respectively; 
party membership is identified to range between 20 and 30 percent. Last but not least, it is 
observed that the share of tenured workers fluctuates substantially across years, from as 
low as 51 percent in 2002 to almost covering the full sample (98 percent) in 1988.  










Table 4-2-1. Descriptive Statistics of 1988 CHIP Urban Labor Market Participant Sample 
Variable Definition and Metrics N Mean SD Max Min 
Labor Market Outcomes 
 
     
 
Weekly Wages Weekly Earnings in Yuan 17073 35.45 16.16 95 0.25 
Teacher and Sector Identifiers 
 
     
 
Teacher Teacher =1, otherwise =0 17073 0.04 - 1 0 
 
Public Sector Non-Teachers Public Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 17073 0.74 - 1 0 
 
Private Sector Non-Teachers Private Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 17073 0.22 - 1 0 
Education Attainment Level 
 
     
 
Bachelor's & Above 
Highest educational attainment was bachelor's 
degree or above =1, otherwise =0 
17073 0.06 - 1 0 
 
Associate's 
Highest educational attainment was associate's 
degree =1, otherwise =0 
17073 0.07 - 1 0 
 
Upper Secondary & Below 
Highest educational attainment was upper 
secondary or below =1, otherwise =0 
17073 0.87 - 1 0 
Background Characteristics 
 
     
 
Age Age in Years 17073 36.61 9.91 16 60 
 
Years of Work Experience Work Experience in Years 17073 19.24 9.97 0 40 
 
Female Female =1, male =0 17073 0.48 - 1 0 
 
Minority Minority =1, otherwise =0 17073 0.04 - 1 0 











Party Membership Party member =1, otherwise =0 17073 0.23 - 1 0 
  
Permanent Contract 
Working on permanent contract or with tenure =1. 
otherwise =0 
17073 0.97 - 1 0 
Note: The sample is restricted to all employed individuals between the age of 16 and 60 years old, with at most 40 years of working 
experience. Winsoring adjustment has been applied to weekly wages for top and bottom 1 percent. 
 
 
Table 4-2-2. Descriptive Statistics of 1995 CHIP Urban Labor Market Participant Sample 
Variable Definition and Metrics N Mean SD Max Min 
Labor Market Outcomes 
 
     
 
Weekly Wages Weekly Earnings in Yuan 10756 109.86 57.62 325 11.5 
Teacher and Sector Identifiers 
 
     
 
Teacher Teacher =1, otherwise =0 10756 0.04 - 1 0 
 
Public Sector Non-Teachers Public Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 10756 0.28 - 1 0 
 
Private Sector Non-Teachers Private Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 10756 0.68 - 1 0 
Education Attainment Level 
 
     
 
Bachelor's & Above 
Highest educational attainment was bachelor's 
degree or above =1, otherwise =0 
10756 0.08 - 1 0 
 
Associate's 
Highest educational attainment was associate's 
degree =1, otherwise =0 
10756 0.16 - 1 0 











Upper Secondary & Below 
Highest educational attainment was upper 
secondary or below =1, otherwise =0 
10756 0.76 - 1 0 
Background Characteristics 
 
     
 
Age Age in Years 10756 38.4 9.22 60 16 
 
Years of Work Experience Work Experience in Years 10756 19.32 9.28 40 0 
 
Female Female =1, male =0 10756 0.47 - 1 0 
 
Single Single =1, otherwise =0 10756 0.12 - 1 0 
 
Minority Minority =1, otherwise =0 10756 0.04 - 1 0 
 
Party Membership Party member =1, otherwise =0 10756 0.25 - 1 0 
  
Permanent Contract 
Working on permanent contract or with tenure =1. 
otherwise =0 
10756 0.77 - 1 0 
Note: The sample is restricted to all employed individuals between the age of 16 and 60 years old, with at most 40 years of working 
experience. Winsoring adjustment has been applied to weekly wages for top and bottom 1 percent. 
  










Table 4-2-3. Descriptive Statistics of 2002 CHIP Urban Labor Market Participant Sample 
Variable Definition and Metrics N Mean SD Max Min 
Labor Market Outcomes 
 
     
 
Weekly Wages Weekly Earnings in Yuan 9762 261.5 173.13 983 35 
Teacher and Sector Identifiers 
 
     
 
Teacher Teacher =1, otherwise =0 9762 0.05 - 1 0 
 
Public Sector Non-Teachers Public Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 9762 0.31 - 1 0 
 
Private Sector Non-Teachers Private Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 9762 0.64 - 1 0 
Education Attainment Level 
 
     
 
Bachelor's & Above 
Highest educational attainment was bachelor's 
degree or above =1, otherwise =0 
9762 0.13 - 1 0 
 
Associate's 
Highest educational attainment was associate's 
degree =1, otherwise =0 
9762 0.29 - 1 0 
 
Upper Secondary & Below 
Highest educational attainment was upper 
secondary or below =1, otherwise =0 
9762 0.58 - 1 0 
Background Characteristics 
 
     
 
Age Age in Years 9762 40.23 8.81 60 18 
 
Years of Work Experience Work Experience in Years 9762 21.87 9.32 40 0 
 
Female Female =1, male =0 9762 0.45 - 1 0 
 
Single Single =1, otherwise =0 9762 0.10 - 1 0 











Minority Minority =1, otherwise =0 9762 0.04 - 1 0 
 
Party Membership Party member =1, otherwise =0 9762 0.29 - 1 0 
  
Permanent Contract 
Working on permanent contract or with tenure =1. 
otherwise =0 
9762 0.51 - 1 0 
Note: The sample is restricted to all employed individuals between the age of 16 and 60 years old, with at most 40 years of working 
experience. Winsoring adjustment has been applied to weekly wages for top and bottom 1 percent. 
 
 
Table 4-2-4. Descriptive Statistics of 2007 CHIP Urban Labor Market Participant Sample 
Variable Definition and Metrics N Mean SD Max Min 
Labor Market Outcomes 
 
     
 
Weekly Wages Weekly Earnings in Yuan 5465 579.3 422.97 2499.8 87.5 
Teacher and Sector Identifiers 
 
     
 
Teacher Teacher =1, otherwise =0 5465 0.03 - 1 0 
 
Public Sector Non-Teachers Public Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 5465 0.29 - 1 0 
 
Private Sector Non-Teachers Private Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 5465 0.68 - 1 0 
Education Attainment Level 
 
     
 
Bachelor's & Above 
Highest educational attainment was bachelor's 
degree or above =1, otherwise =0 
5465 0.17 - 1 0 












Highest educational attainment was associate's 
degree =1, otherwise =0 
5465 0.29 - 1 0 
 
Upper Secondary & Below 
Highest educational attainment was upper 
secondary or below =1, otherwise =0 
5465 0.54 - 1 0 
Background Characteristics 
 
     
 
Age Age in Years 5465 38.69 9.2 60 18 
 
Years of Work Experience Work Experience in Years 5465 19.73 10.28 40 0 
 
Female Female =1, male =0 5465 0.43 - 1 0 
 
Single Single =1, otherwise =0 5465 0.14 - 1 0 
 
Minority Minority =1, otherwise =0 5465 0.01 - 1 0 
  
Permanent Contract 
Working on permanent contract or with tenure =1. 
otherwise =0 
5465 0.77 - 1 0 
Note: The sample is restricted to all employed individuals between the age of 16 and 60 years old, with at most 40 years of working 
experience. Winsoring adjustment has been applied to weekly wages for top and bottom 1 percent. 
  










Table 4-2-5. Descriptive Statistics of 2008 CHIP Urban Labor Market Participant Sample 
Variable Definition and Metrics N Mean SD Max Min 
Labor Market Outcomes 
 
     
 
Weekly Wages Weekly Earnings in Yuan 5452 649.31 467.91 2500 100 
Teacher and Sector Identifiers 
 
     
 
Teacher Teacher =1, otherwise =0 5452 0.03 - 1 0 
 
Public Sector Non-Teachers Public Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 5452 0.31 - 1 0 
 
Private Sector Non-Teachers Private Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 5452 0.66 - 1 0 
Education Attainment Level 
 
     
 
Bachelor's & Above 
Highest educational attainment was bachelor's 
degree or above =1, otherwise =0 
5452 0.23 - 1 0 
 
Associate's 
Highest educational attainment was associate's 
degree =1, otherwise =0 
5452 0.29 - 1 0 
 
Upper Secondary & Below 
Highest educational attainment was upper 
secondary or below =1, otherwise =0 
5452 0.48 - 1 0 
Background Characteristics 
 
     
 
Age Age in Years 5452 39.33 9.32 60 18 
 
Years of Work Experience Work Experience in Years 5452 20.34 10.51 40 0 
 
Female Female =1, male =0 5452 0.45 - 1 0 
 
Single Single =1, otherwise =0 5452 0.14 - 1 0 











Minority Minority =1, otherwise =0 5452 0.01 - 1 0 
  
Permanent Contract 
Working on permanent contract or with tenure =1. 
otherwise =0 
5452 0.77 - 1 0 
Note: The sample is restricted to all employed individuals between the age of 16 and 60 years old, with at most 40 years of working 
experience. Winsoring adjustment has been applied to weekly wages for top and bottom 1 percent. 
 
 
Table 4-2-6. Descriptive Statistics of 2013 CHIP Urban Labor Market Participant Sample 
Variable Definition and Metrics N Mean SD Max Min 
Labor Market Outcomes 
 
     
 
Weekly Wages Weekly Earnings in Yuan 7811 863.21 584.05 3350 50 
Teacher and Sector Identifiers 
 
     
 
Teacher Teacher =1, otherwise =0 7811 0.05 - 1 0 
 
Public Sector Non-Teachers Public Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 7811 0.2 - 1 0 
 
Private Sector Non-Teachers Private Sector Non-Teachers =1, otherwise =0 7811 0.74 - 1 0 
Education Attainment Level 
 
     
 
Bachelor's & Above 
Highest educational attainment was bachelor's 
degree or above =1, otherwise =0 
7811 0.24 - 1 0 
 
Associate's 
Highest educational attainment was associate's 
degree =1, otherwise =0 
7811 0.23 - 1 0 











Upper Secondary & Below 
Highest educational attainment was upper 
secondary or below =1, otherwise =0 
7811 0.53 - 1 0 
Background Characteristics 
 
     
 
Age Age in Years 7811 39.8 9.17 60 16 
 
Years of Work Experience Work Experience in Years 7811 21.13 10.13 40 0 
 
Female Female =1, male =0 7811 0.45 - 1 0 
 
Single Single =1, otherwise =0 7811 0.11 - 1 0 
 
Minority Minority =1, otherwise =0 7811 0.05 - 1 0 
 
Party Membership Party member =1, otherwise =0 7811 0.21 - 1 0 
  
Permanent Contract 
Working on permanent contract or with tenure =1. 
otherwise =0 
7811 0.59 - 1 0 
Note: The sample is restricted to all employed individuals between the age of 16 and 60 years old, with at most 40 years of working 
experience. Winsoring adjustment has been applied to weekly wages for top and bottom 1 percent.  






In Tables 4-2-7 and 4-2-8, I report the regression adjusted mean wage differences and the 
differential returns to skills and education across sectors. To begin, each column represents 
an independent regression model using different waves of the repeated cross-sectional 
CHIP data, such that Models (1) through Model (6) each correspond to a respective wave 
of CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, 2008, or 2013. The first and second rows in Table 4-2-7 
respectively correspond to coefficients β2 and β3 in Equation (2.2), which indicate the 
regression-adjusted mean wage differences in natural log points between teachers and 
private or public sector non-teaching workers, after controlling for important background 
and demographics covariates. The subsequent rows show point estimates for each control 
covariate that entered the regression analysis, and importantly, all models include birth 
cohort and worker type fixed-effect dummies as additional controls. To this end, this 
exercise aims to detect the existence and quantify the degree of sector-based mean wage 
differences, and several important insights on sectoral wage characteristics can be 
summarized from results in Table 4-2-7. 
 
Firstly, point estimate results for β2  are statistically significant across all years with 
exception of 2007, and the coefficients which indicate the mean wage differences are 
respectively -0.129 (p-value <0.05), -0.068 (p-value <0.05), -0.180 (p-value <0.05), 0.036, 
0.099 (p-value <0.05), and 0.112 (p-value <0.05) log points. These results illustrate that 
between 1988 and 2013, the regression-adjusted mean wage difference between teachers 
and private non-teaching workers has changed from approximately 13 percent in favor of 
teachers in 1988, which began reducing over time and eventually reversed to about 11 
percent benefitting private non-teaching workers in 2013. This drastic shift represented a 






24 percentage point reversal. To be clear, this means that teachers’ mean wage levels were 
about 13 percent higher than that of comparable private sector workers in 1988, but this 
wage premium gradually dissipated, such that in 2007 there was no statistical difference 
between teacher and private sector worker wages, but the gap reversed, and in 2013 
teachers are on average paid about 11 percent less than similar private sector workers. 
Nonetheless, such observations are expected as rapid economic developments in the private 
sector can result in new employment opportunities arising that are more responsive to 
market forces (Zhao & Zhou, 2007) 
 
Secondly, results for  β3 , which subsequently indicate the difference in mean wages 
between teachers and comparable public sector workers, are either not statistically 
significant or relatively small when they are marginally significant. To illustrate, significant 
differences in mean wages are only observed in 1988 and 2008, when public sector worker 
wages are paid about 4 percent (p-value <0.05) and 9 percent (p-value <0.10) higher than 
teachers respectively. Overall, there seems to be a general pattern indicating that mean 
wages for comparable workers in the public sector have been somewhat similar to that of 
teachers, whereas private sector wages have expanded considerable for workers who are 
similarly qualified as teachers.  
 
Thirdly, the estimated coefficients on a few important control covariates are also worth 
mentioning for more contextual understanding of broader labor market conditions in China 
during this time period. For one, coefficients for “Bachelor’s & Above” only became 
consistently significant in the 2007, 2008, 2013 waves, suggesting that the returns to 






Bachelor’s degree and Associate’s degree are statistically similar in earlier years, after 
accounting for sector and other background variables. Before 2007, there were no 
discernible wage benefits to obtaining advanced tertiary education. For another, female 
workers have been consistently undervalued relative to comparable male counter parts 
across all years, and the gender wage gap has been expanding much more recently, reaching 
a staggering -23.6 percent in 2013 from a marginally significant -2.1 percent in 1988.  
 
Table 4-2-7. Regression Results from Mincer Earnings Function, by year 
Year 1988 1995 2002 2007 2008 2013 
Dependent Variable:  













Adjusted Mean Wage 
Difference 
      
 
Private Non-Teachers  
(reference = teachers) 
-0.129* -0.068* -0.180* 0.036 0.099* 0.112* 
 
(0.031) (0.022) (0.034) (0.042) (0.04) (0.049) 
 
Public Non-Teachers  
(reference = teachers) 
0.039* 0.009 -0.081 0.017 0.091# -0.021 
 
(0.014) (0.027) (0.025) (0.047) (0.047) (0.040) 
Control Covariates       
 
Bachelor's & Above  
(reference = associate's) 
0.010 0.090* -0.014 0.155* 0.212* 0.185* 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.020) (0.022) 
 
Upper Secondary & 
Below (reference = 
associate's) 
0.029 -0.086* 0.077# -0.144* -0.232* -0.060# 
 
(0.027) (0.015) (0.027) (0.052) (0.026) (0.029) 
 
Years of Work 
Experience 
-0.001 0.032* -0.096* 0.011 0.011# -0.017 
 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.014) 







Years of Work 
Experience Squared 
-0.001* -0.001* -0.000# -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Female -0.021# -0.115* -0.161* -0.260* -0.246* -0.237* 
 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.016) (0.021) 
 
Single - 0.004 0.006 -0.096 -0.137# -0.012 
  
- (0.054) (0.055) (0.064) (0.070) (0.038) 
 
Minority -0.041 -0.069 0.029 -0.200 -0.222* -0.109# 
 
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.034) (0.124) (0.081) (0.050) 
 
Party Membership 0.059* 0.063* 0.036# - - 0.011 
 
 (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) - - (0.026) 
 
Permanent Contract 1.318* 0.029 0.050 0.194* 0.165* 0.264* 
 
 (0.094) (0.029) (0.049) (0.056) (0.049) (0.028) 
Fixed-effect Dummies       
 
Birth Cohorts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Worker Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
      
Constant 0.851* 4.119* 7.556* 6.518* 6.238* 7.318* 
  (0.187) (0.107) (0.354) (0.291) (0.137) (0.248) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4609 0.2255 0.2234 0.2139 0.2902 0.2237 
Observations 17073 10756 7701 5465 5452 7811 
Note: Individual information on single status in CHIP1988 and party membership 
information in CHIP2007, 2008 are not available, therefore models omitted these 
covariates. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the provincial-level, * 
denotes p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10.  
 
 
Next, in Table 4-2-8, I turn to the expanded Mincer function regression, as illustrated in 
Equation (2.3), which has incorporated the interaction terms between sector of employment 
and educational attainment level. With the inclusion of interaction terms, interpretation of 
the coefficients β2 and β3 has changed, which will now be referred to as the mean wage 






differences for non-Bachelor’s degree holders between teachers and public or private sector 
non-teaching workers respectively. Consequently, β5 and  β6 will indicate the differential 
returns to having a Bachelor’s degree in teaching versus returns in the private and public 
sectors respectively. Keeping these interpretations in mind, I focus on results in Table 4-2-
8, where the first row corresponds to β5, or the difference in returns to having a Bachelor’s 
degree for teachers versus private sector non-teacher workers, whereas the second row 
represents point estimates for β6, that is the difference in returns to having a Bachelor’s 
degree for teachers versus public sector non-teacher workers. The mean wage differences 
for non-Bachelor’s degree holders between teachers and private or public sector non-
teaching workers are in rows three and four of Table 4-2-8 respectively.  
 
Point estimates of coefficients β5 as represented in the first row of Table 4-2-8, show that 
there is some suggestion that returns to additional human capital accumulation are higher 
for comparable private sector workers than teachers between 1988, 1995 and 2002, but the 
two groups are not statistically significant. However, in more recent years such as 2007, 
2008, and 2013, results have become statistically significant which indicate that returns to 
Bachelor’s and more education are higher for comparable private sector workers, 
respectively 15.8, 11.3, and 13.5 percent more. Results in the second row correspond to 
 β6 estimates, which illustrate the relationship between returns to more education among 
public sector non-teaching workers and teachers. Broadly speaking, differences in returns 
on education for these two groups are either statistically indistinguishable or much smaller 
in relative magnitudes compared to the differences observed between private sector 
workers and teachers. 






In summary, patterns observed in Table 4-2-8 are to a large extent similar to that of Table 
4-2-7, in that wage characteristics, in terms of mean wages and returns to human capital, 
are at least similar if not more favorable for teachers relative to comparable private sector 
workers in the earlier years 1988, 1995, 2002. On the other hand, sharp contrasts in results 
for 2007, 2008, and 2013 waves are observed, such that not only teachers’ mean wages 
were about 10 percent less than that of comparable private workers, the returns to education 
estimates also show that teachers are at a 11 to 15 percent disadvantage compared to similar 
private sector workers. As for the comparison between teachers and similarly qualified 
public sector workers, differences in mean wages and returns to human capital are 
negligible across years, either being statistically insignificant or at much smaller magnitude. 
 
As robustness check, in Table 4-2-9, I take advantage of the available household-level 
linked information on respondent’s father and mother educational attainment level to 
evaluate the sensitivity of results presented in Tables 4-2-7 and 4-2-8. Specifically, for 
Models 12 and 14, I add father’s and mother’s educational attainment level controls to the 
base and full specifications to mitigate potential biases in individual’s section into higher 
educational attainment, and directly compare the results with that of Models 6 and 13. In 
detail, Model 13 evaluates the soundness of results in Model 6 with added parental 
education level controls, whereas Model 14 is directly comparable with Model 12. 
Indicated by the comparison of β2  estimates in Model 6 and 13, reduction of the 
coefficient by half and becoming statistically insignificant suggest that there are some 
concerns with endogeneity of individual’s decision into private or teaching sectors being 
influenced in part by parental educational attainment level. However, in Models 12 and 14, 






β5  estimates are consistent across models which provide some assurance that the 
differential returns to education results observed in private and teaching sectors are not 
substantially driven by parental education. Overall, the robustness test suggests that results 
for β5 in Table 4-2-8 continue to hold true even with additional household level control 
covariates included. 
 
Finally, the above results have important theoretical implications through the lens of 
teacher occupational choice framework. For instance, if one assumes that worker aptitude 
and general skills are positively correlated with earnings across different sectors, a rise in 
the difference in returns to human capital and skills would imply that individuals would 
choose the sector with higher returns. The empirical results observed in Part II suggest that 
returns to more education in the teaching sector have substantially lagged behind that of 
the private sector, even for workers with comparable characteristics. After accounting for 
important individual characteristics, persistence of such pay differences imply that by 
choosing the teaching sector, a well-educated individual would not be rewarded for her 
skills and human capital, as she would otherwise in the private sector. This finding shows 
that in recent years, teaching has become much less attractive career in comparison to 
working in the private sector for individuals with advanced tertiary education. If sustained 
over a long period of time, the teacher occupational choice framework predicts that average 
teacher ability would decline, because as teaching becomes an occupation without 
attractive income, well-educated individuals are predicted to pursue higher returns on their 











Table 4-2-8. Regression Results from Mincer Earnings Function with Interaction Terms, by year 
Year 1988 1995 2002 2007 2008 2013 













Interaction Terms       
 
Private Non-Teachers * Bachelor's & Above 
0.111 0.010 0.065 0.158# 0.113# 0.135* 
 
(0.077) (0.059) (0.071) (0.070) (0.049) (0.057) 
 
Public Non-Teachers * Bachelor's & Above 
-0.008 -0.047 -0.036 0.082 0.099# 0.044 
 
(0.013) (0.032) (0.076) (0.071) (0.053) (0.064) 
Adjusted Mean Wage Difference 
  
    
 
Private Non-Teachers  
(reference = teachers) 
-0.129* -0.063* -0.192* -0.019 0.027 0.053 
 
(0.031) (0.023) (0.035) (0.042) (0.072) (0.059) 
 
Public Non-Teachers  
(reference = teachers) 
0.040* 0.020 -0.081* -0.023 0.023 -0.065 
 
(0.013) (0.022) (0.031) (0.047) (0.072) (0.060) 
Educational Attainment       
 
Bachelor's & Above  
(reference = associate's) 
0.013 0.111* -0.22 0.035 0.111* 0.097 
 (0.017) (0.039) (0.064) (0.062) (0.031) (0.056) 
 Upper Secondary & Below  
(reference = associate's) 
0.029 -0.086* 0.078* -0.139* -0.231* -0.050 











Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed-effect Dummies  
  
   
 
Birth Cohorts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 







Constant 0.849* 4.112* 7.545* 6.570* 6.309* 7.366* 
  (0.186) (0.104) (0.290) (0.283) (0.132) (0.263) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4609 0.2212 0.2399 0.2143 0.2901 0.2243 
Observations 17073 10756 7701 5465 5452 7811 
Note: Individual information on single status in CHIP1988 and party membership information in CHIP2007, 2008 are not available, 
therefore models omitted these covariates. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the provincial-level, * denotes p-value 
<.05, # denotes p-value <.10. Control covariates and model specifications are identical with Table 4-2-7, such that point estimates from 
Models 1 & 7, 2 & 8, 3 & 9, 4 & 10, 5 & 11, 6 & 12, are directly comparable. 
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Table 4-2-9. Robustness Check for Mincer Earnings Function, using CHIP 2013 
Year 2013 
Dependent Variable:  









Interaction Terms     
 
Private Non-Teachers * 
Bachelor's & Above 
 0.136*  0.132* 
 
 (0.057)  (0.051) 
 
Public Non-Teachers * 
Bachelor's & Above 
 0.044  0.056 
 
 (0.064)  (0.059) 
Adjusted Mean Wage Difference     
 
Private Non-Teachers 
(reference = teachers) 
0.112* 0.053 0.067 0.012 
 
(0.049) (0.059) (0.050) (0.066) 
 
Public Non-Teachers 
(reference = teachers) 
-0.021 -0.065 -0.043 -0.094 
 
(0.040) (0.060) (0.040) (0.061) 
Educational Attainment     
 
Bachelor's & Above 
(reference = associate's) 
0.185* 0.097 0.153* 0.065 
 (0.022) (0.056) (0.024) (0.055) 
 Upper Secondary & Below 
(reference = associate's) 
-0.060# -0.050 -0.069# -0.059 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) 
Additional Control Covariates     
 Father's Education Level No No Yes Yes 
 Mother's Education Level No No Yes Yes 
All Control Covariates  
In Table 4-2-7 & 4-2-8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed-effect Dummies     
 
Birth Cohorts Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Worker Type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
    
Constant 7.336* 7.355* 7.241* 7.260* 
  (0.248) (0.266) (0.259) (0.275) 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.2239 0.2243 0.2262 0.2263 
Observations 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the provincial-level, * denotes 
p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10. 
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4.3 Results for Part III:  
Teacher Quality and Occupational Trends 
 
Since 1980, each of the Chinese central government’s quinquennial national policy plan 
has featured a the importance of building a high-quality teaching force, and this emphasis 
on recruiting and maintaining high teacher standards have been reiterated again in the most 
recent “Thirteen-Five National Education Plan” (State Council, 2017). As the current 
national plan states, one of the key issues limiting development in China’s education sector 
is the “quality and composition of the teaching force” (State Council, 2017, Section 1), and 
the plan subsequently lists the “improvement of teacher quality” as a primary objective in 
the “Thirteen-Five” period before 2020 (State Council, 2017, Section 4). The research 
objective of Part III is to analyze teacher’s occupational decisions based on their human 
capital traits, and track trends in relative labor quality between teacher and non-teachers 
using observed career decisions to approximate revealed occupational preferences among 
current workers in the labor force. 
 
More specifically, I estimate a multinomial probit model to relate measures of labor quality 
and human capital – educational attainment level, upper secondary school selectivity, 
national college entrance exam scores – to observed occupational choice decisions in 
teaching, public non-teaching or private non-teaching careers. To further ensure 
comparability among different career outcomes, I restrict the analysis to the professional 
worker subsample within each wave of CHIP data, such that employed workers who self-
reported as owner, manger, and laborer are excluded from the regression analysis.  
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For further elaboration, the educational attainment level variable used for this analysis will 
be identical for all waves of CHIP data (see Tables 4-2-1 through 4-2-6 for more 
information), whereas descriptive statistics on upper secondary school selectivity and 
national college entrance exam (gaokao) scores are illustrated further in Table 4-3-1. Data 
on upper secondary school selectivity and national college entrance exam scores are limited 
to more recent waves of CHIP in 2002, 2007 and 2013. For example, in Panel A of Table 
4-3-1, I show share of individuals in the sample by the selectivity of the upper secondary 
school that they have attended. Approximately 8 percent of the CHIP2002 professional-
only analytic sample report having attended a “National & Provincial Key School” which 
represents the most selective category, while the same numbers are 36 percent for 
“Municipal & County Key School,” and the majority 57 percent attended none of the above 
categories (least selective). For CHIP2007, only national college entrance exam scores are 
reported (see Panel B, Table 4-3-1), which had a subsample mean of 469 points (SD=107). 
In Panel C of Table 4-3-1, information on both upper secondary school selectivity and 
national college entrance exam scores are provided in CHIP2013, such that there are 6 
percent in the most selective national and provincial key schools category, 44 percent in 
municipal or county-level key schools, and 50 percent in the least selective category; mean 
scores for the national college entrance exam is 466 points (SD=99). 






Table 4-3-1. Descriptive Statistics of CHIP Urban Labor Market Participant Ability 
Characteristics (Professional Workers Only), by year 
Variable Definition and Metrics N Mean  SD Max Min 
Panel A | CHIP2002      





Attended a national or 
provincial key school =1, 
otherwise =0 




Attended a municipal or county 
key school =1, otherwise =0 
1864 0.36 - 1 0 
 
Not Key or 
Other 
Attended a non-key high 
school, or other =1, otherwise 
=0 
1864 0.57 - 1 0 
Panel B | CHIP2007      
Gaokao Score 
National College Entrance 
Examination Score 
669 469 107 817 30 
Panel C | CHIP2013      





Attended a national or 
provincial key school =1, 
otherwise =0 




Attended a municipal-level key 
high school =1, otherwise =0 
1763 0.44 - 1 0 
 
Not Key or 
Other 
Attended a county-level key 
high school =1, otherwise =0 
1763 0.50 - 1 0 
Gaokao Score 
National College Entrance 
Examination Score 
1005 466 99 730 58 
  






In Table 4-3-2, I turn to the multinomial probit regression results, which are separately 
reported in each column for each model’s coefficient as well as the marginal effect for each 
educational attainment level (relative to the reference category: Associate’s). For instance, 
Columns 1 and 2 correspond respectively to the “Beta” coefficient and “Marginal Effect” 
estimates from Model 1 that is fitted on the CHIP1988 professional worker subsample.  
Consequently, the fifth and ninth row of “Beta” column results in Table 4-3-2 represent the 
estimated relationship between obtaining at least a Bachelor’s degree (reference category 
is Associate’s degree), or only Upper Secondary or below (reference category is 
Associate’s degree), on the probability of choosing to be a worker in the private sector 
relative to choosing teaching. A negative coefficient in these rows suggests that being a 
teacher is more likely predicted than working in the private sector, for a set of educational 
attainment level. In the same vein, “Beta” column results in rows seven and eleven of Table 
4-3-2 relate to the same probabilities and are interpreted in the same way, but the 
relationship is subsequently between public sector careers and teaching. The “M. Effect” 
column represents the marginal effect of holding a given degree versus the reference 
category on the predicted probability of choosing a particular career option: teaching, 
private sector, or public sector. 
 
For interpretation, a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the “Beta” column 
indicates that the receipt of a given degree (Bachelor’s in rows 5 and rows 9, or Upper 
Secondary or Below in rows 7 and 11) is associated with higher predicted probability of 
choosing teaching as a career, compared to either private or public sector professional jobs; 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient indicates the reverse relationship. In the 






“M. Effect” column, a statistically significant point estimate indicates the conditional 
probability change in choosing a given career that is related to one unit change in the 
explanatory variable; for “Bachelor’s & Above” this refers to holding at least a bachelor’s 
degree. For all cells, the reference group is for workers who hold an associate’s degree. 
 
To begin, generalizing from results shown in Table 4-3-2, more educated professional 
workers are more likely to choose a career in teaching as opposed to working in private or 
public sector non-teaching jobs. For instance, taking a closer look at the “Beta” column in 
the fifth row of Table 4-3-2, we can observe a consistent trend across all models and years 
that between 1988 and 2013, coefficients are always negative and statistically significant 
(coefficient was marginally significant at .10-level in 1988, for all other years p-value<.05). 
This means that across all years, it is more likely for professional workers with Bachelor’s 
degrees or above (relative to those with Associate’s degrees) to choose teaching over 
working in the private sector, after controlling for a vector of important demographic 
characteristics. Similarly, in row seven, it is more likely for professional workers with an 
Associate’s degree to be a teacher than to work in the private sector.  
 
Also, results from “Beta” column in rows nine and eleven, which represent the probability 
of choosing public sector relative to teaching jobs, show that workers with higher education 
attainment tend to favor teaching careers relative to public sector jobs, especially in the 
2002, 2007, and 2013 waves. Importantly, while Bachelor’s degree attainment does not 
seem to influence likelihood of choosing teaching over public sector careers in 1988 and 
1995, as indicated by the insignificant “Beta” coefficients -0.137 and -0.101, workers with 






Bachelor’s degrees are more likely to choose teaching rather than other public sector jobs 
in later waves since the “Beta” coefficients become negative and significant -0.521 (p-
value<.05), -0.242 (p-value<.10), and -0.361 (p-value<.05) in Models 3, 4, 5 respectively.  
 
Secondly, in order to evaluate the magnitude of observed relationships above, I turn to the 
“M. Effects” column in Table 4-3-2. Using Model 1 as example, in the first row I find that 
in 1988, having attained at least a Bachelor’s degree is on average correlated with a 3 
percent increase in the probability of entering teaching, relative to only obtaining an 
associate’s degree, but this relationship is not statistically significant. The same relationship 
is 7.6 percent, 10.8 percent, 6.3 percent and 8.7 percent for Models 2, 3, 4, 5 respectively. 
These findings are not surprising, and to a large extent corroborate the macro-level 
accounting exercise carried out at the outset of this chapter, in Table 4-0-2, which showed 
that the percent of teachers with advanced tertiary education degrees increased 
substantially and at a quicker pace than the national average between period 2003 and 2017. 
 
As a third step, in Table 4-3-3, I distinguish the differential quality occupation decision 
patterns in teacher stock and teacher flow, by reporting Adjusted Predictions at 
Representative Values (APRV) for individuals whose age are 30 and 50 years old 
respectively. The APRV of Bachelor’s degree attainment on the probability of choosing to 
be a teacher conditional on age equals 30 will illustrate the career decisions of new labor 
market entrants, while the APRV results conditional age equals 50 will approximate the 
existing stock of the teaching force. For instance, in 2013, new entrants who hold a 
Bachelor’s degree are about 4.5 percent more likely to become a teacher relative to another 






new entrant who holds an Associate’s degree, but this number was 10.3 percent more likely 
for older cohorts. 
 
To this end, I evaluate the differences in APRVs between new entrants and existing labor 
force, such that a negative and statically significant difference between the two APRVs will 
indicate that more educated new labor market entrants are less likely to become a teacher 
compared to the existing cohort. Indeed, in Table 4-3-3, I find negative and statistically 
significant differences in the marginal effect between new entrants and existing workers in 
recent waves 2007 and 2013, and these deficits are -4.7 percentage points (p-value<.0.5) 
and -5.8 percentage points (p-value<.05) respectively, representing a difference of more 
than 50 percent between the two groups. To be clear, this means that new workers with 
Bachelor’s degrees are about half as likely to choose teaching as compared to older cohorts. 
Relating these observations to results shown for 1988, 1995 and 2002, I conclude that while 
more educated new labor market entrants are about as likely or more likely to become 
teachers between 1988 and 2002 compared to more senior cohorts in the existing labor 
force, more educated individuals are less likely relative to more senior cohorts to choose 
teaching as a career in 2007 and 2013.   










Table 4-3-2. Multinomial Probit Regression Results of the Relationship between Educational Attainment Level and Career Decision 
Outcome ("Teacher" as omitted base category), with Marginal Effects on Predicted Probabilities by Outcome, 1988 -2013 
Professional Worker Subsample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Year 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Career  
Outcomes 




















- 0.030 - 0.076* - 0.108* - 0.063* - 0.087* 




- -0.121* - -0.054* - -0.139* - -0.107* - -0.119* 






-0.597# -0.054# -0.653* -0.166* -0.507* -0.053# -0.458* -0.084# -0.504* -0.077* 




0.732* 0.040* 0.344* 0.052* 0.786* 0.098* 0.882* 0.145* 0.928* 0.188* 





-0.137 0.024 -0.101 0.089* -0.521* -0.055* -0.242# 0.021 -0.361* -0.010 
(0.097) (0.019) (0.142) (0.032) (0.112) (0.024) (0.138) (0.040) (0.190) (0.037) 













0.440* 0.081* 0.243* 0.002 0.653* 0.041# 0.515* -0.037 0.333# -0.069* 
(0.086) (0.026) (0.110) (0.023) (0.116) (0.024) (0.207) (0.029) (0.202) (0.027) 
Control Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 2695 2456 2036 1343 2132 
Number of Teacher 
Observations 
779 441 505 207 429 
Percent Teachers 0.29 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.20 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis and are clustered at the provincial-level, * denotes p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10. 
Control covariates include respondent’s sex, age, quadratic age, minority status, party membership status, permanent contract status. 
Marginal effects (dy/dx) and associated robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated based on delta-method. 
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Table 4-3-3. Marginal Effect, Multinomial Probit Regression Results of the Relationship 
between Bachelor’s Degree Attainment (Ref = Associate's) on Predicted Probabilities of 
Being a Teacher, at Representative Ages 30 and 50 
 M. Effect at Age 30 M. Effect at Age 50 Difference 
1988 
(Model 1) 
0.023 0.025 -0.002 
(0.029) (0.023) (0.018) 
1995 
(Model 2) 
0.052# 0.031* 0.021 
(0.031) (0.013) (0.028) 
2002 
(Model 3) 
0.093* 0.042* 0.051# 
(0.036) (0.017) (0.032) 
2007 
(Model 4) 
0.032* 0.079* -0.047* 
(0.011) (0.027) (0.025) 
2013 
(Model 5) 
0.045* 0.103* -0.058* 
(0.020) (0.035) (0.029) 
Note: Marginal effects (dy/dx) and robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated 
using delta-method. Following Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995), a z-test comparison 
of coefficients is used, * denotes p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10.  
  
 






Figure 4-3-1. Distribution of the Marginal Effect of Bachelor’s Degree (ref=Associate’s) on Predicted Probabilities of Being a 
Teacher, by Age, 1988-2013 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. Note: y-axis is the marginal effect of having a Bachelor’s degree relative to having an Associate’s degree 
on the predicted probability of being a teacher; x-axis is age with a band of 20 to 60 years old. Predicted probability of zero is marked 
by a horizontal red line.  






A visual representation of how this probability changes over time is illustrated in Figure 4-
3-1, such that from left to right, each panel offers a glimpse of the full distribution of 
marginal effect of educational attainment by age for each wave of data. Within each panel, 
age is the running variable on the x-axis with younger cohorts on the left and older cohorts 
to the right. Across time, we can see that the distribution of marginal effects has gradually 
become left-skewed, suggesting that younger cohorts are less likely than older cohorts to 
enter teaching, when they are more educated. Taken altogether, the interpretation of results 
from Tables 4-3-2, 4-3-3 and Figure 4-3-1 reveals that being more educated is generally 
associated with a higher probability of becoming a teacher, but in recent years 2007 and 
2013, this relationship has become weaker among new workers, and indicates a potentially 
large decline in relative labor quality among new teacher entrants when compared to the 
workforce in non-teaching sectors. 
 
To further confirm the observed trends and check for the robustness of using educational 
attainment level as proxy for human capital and general skills levels, I conduct two 
additional analyses with different types of human capital measures: upper secondary 
selectivity and national college entrance exam scores. To this end, these two pre-labor 
market human capital measures are proxies for general worker aptitude, and are intended 
to be interpreted broadly as guidance information on the relative placement of individuals 
on the labor quality distribution. 
  
In Table 4-3-4, I leverage information on the selectivity of respondents’ upper secondary 
school in CHIP2002 and CHIP2013 to run identical multinomial probit models. For Model 






6 using data from 2002, negative and significant coefficients in “Beta” column on rows 
five and seven of Table 4-3-4 suggest that respondents who attended a selective “National 
& Key” or “Municipal & County Key” upper secondary school are more likely to be a 
teacher than to be working in private or public sector, compared to those who attended 
“Non-Key & Other” schools. However, for public sector jobs, “Beta” column results in 
rows nine and eleven indicate that those who attended the most selective “National & Key” 
schools were not statistically more likely to choose teaching. On the other hand, it is more 
likely for those who attended less selective “Municipal & County Key” schools to choose 
teaching over public sector careers. For 2013, results in the “Beta” columns show that 
individuals who attended selective schools were not more likely to choose teaching than 
either private or public sector jobs. However, those who attended more selective 
“Municipal & County Key” schools were more likely to choose teaching rather than private 
or public sector jobs. Moreover, while in year 2002, individuals who attended more 
selective schools are 9 percent more likely to become teachers than to work in other sectors, 
comparing the “M Effect” column results in rows one and three for Model 6 and 7 shows 
that those who attended more selective schools are becoming less likely to choose the 
teaching sector. To this end, by 2013, the numbers have become statistically insignificant 
for those who attended the most selective “National & Provincial Key” schools. In other 
words, compared to 2002, individuals who attended the most selective schools are no 
longer more likely to choose teaching careers in 2013. 
 
Similarly, in Table 4-3-5, I report multinomial probit regression results that relate 
individuals’ performance on National College Entrance Exam (gaokao) to their career 






choices: teaching, private or public sector jobs. In Models 8 and 9, exam scores are 
standardized within exam year, and exam type dummies controlling for Arts, Humanities, 
and Science tracks are added as measures to mitigate inter-temporal and inter-subject 
influence. Although exam scores information is only available in more recent waves of 
CHIP2007 and CHIP2013, the likelihood of entry into teaching relative to other careers for 
high scorers on the National College Entrance Exam is declining, which seems to be 
consistent with prior results using educational attainment and school selectivity 
information. In particular, results found in rows three and five in the “Beta” columns for 
Model 8 and 9 suggest that it was more likely for higher-scoring individuals to choose 
teaching over private sector jobs in 2007, but in 2013 the advantage dissipates and becomes 
statically insignificant. To add, the “M. Effect” columns reflect Adjusted Predictions at the 
Means (APM), based on estimating the marginal effect of increasing exam scores by 1 
standard deviation on the likelihood of choosing private or private sector jobs over teaching 
careers. A comparison of APM results between Models 8 and 9 from row one in the “M. 
Effect” columns suggest that a lower probability of choosing teaching jobs are also 
predicted for individuals who score around the mean on the National College Entrance 
Exam, which was approximately 469 and 466 respectively in the 2007 and 2013 subsample. 
 
Finally, as a note of caution, the decline in probability for higher aptitude individuals to 
enter teaching careers may be attributed to two different forces, one being that high-ability 
individuals in younger cohorts are disproportionately choosing non-teaching careers, and 
another explanation being high-ability individuals among older workers are electing to 
leave teaching posts. Unfortunately in this section, due to data limitation, it is not possible 






to untangle the influence and evaluate how magnitudes of these two factors compare. 
However, the above analysis can confirm that by utilizing observed career decisions to 
approximate individuals’ revealed occupational preference, I find that the relative 
attractiveness of becoming a teacher, relative to private sector professional jobs, have 
declined substantially for more educated and higher ability individuals. Relating the results 
in this section to that of Part II, the timing of the decline of teaching career’s relative 
attractiveness coincide with the occurrence of lower returns to education and human capital 
for teachers, as compared to the private sector. Importantly, this finding is in large part 
consistent with the broader literature on teacher occupational choice in developed countries, 
which has found that large declines in the relative aptitude of teachers are observed when 
outside employment opportunities become ample and more resourceful. 
  






Table 4-3-4. Multinomial Probit Regression Results of the Relationship between Upper 
Secondary School Selectivity and Career Decision Outcomes ("Teacher" as omitted base 
category), by year  
 Model (6) Model (7) 
Year 2002 2013 
Career  
Outcomes 
(Ref = AA's) Beta M. Effect Beta M. Effect 
Omitted: Teacher 
National & Key 
- 0.093* - 0.014 
- (0.044) - (0.048) 
Municipal & 
County Key 
- 0.094* - 0.062* 
- (0.024) - (0.030) 
Private Non-teaching 
National & Key 
-0.418* -0.072 -0.156 -0.055 
(0.169) (0.050) (0.259) (0.057) 
Municipal & 
County Key 
-0.489* 0.107* -0.354* -0.073* 
(0.107) (0.023) (0.151) (0.033) 
Public Non-teaching  
National & Key 
-0.341 -0.021 0.072 0.041 
(0.274) (0.062) (0.206) (0.038) 
Municipal & 
County Key 
-0.252* 0.013 -0.180 0.011 
(0.108) (0.021) (0.143) (0.026) 
Control Covariates Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1864 1763 
Number of Teacher Observations 466 388 
Percent Teachers 0.25  0.22  
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis and are clustered at the provincial-level, * 
denotes p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10. Control covariates include respondent’s sex, 
age, quadratic age, minority status, party membership status, permanent contract status. 
Marginal effects (dy/dx) and associated robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
calculated based on delta-method. 






Table 4-3-5. Multinomial Probit Regression Results of the Relationship between 
National College Exam Score and Career Decision Outcomes ("Teacher" as omitted 
base category), with Marginal Effects 
 
Model (8) Model (9) 
2007 2013 
Beta M. Effect Beta M. Effect 
Omitted: Teacher 
College Entrance 
Exam Score (sd) 
- 0.042* - 0.036* 
- (0.017) - (0.016) 
Private Non-teaching 
College Entrance 
Exam Score (sd) 
-0.309* -0.070* -0.115 -0.003 
(0.094) (0.024) (0.078) (0.023) 
Public Non-teaching 
College Entrance 
Exam Score (sd) 
-0.122 0.027 -0.210* -0.033# 
(0.095) (0.021) (0.075) (0.018) 
Control Covariates Yes Yes 
Exam Type Dummies Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 668 1005 
Number of Teacher Observations 112 249 
Percent Teachers 0.17  0.25  
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the provincial-level, * denotes 
p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10. Marginal effects columns report standard errors based 
on delta-method. National college exam scores are standardized within exam year. 






4.4 Results for Part IV:  
Teacher Exits, Opportunity Wages, and Non-Pecuniary Outcomes 
 
In this section of the dissertation, I attempt to understand why teachers leave teaching and 
draw connections between wage characteristics, occupational choice, and non-pecuniary 
outcomes. I take advantage of the panel structure of the RUMiC urban subsample, which 
matched individuals’ employment information between years 2007 and 2008. More 
concretely, I track teacher’s job status across years to examine the prevalence of teacher 
turnover, identify teacher job switch destinations, and relate these decisions to observed 
wage characteristics. In addition, I conduct explorative investigation on how teacher’s 
attained utility, as approximated by a composite index assessing subjective well-being, may 
be affected by one’s career switching behavior. In the following paragraphs, I first describe 
the unique matched-teacher panel data, and detailed results obtained in this section. 
 
As described in the data section, RUMiC 2007 and 2008 are two special waves of CHIP 
dataset that could be linked together to produce a matched panel that tracks households so 
long as they are present in the surveyed cities. Leveraging this sample feature, I first match 
all individuals in both waves of the urban subsample using their exclusive personal 
identifiers, which resulted in a combined dataset with 5,825 tracked individuals across the 
two waves. Next, I identify teachers according to sectoral, occupational, and work unit 
ownership information, such that teachers are defined as professional workers who are 
employed in the education sector and working in public institutions (shiye danwei). 
Unfortunately, due to data availability, I am not able to distinguish between levels of 






instruction. Altogether, across two waves of data, I find a total of 211 tracked teachers, 
whose labor market information is present in both RUMiC 2007 and 2008. One important 
caveat and limitation of relying on RUMiC’s household-based resampling approach to 
identify teacher career choices in the follow-up survey, is that I am not able to fully track 
new entrant teachers, especially if they are fresh graduates or new participants in the labor 
market. For instance, all but 2 individuals among 39 new entrant teachers held prior 
administrative jobs in the education sector. Therefore, new entrants I track in this analysis 
are exclusively not first-time workers, which I roughly estimate to account for at least 75 
percent of all teachers in the follow-up survey, while the remaining share of all teachers 
are new labor market entrants. 
 
As illustrated in Table 4-4-1, I provide summary statistics on variables of interest in this 
analysis by survey year, as well as differences between waves and the corresponding t-
statistics. Importantly, there are a total of 211 matched teachers that are tracked across both 
years. In 2007, there are a total of 172 tracked teachers; among them, 107 remained as 
teachers in 2008, 65 left their original teaching posts. In 2008, 39 new entrants enter into 
teaching posts to replenish the teacher sample to a total of 146 matched individuals. In 
terms of background characteristics across the two sample years, the only statically 
significant difference is log weekly wages: the average in 2007 is about 0.10 log points 
lower than in 2008 (approximately 10 percent), which reflects both a nominal year-over-
year wage increase and any potential compositional changes related to career choices sets. 
All other key variables do not show substantial variation across the two waves. 
 






To begin, the first segment of the current analysis focuses on understanding alternative job 
destinations for teachers. Using treemapping illustration shown in Figure 4-4-1, I offer 
visual representation of the occupational destinations of all 172 baseline identified teachers, 
as observed in the follow-up survey a year later in 2008. To be clear, I define teachers who 
work in the basic education as professional workers who are employed in the education 
sector and working in a public institution (shiye danwei), which is consistent with previous 
sections. Figure 4-4-1 captures the job destination information of teachers in 2008, and 
observations can be grouped in three main career choice categories: remained as teachers 
(111 teachers, or 64 percent of 172 baseline identified teachers), job change within 
education sector (33 teachers, or 19 percent), job change out of education sector (28 
teachers, or 16 percent). To this end, it is worth noting that teacher turnover rates are high 
at over 30 percent, and only about two-thirds of teachers in 2007 remained in a public 
school teaching career in the following year (represented by darkest shade in Figure 4-4-
1). After a detailed review of the teacher turnover literature, I am not aware of any existing 
research that provides turnover rates using a tracked panel approach in China, so these 
estimates presented here contribute substantively to the current understanding on the 
prevalence and magnitude of teacher departures from teaching posts and the education 
sector as a whole in the Chinese context. 
 
In terms of departures from teaching, it is interesting to find that about one-in-five (19 
percent) of teachers left teaching positions but remained in the broader education sector, 
and are found working in administrative positions (10 percent), school principals (5 
percent), or transitioned to teaching positions in non-public schools (4 percent). These 






types of job switching can be broadly interpreted as career progression, which may result 
in promotion or expansion of existing responsibilities on-the-job and may be productivity 
enhancing for the education sector. Among those who exited education sector entirely, the 
most common destinations are unemployment or retirement, jobs in “Culture, Sports, and 
Entertainment,” “Health & Social Services,” or “Transportation” sectors. Individuals also 
departed to work in “Information Technology,” “Finance,” “Personal Services,” 
“Wholesale & Retail,” but are significantly fewer. These types of sector switching are more 
concerning because teacher departures to these sectors are likely permanent. 
 
Next, in the second segment of the analysis, I turn to understanding the role of opportunity 
wages on teacher departures. In more detail, I leverage within-individual variation in 
exposure to different opportunity wage levels to eliminate unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity that may influence job exit decisions. In Table 4-4-2, I present results from 
a standard probit model that has a binary dependent variable indicating whether individuals 
are identified as a teacher (otherwise =0); coefficients are directly interpretable as 
probability of working as a teacher that is related to each unit increase in the independent 
explanatory variables. To be clear, the key variable of interests “Distance in Log Points to 
Comparable Worker Wage” is computed as the conditional wage difference between 
teacher i and comparable workers who resides in the same province, with the same level of 
educational attainment at time t. Model 1 is the base model, while I subsequently add more 
control variables, and Model 4 contains results from the full specification. 










Table 4-4-1. Summary Statistics of RUMiC 2007 and 2008 Key Variables (Teachers Only), by year 
   2007 2008 Difference:  
2007-2008 
t-statistic 
Variables Definitions and Metric N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Teacher Exits 
Individuals who were teachers in 
2007 but left teaching in 2008 =1, 
otherwise =0 
- - - 65 - - - - 
New Teacher 
Entrants 
Individuals who were not teachers 
in 2007 but became teachers in 
2008 =1, otherwise =0 
- - - 39 - - - - 
Teacher Remained 
Individuals who were teachers in 
both 2007 and 2008 =1, otherwise 
=0 
- - - 107 - - - - 
Log Weekly Wage Log of weekly earnings 211 6.42 0.497 211 6.519 0.465 -0.099 -2.087* 




Conditional wage difference in log 
points between each teacher and 
comparably educated workers who 
reside in the same province 
211 0.444 0.409 211 0.539 0.346 -0.10 -0.255 
Log Subjective 
Well-Being Scale 
Log of Subjective Well-Being 
Composite Score based on 12 
Questions (GHQ-12) 
129 3.354 0.155 129 3.35 0.154 0 0.030 












Number of working hours per 
week 
211 40.476 9.001 211 40.099 8.945 0.377 0.425 
Health Status  211   211     
 Excellent 
Respondent's self-assessment of 
relative health status compared to 
others of similar age 
- 0.232 - - 0.142 - 0.09 - 
 Good - 0.488 - - 0.54 - -0.052 - 
 Average - 0.27 - - 0.289 - -0.019 - 
 Poor - 0.009 - - 0.028 - -0.019 - 
Female Female =1, male =0 211 0.507 - 211 0.517 - -0.01 - 
Age Age in Years 211 39.16 8.59 211 40.1 8.4 -0.94 -1.145 
Single Single =1, otherwise =0 211 0.071 - 211 0.066 - 0.005 - 
Minority Minority =1, otherwise =0 211 0.014 - 211 0.014 - 0 - 
Permanent 
Contract 
Working on permanent contract or 
with tenure =1. otherwise =0 
211 0.99 - 211 0.985 - 0.005 - 
 
  










Figure 4-4-1. Occupational destinations of RUMiC 2007 teachers, in 2008 
 







Importantly, across all models in Table 4-2-2, wage gap between teachers and comparable 
workers with the same level of educational attainment is shown to have a negative 
relationship with probability of working as a teacher. In the base model with no additional 
controls, this relationship is not statistically significant, but once adding important time-
variant control variables to improve precision, the negative relationship becomes 
marginally significant at -0.319 (p-value<0.10) and -0.442 (p-value<0.10) in Models 2 and 
4 respectively. To add, I also provide results of Model 3 as reference for the relationship 
between nominal wage levels and occupational decisions; the relationship is insignificant. 
For Model 4, while there are some structural multicollinearity concerns regarding the 
correlation between “Log Weekly Wage” and “Distance in Log Points to Comparable 
Worker Wage” due to the computation approach, marginally significant results in Model 4 
continue to indicate that larger wage gaps are related to reduced probability of working as 
a teacher. This negative relationship is evaluated at a 1 to -0.442 ratio (p-value<0.10), 
which means that for every 10 percent increase in the difference in the wage gap between 
teachers and comparable workers, a 4.42 percent decrease in the probability of individuals 
working as teachers is observed. The results here should be interpreted with caution as 
there could be endogeneity issues with why there exist variations in wages gaps between 
teachers and comparable workers. For instance, the level of opportunity wages that teachers 
face could be a function of both wage and non-wage factors, including local perception of 
job prestige, or local supply of teachers. Therefore, in general terms, I interpret the 
opportunity wage level as a proxy for how much teachers are valued in relation to a 








Table 4-4-2. Probit Panel Regression Results of the Relationship between Opportunity 
Wages and Career Decision Outcomes (Teachers Only) 
DV: Occupation = Teacher Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Distance in Log Points to 
Comparable Worker Wage 
-0.257 -0.319#  -0.442# 
(0.182) (0.188)  (0.259) 
Log Weekly Wage 
  -0.096 0.138 
  (0.0143) (0.199) 
Weekly Work Hours 
 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Permanent Contract Dummy No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed-effect Dummy No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.767* 0.096 0.757 -0.744 
(0.070) (0.680) (1.071) (1.389) 
Number of Observations 422 422 422 422 
Number of Groups 211 211 211 211 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the provincial-level, * denotes 
p-value <.05, # denotes p-value <.10. 
 
 
In the final analysis presented in Part IV, I relate teacher’s job-switching behavior to her 
general happiness and wellbeing, which I approximate as individual’s attained utility. To 
achieve this, I utilize the subjective well-being (SWB) index to derive one’s attained utility. 
Figure 4-4-2 plots the kernel density distribution of the logarithm of SWB scale for teachers 
in 2007 and 2008. It is visible that the distributions of SWB scores are similar across both 
waves and seem to be somewhat left-skewed, which is consistent with the broader literature 








In Table 4-4-3, I present results from the panel regression model I fit on the tracked teacher 
data, which relates within-individual variation in career decisions to their assessment of 
life’s general happiness. To begin, Model 5 is the base model with only career choice 
indicators, for which indicate the difference in the logarithm of SWB index between each 
career decision type and the default option of remaining in the job position. In Model 6, I 
add time-variant control variables such as wage levels, work hours and health status, and 
the signs of coefficients on all three career decision indicator variables continue to hold. In 
particular, new entrant teachers report a 5.7 percent gain (p-value<0.10) on the subjective 
well-being index than in their prior jobs, and this relationship is marginally significant. As 
indicated by the sign of coefficients, teacher exits within education may be positively 
associated subjective well-being while the converse is true for teacher departures for non-
education sectors, but both are not statistically significant. To further nuance explorative 
findings obtained in this exercise, it should be cautioned that sample sizes are relatively 
small and insufficiently powered to detect small differences, and further, not all identified 
teachers in the sample completed the subjective well-being assessment, and therefore the 
results presented above can be partially influenced by missing data for almost half of the 








Figure 4-4-2. Distribution of Log of Teacher’s SWB Scores in 2007 and 2008 
 
Source: Author’s compilation according to RUMiC 2007 and 2008 tracked teacher 
subsample. Kernel density is computed using Epanechnikov method, bandwidth for 2007 
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Table 4-4-3. Panel Regression Results of the Relationship between Career Decision 
and Subjective Well-Being (Teachers Only) 
DV: Log of SWB Index Model 5 Model 6 
Career Decisions  
(ref= individual’s prior occupational choice) 
  
 
Teacher Departures within Education 
0.014 0.027 
 (0.035) (0.038) 
 
Teacher Departures to outside Education 
-0.10 -0.019 
 (0.036) (0.047) 
 
New Teacher Entrants 
0.048 0.057# 
(0.030) (0.033) 
Log of Weekly Wage Control No Yes 
Number of Work Hours Per Week Control No Yes 
Health Status Dummies No Yes 
Permanent Contract Dummy No Yes 




 (0.013) (0.162) 
 Number of Observations 258 258 
 Number of Groups 129 129 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the provincial-level, * denotes 









CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
China’s rapid economic growth in past decades has created huge employment opportunities 
and substantially improved general welfare of its population. However, in light of such 
drastic shifts in the labor market, concerns are raised in this dissertation regarding the 
potentially large adverse effects of holding teacher wages back from broader market levels; 
teachers set the standards for the quality of an educational system. Much of the current 
research on teacher occupational choice, especially in developed economies, has shown 
that in doing so there are considerable consequences, both in terms of declining teacher 
aptitude and unrealized student learning. Using a four-part analytic approach in this 
dissertation, I confirm empirical observations made elsewhere and contextualize 
theoretical stipulations of the broader occupational choice framework using the case of 
Chinese teachers. To define the Chinese case and situate this dissertation more closely with 
the large bodies of education development literature on teacher shortage, recruitment and 
retention, I have aimed to produce a targeted collection of “thick description” (Steiner-
Khamsi, 2016b, p.691) in addition to empirical findings to extend the current state of 
knowledge on teacher occupational choice and its relevant consequences on student 
learning, with particular attention to developing contexts. 
 
At the outset of the analysis, I observe two important trends at the aggregate level. On the 
one hand, average teacher salary has considerably lacked behind that of other sectors, 







varied substantially across geographical regions. On the other hand, the percent of workers 
with advanced tertiary education degrees are the highest in the education sector than in all 
other sectors, and educational attainment of teachers was shown to have increased at all 
instructional levels. However, there are signs of more attractive sectors in recent years that 
are also competing for workers with advanced degrees, such as “Finance and Banking,” 
“Information Technology,” and “Public Health and Social Welfare.” Zooming in further on 
compositional shifts in the teaching force, I find that new entrants are a major source of 
teacher additions at all instructional levels; however, in lower secondary schools, there is 
considerable numbers of net transfers out of teaching jobs. In general terms, while wage 
growth has been largely stagnant for teachers, there is still an increase in the number of 
individuals with advanced educational attainment becoming teachers, but recent rates of 
recruitment has been growing comparatively faster in non-education sectors. To be clear, 
these macro-level findings, while instructive, are aggregate trend summaries of high 
abstraction and prompts further investigation using micro-level analysis.   
 
Main Findings and Discussion for Part I 
Undeniably, teacher quality has been shown to be one of the most important school-related 
factors in influencing a student’s academic performance. In this regard, policymakers have 
often relied on pre-labor market human capital signals to screen teacher candidates for 
potential instructional effectiveness. To establish the causal link between teachers’ 
comparable and observable quality characteristics and student learning outcomes, in Part I 
of this dissertation I employed a student fixed-effect strategy to relate differences in teacher 







student-learning benefits from having a teacher with advanced tertiary degree are evaluated 
at 0.033 standard deviations. In other words, the learning gains from having a more 
educated teacher are approximately 1 additional month of learning in a typical 9-month 
academic year, even after controlling for other teacher background attributes. Further 
robustness check was conducted by limiting the analysis to only students who have not 
been systematically sorted according to ability grouping, and the impacts are shown to 
double, at about 0.071 standard deviations. In examining potential heterogeneous effects, 
findings suggest that students from advantaged and disadvantaged students both benefit 
from better educated teachers alike, and there are no foreseeable equity concerns.  
 
Altogether, results presented in Part I of this dissertation underscore the critical 
consequence teachers can have on students’ learning outcomes. In this regard, findings 
from the Chinese context contribute rigorous evidence to a broader debate in the teacher 
effectiveness and teacher value-added literature on whether teacher observational 
characteristics on preparation and certification are useful for improving student learning 
(Darling-Hammond, 2000; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006; Harris & Sass, 2007; Winters, 
Dixon, Greene, 2012). One of the most influential research on this topic in the United States, 
by Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), found that only 29 percent of all 170 estimates regarding 
the impact of teacher’s earning an advanced degree on student achievement is significant, 
the vast majority of the impacts are statistically insignificant. This result and others 
following it have put in question policy efforts that aim at improving teacher education 
programs or job attractiveness to highly educated individuals, since teacher’s human 








Other studies, however, have challenged these beliefs and confirm that what teachers know, 
how well they are prepared to teach, and the level of educationally important credentials 
they hold really do affect student learning (Polk, 2006; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; 
Hairrel, Rupley, Edmonds, Larsen, Simmons, Wilson & Vaughn, 2011; Meroni, Vera-
Toscano, & Costa, 2015; Cakır & Bichelmeyer, 2016). For instance, Jackson and 
Bruegmann (2009) summarize teacher’s observable pre-labor market traits (i.e. licensure, 
score of license exams, certification, and degree level) in to a single index and find positive 
associations between observable teacher characteristics and students’ math and reading 
scores. Importantly, classroom teaching is a complex and intellectually demanding activity 
that requires teachers to possess substantive cognitive, non-cognitive, and critical thinking 
skills as well as a solid foundation of subject and pedagogical knowledge (Stronge, 2018). 
To conclude, results in Part I of this dissertation supports this view that teacher’s attained 
human capital levels have serious consequences for improving student achievement, such 
that more educated teachers can lead to better student learning. 
 
Main Findings and Discussion for Part II 
Having established the importance of high ability teachers on effective student 
achievement, my analysis proceeded to examine the wage returns to common human 
capital traits – educational attainment level. Accordingly, in Part II, I estimate a Mincer 
earnings function to examine gaps in mean wage levels and returns to human capital 
between teaching and non-teaching sectors. In general terms, I find sharp shifts in the 







teachers’ mean wage was 13 percent higher than workers in non-teaching private sectors, 
but this advantage has since disappeared in 2007, and by 2013, the mean wage reversed to 
be in favor of workers in non-teaching sectors by 11 percent, marking a total of 24 
percentage point reversal. Regarding gaps in returns to education, returns to having a 
Bachelor’s degree or above became significantly higher, about 11-15 percent, in private 
non-teaching sectors than the teaching sector in years 2007, 2008, and 2013. Connecting 
both findings, it is suggested that the education sector has made potentially large salary 
savings compared to if it was required to hire individuals with similar qualifications at the 
market rate. To this end, prolonged lag in mean wage growth and returns to human capital 
may be critical risk factors for thwarting potential high quality candidates from entry. 
 
As observed in the United States and elsewhere, relative wage levels are strong 
occupational determinants, and may substantially influence career decisions of prospective 
teacher candidates. Recent evidence linking career aspirations of 15-year-olds and current 
teacher salary levels show that students in the top tertile of academic achievement who live 
in countries that pay their teachers better are more likely to aspire to become a teacher, 
relative to countries that pay teachers poorly (Park & Byun, 2015). Consistent with studies 
that examine the relationship between salary and career inclinations for teacher education 
enrollees (Watt & Richardson, 2012) and recent college graduates (Bacolod, 2007), 
findings from this section provide insights to future trajectories of who will become 
teachers. In sum, the consequences of withholding teacher salary levels could be 
longstanding, and the stake for leaving teaching as an unattractive career is potentially high 








Main Findings and Discussion for Part III 
In Part III, I proceed to address the empirical question of how teacher quality has changed 
with respect to the shifting landscape of China’s job market. To achieve this, I apply 
multinomial probit regression to assess the relationship between human capital measures, 
such as educational attainment level, high school selectivity, and national college entrance 
exam scores, on individual’s occupational choice. Notably, findings show that while 
individuals with advanced tertiary degrees are consistently more likely to choose teaching 
as a career, this relationship is considerably weaker among younger cohorts in recent years. 
For one, between 1988 and 2013, more educated individuals with Bachelor’s degrees or 
above are consistently more likely to choose teaching over both private and public non-
teaching sectors. For another, by separately calculating adjusted probabilities of choosing 
teaching careers for individuals aged 30 and 50 years old, I find that in 2007 and 2013, new 
labor market entrants with advanced tertiary degrees are 4.7 percent and 5.8 percent less 
likely than comparable workers in older cohorts to choose teaching.  
 
To confirm the validity of these findings, I perform additional analyses by substituting 
educational attainment with upper secondary school selectivity and national college 
entrance exam scores as proxies for human capital and worker aptitude. Findings indicate 
that graduates from the most selective secondary schools and those that scored better on 
the national college entrance exam were more likely to enter the teaching sector in 2002 
and 2007, respectively. However, by 2013, workers in both high aptitude groups became 







suggest that workers with better labor market signals or human capital traits have become 
less likely to enter the education sector, resulting in relative declines in teacher quality. 
 
A broad class of existing studies has examined the positive relationship between earnings 
and career attractiveness, and have documented the relative declines in teacher aptitude, 
qualifications, and skills (Vegas, Murnane, & Willett, 2001; Elfers, Plecki, John & Wedel, 
2008; Gilpin, 2012). In particular, Hoxby and Leigh (2004) has shown that the share of 
teachers coming from the most elite colleges have fallen over time in the United States; 
Fredriksson and Ockert (2008) find similar patterns in Sweden that younger cohorts are 
much less likely to choose a career in teaching. Using the case of Chinese teachers, I add 
to this large and growing literature that document the worrisome trend in relative declines 
in teacher aptitude and ability in relation to other sectors. 
 
Main Findings and Discussion for Part IV 
In Part IV, I leverage the availability of a nationally representative panel data containing 
211 matched teachers with information on their employment information, and track their 
career destinations across time. In general, I find that teacher turnover rates are relatively 
high, and there exists positive associations with the level of opportunity wages, and there 
is no obvious evidence on individual non-pecuniary gains from teacher exit decisions. For 
one, findings show that teacher turnover rates are high and evaluated at approximately 35 
percent, of which about half of the teachers exit the sector entirely. The top outside-
education career destinations for teacher exits are “Culture, Sports, and Entertainment,” 







contribute substantively to the current understanding in China on the prevalence and 
magnitude of teacher departures from teaching posts and the education sector. For another, 
I evaluate the degree to which opportunity wage levels influence teacher turnover decisions, 
I find that every 10 percent increase in opportunity wages that teachers face, it is shown to 
be 4.42 percent less likely to remain a teacher. In general terms, I interpret the opportunity 
wage level as a proxy for how much teachers are valued in relation to a comparable worker 
in a specific geographic locality. Therefore, the less value a community has for teachers, 
the higher the likelihood of teacher turnover. Finally, I conduct an explorative analysis on 
whether there are non-pecuniary benefits for those who leave teaching, and there is no 
evidence to suggest that there exist substantive differences on non-pecuniary benefits to 
teacher job switching. 
 
The issue of teacher turnover is a crucial component of occupational choice and holds the 
key in broader retention efforts. In particular, Chingos and West (2009) have shown that 
more effective teachers are more likely to receive higher pay when they depart from 
education, but do not when they remain as teachers. Other scholars have examined the 
importance of non-pecuniary factors, such as working conditions and workload, and 
stipulate that they are also important for teacher retention (Ingersoll, 2003; Guarino, 
Santibanez, & Daley, 2006). Accordingly, findings in this dissertation provide some new 
evidence on alternative careers, opportunity wages, and non-pecuniary effects of teacher 
turnover that are more consistent with existing studies which have highlighted the 
intertwined relationship between pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors on teacher 







needed to untangle the overlay between wage levels and social prestige, among other 
occupationally important non-pecuniary factors. 
 
Policy Implications 
As China continues to modernize its education system and address equity concerns in its 
education development, findings presented in this dissertation point to several important 
policy considerations regarding existing teacher recruitment and retention policies and 
practices. Most strikingly, the analysis gathered evidence in underscoring the consequences 
of holding teacher wage levels back, which affects teacher occupational choice, 
instructional quality, and student learning outcomes.  
 
As shown in Part I, the student achievement gains from having more capable teachers are 
non-trivial and can be reasonably expected to compound over the course of a student’s 
learning career. In particular, there may be substantial returns to boosting ability traits of 
teachers, in the form of increased student learning, especially in settings where current 
levels of teacher staffing and quality is low. The findings presented here resonate with the 
broader national policy focus and discussion on setting teacher quality improvement as a 
primary objective in the “Thirteen-Five” period before 2020 (State Council, 2017, Section 
4). In particular, as shown in Part I, boosting teacher quality by recruiting better qualified 
teachers can lead to close to 10 percent gain in the average learning productivity over the 
course of a typical school year (1 month of additional learning in a typical 9-month 
academic year). Therefore, evidence gathered in this study supports the current Chinese 







makers should continue to realize their commitment to realizing meaningful teacher quality 
improvements. 
 
In addition, Parts II and III have indicated the important relationship between relative wage 
characteristics and teacher occupational choice. The conclusion is straightforward: wage 
policies for teachers need to include meaningful considerations for the concurrent wage 
conditions and developments in the broader labor market, which have been shown to be 
crucial covarying factor influencing teacher occupational choice. In recent years in 
particular, younger cohorts of highly educated workers are becoming less likely to choose 
teaching as a career, which coincides with the rapidly decreasing returns to education/skills 
within the education sector. This may be a worrying from a policy standpoint, if current 
developments are left unattended, because there considerable consequences, both affecting 
the status of the teaching profession as well as influencing the level of student learning 
achieved. To this end, policy makers should rethink existing forms of teacher compensation 
arrangements and develop sustainable wage adjustment practices, especially in relation to 
conditions in the broader market levels, in order to retain and attract bright minds to enter 
and stay in teaching.  
 
Limitations and Paths for Future Research 
It is worth noting that while the methodology and findings from this dissertation are 
rigorous to the extent possible, interpretation of results require further caution with special 
attention to remaining issues not fully addressed in this current study. First, due to data 







differences that exist between urban and rural schools in China. In this vein, the 
complications in teacher quality and occupational choice that arise as result of large 
geographic variabilities cannot be overlooked. As previous studies have illustrated, living 
and working conditions are reasonably expected to influence teacher occupational 
decisions through compensating wage differentials, which are important factors in 
individuals’ career determination. Therefore, further research on the link between teacher 
occupational choice, instructional quality and student learning is needed. 
 
Second, findings illustrated in Parts II and III are to be contextualized in relation to the 
broader trajectory of development of tertiary education in China. Importantly, tertiary 
education enrollment doubled in 1999/2000 as a result of China’s Higher Education 
Expansion reform, which was designed as a counter-cyclical stimulus measure to delay 
entry of new labor supply, in response to the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis that resulted 
in export contraction and subsequent saturation in the labor market (Che & Zhang, 2017). 
By June 2000, the Ministry of Education announced that the enrollment expansion target 
had increased to 1.56 million students, or a 44 percent gain year-over-year, which was 
observed somewhat evenly across fields and disciplines (Che & Zhang, 2017). To this end, 
the rapid expansion of tertiary enrolment implies that the meaning of being “tertiary-
educated” has changed dramatically for new labor market entrants, as tertiary education 
becomes in abundant supply in the post reform era, which may both impact labor prices 
and quality. Therefore, the interpretation wage differential and entry probability results in 
Part II and III, for the post-2003/2004 period require additional caution because this is 







research in this area is needed to understand how teacher quality and occupational choice 
is affected by educational reforms from both labor supply and demand sides. 
 
Third, there may be concerns regarding the relatively small teacher-panel sample used in 
Part IV, which limits its national representativeness and interpretation of the associated 
results. To this end, if more data becomes publicly available, a longer panel could be readily 
constructed to extend the current analysis and verify the generalizability of results. Finally, 
this dissertation conceptualizes teacher quality using both teacher input and output proxies. 
For teacher output proxies, I utilized student achievement scores on three tested subjects. 
Notwithstanding, there are arguably many other educationally-important teacher outputs 
that is not fully captured in testing, such as non-cognitive skills development, therefore this 
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